

Maj. Willis Wittich, Twenty-first Infantry, to be lieutenant-colonel, May 5, 1902, vice Rice, Second Infantry, promoted.

Maj. William H. W. James, Twenty-third Infantry, to be lieutenant-colonel, May 9, 1902, vice Penney, Twenty-third Infantry, promoted.

COINER OF THE MINT.

Rhine Russell Freed, of Pennsylvania, to be coiner of the mint of the United States at Philadelphia, Pa., in place of Albert A. Norris, confirmed April 14, 1902, and declined.

ASSISTANT PAYMASTER IN THE NAVY.

Gustavus R. Madden, a citizen of California, to be an assistant paymaster in the Navy, to fill a vacancy existing in that grade.

CONFIRMATIONS.

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate May 14, 1902.

GOVERNOR OF ARIZONA.

Alexander O. Brodie, of Arizona, to be governor of Arizona, to take effect July 1, 1902.

COINER OF THE MINT.

Rhine Russell Freed, of Pennsylvania, to be coiner of the mint at Philadelphia, Pa.

SECRETARIES OF EMBASSIES.

Montgomery Schuyler, jr., of New York, to be second secretary of the embassy of the United States at St. Petersburg, Russia.

Craig W. Wadsworth, of New York, to be third secretary of the embassy of the United States at London, to take effect July 1, 1902.

INDIAN AGENT.

S. G. Reynolds, of Billings, Mont., to be agent for the Indians of the Crow Agency in Montana.

REGISTERS OF THE LAND OFFICE.

Francis M. Rathbun, of Nebraska, to be register of the land office at McCook, Nebr., to take effect May 29, 1902.

James Whitehead, of Nebraska, to be register of the land office at Broken Bow, Nebr., to take effect May 25, 1902.

RECEIVERS OF PUBLIC MONEYS.

John Nelson, of Wahpeton, N. Dak., to be receiver of public moneys at Grand Forks, N. Dak.

C. W. Barnes, of Nebraska, to be receiver of public moneys at McCook, Nebr., to take effect May 29, 1902.

Frank H. Young, of Nebraska, to be receiver of public moneys at Broken Bow, Nebr., to take effect May 25, 1902.

POSTMASTERS.

Burt Graves, to be postmaster at Middleport, in the county of Niagara and State of New York.

William H. Bartlett, to be postmaster at Amenia, in the county of Dutchess and State of New York.

William B. R. Mason, to be postmaster at Boundbrook, in the county of Somerset and State of New Jersey.

Frank N. Webster, to be postmaster at Spencerport, in the county of Monroe and State of New York.

George T. Reeve, jr., to be postmaster at Riverhead, in the county of Suffolk and State of New York.

Thomas Dye, to be postmaster at Millerton, in the county of Dutchess and State of New York.

George H. Richmond, to be postmaster at Northfield, in the county of Washington and State of Vermont.

Reuben F. Hoff, to be postmaster at Union Springs, in the county of Cayuga and State of New York.

Edwin P. Bouton, to be postmaster at Trumansburg, in the county of Tompkins and State of New York.

George H. Tice, to be postmaster at Perth Amboy, in the county of Middlesex and State of New Jersey.

Peter F. Wanser, to be postmaster at Jersey City, in the county of Hudson and State of New Jersey.

Edward S. Hance, to be postmaster at Wharton, late Port Oram, in the county of Morris and State of New Jersey.

Joseph F. Naugle, to be postmaster at Meyersdale, in the county of Somerset and State of Pennsylvania.

Walter C. Dolson, to be postmaster at Kingston, in the county of Ulster and State of New York.

Luther M. Whitaker, to be postmaster at Westfield, in the county of Union and State of New Jersey.

George L. Fish, to be postmaster at Woonsocket, in the county of Sanborn and State of South Dakota.

James H. Happy, to be postmaster at Mayfield, in the county of Graves and State of Kentucky.

B. J. Bowman, to be postmaster at Berlin, in the county of Somerset and State of Pennsylvania.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

WEDNESDAY, May 14, 1902.

The House met at 12 o'clock m. Prayer by the Chaplain, Rev. HENRY N. COUDEN, D. D.

The Journal of yesterday's proceedings was read and approved.

CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

By unanimous consent, the Committee on Ways and Means was discharged from the consideration of House Document 293, relating to authority to cover into the Treasury so-called retained bounty fund, and it was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to Mr. TALBERT, indefinitely, on account of important business.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House now resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the naval appropriation bill; and pending that motion, I will ask my colleague from Louisiana if we can not agree on some limit as to general debate?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, I would suggest that we allow the debate to continue during the day without any limitation, and that on to-morrow we may agree upon a limit.

Mr. FOSS. I will say to the gentleman that I would like to fix a limitation to-day if we can. Would it not be agreeable to him to close general debate at the close of to-day's session? Will not that give sufficient time to the other side?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. There are a number of gentlemen on this side who desire to speak, and to close debate to-day would scarcely afford adequate time to meet their desires. I think if we were to continue general debate until to-morrow at 3 o'clock, it would perhaps afford sufficient time and be satisfactory to all upon this side.

Mr. FOSS. How much time is desired on that side?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. About five hours.

Mr. FOSS. Would it not be agreeable to the gentleman to close debate to-morrow at 2 o'clock?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. I have suggested 3 o'clock. We want about five hours on this side.

Mr. FOSS. We shall not use five hours on this side.

Mr. VANDIVER. Will the gentleman permit me a suggestion? I suggest to the chairman of the committee that we proceed as we did yesterday with general debate, and if there is a little time wanted on the other side, perhaps we may be able to get through to-day. Let us proceed to-day as we did yesterday and see if we can not get through; and if not, an agreement can be made to-morrow. The chairman of the committee had two hours and a half yesterday, and perhaps others may want some time to-day or to-morrow.

Mr. FOSS. Then I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that we close general debate at 3 o'clock to-morrow afternoon. I make this upon the suggestion of my colleague, Mr. MEYER.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent that general debate be closed to-morrow afternoon at 3 o'clock.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, I do not want to object, but I would like to ask the chairman of the committee, in view of the statement of the gentleman from Louisiana, that five hours will be desired on the other side, if the chairman of the committee has reserved time enough so that we on this side can have the time we desire. I should like an hour myself, and it seems to me if the agreement suggested is carried out, there may not be time enough. I think there are one or two other members on this side who may not get the time they desire.

Mr. FOSS. I think there will be plenty of time for the gentlemen.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Pending that, Mr. Speaker, I will ask the chairman of the committee if he will allow me an hour?

Mr. FOSS. Oh, yes; there will be plenty of time for the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. VANDIVER. Mr. Speaker, I want to ask the gentleman whether he understands or intends to agree that we shall have five hours of that time upon this side?

Mr. FOSS. There has been no such agreement that that side of the House should have five hours.

Mr. VANDIVER. I understood that each member of the committee was to have an hour of time, if he desired, and I understand it is desired by nearly all the members of the committee; and therefore, unless it is so understood that we can have five hours on this side, I shall be obliged to object.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will admonish the gentleman that

the agreement yesterday was that the time should be controlled by the gentleman from Illinois and the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. FOSS. Do I understand that the gentleman from Missouri objects to the arrangement which has been agreed upon between the gentleman from Louisiana and myself?

Mr. VANDIVER. Not if it is understood in that agreement that each of the members of the committee is to have his hour.

Mr. FOSS. The gentleman from Louisiana will control the time on that side of the House, which is provided for by this arrangement. He can parcel it out as he sees fit.

Mr. VANDIVER. Well, if he is to have the five hours I will not object.

Mr. FOSS. Why can you not leave the matter with him?

Mr. VANDIVER. I will if he is to have the five hours.

Mr. FOSS. If the matter is arranged agreeably to him, why not leave it in that way?

Mr. VANDIVER. I am willing, if it is understood in advance that he shall have the five hours.

Mr. FOSS. I think we can make an arrangement all right to close the debate at 3 o'clock to-morrow afternoon.

Mr. VANDIVER. I shall have to object, Mr. Speaker, unless it is understood that five hours will be allowed on this side.

The SPEAKER. Objection is made. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss] that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union to resume the consideration of the naval appropriation bill.

QUESTION OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, after the omnibus bill had been disposed of yesterday by sending it back to the conference committee my attention was called to a circular which had been distributed yesterday morning to members of this House—a circular signed by a man whom I do not know—whom I never met in my life—Henry H. Smith—an entire stranger to me. Now, with the greater part of this circular I have nothing to do, but I want to call the attention of the House to one part of it:

Nathaniel McKay has stated to me that he paid Representative MAHON, chairman of the Committee on War Claims, hundreds of dollars for campaign expenses and hundreds more for "good will" and services rendered. He has made similar statements as to a few other members, some of whom are not now in Congress.

That is the part to which I wish to call to the attention of the House; as to the balance, I have nothing to do with it.

Now, Mr. Speaker, you will observe the statement of this writer that Mr. McKay told him this. I immediately called Mr. McKay up on the telephone and called his attention to that declaration. After reading the circular this morning, he sent to me this affidavit, which I will read:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

Personally appeared before me Nathaniel McKay, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says: In a certain circular signed by one Henry H. Smith, on page 8, the statement is made by said Smith that "Nathaniel McKay has stated to me that he paid Representative MAHON, chairman of the Committee on War Claims, hundreds of dollars for campaign expenses. He has made similar statements as to a few other members, some of whom are not now in Congress."

I have had no communication with said Henry H. Smith since the year 1898, and have not spoken to him since that time. The last communication I received from him was dated August 30, 1898.

In the year 1898 I was not acquainted with Representative MAHON, and have never paid him a cent for campaign purposes in my life, and have never spoken to him in regard to his election.

In June, 1898, the said Smith wrote me a letter demanding \$200, stating that he would give me full acquittance for clerical services, etc., when, as a matter of fact, he has never rendered me any clerical services of any kind whatever.

On August 29, 1898, said Henry H. Smith wrote me that he withdrew his former request for money, and that he would get a thousand dollars' more satisfaction in another way.

I will read the whole of this, although it does not refer to me:

On one occasion the said Henry H. Smith gave me a worthless check drawn on a bank where he had no account—and that brought up the controversy, and he has been hounding me ever since by misrepresentations.

The circular above referred to is not the only one put in circulation by the said Smith, but he has written books in which he has made false statements with reference to me and to which I paid no attention. He again wrote a communication to the editor of Town Topics, New York, for which I obtained an indictment against him in the supreme court of the District of Columbia.

I could have stopped the whole controversy for \$200. The statements of the said Smith are made for the purpose of injuring individuals having claims before Congress. His statement to the effect that I have paid members of Congress to vote for me is false in every particular, and he has been publishing scurrilous articles against me all over the United States. I have never acceded to his demands.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of May, A. D. 1902.

NATHANIEL MCKAY.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 14th day of May, A. D. 1902.

[SEAL.]

SAMUEL E. TATEM,
Notary Public, D. C.

This same Henry H. Smith sent out the circular which I hold in my hand, headed:

The old musty "iron-clad" claims of 1862-1863.

The "fetich" of the Selfridge board "findings" exposed.

The Treasury to be looted out of \$800,000 in order to give Lobbyist McKay a fee of nearly \$400,000, or 50 per cent.

In regard to this circular I read the following affidavit:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

Personally appeared before me, Nathaniel McKay, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have no interest, directly or indirectly, in any claim contained in the omnibus claims bill (H. R. 5537) now pending before Congress, notwithstanding the assertions contained in a certain circular issued by one H. H. Smith this morning to members of Congress setting forth that I am to receive \$400,000 in fees.

That the said circular has been sent out because said Smith has been placed under indictment in the supreme court of this District for libel by me, the said McKay.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of May, A. D. 1902.

NATHANIEL MCKAY.

In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and affix my seal this 13th day of May, 1902.

SAMUEL E. TATEN,

Notary Public, District of Columbia.

Now, Mr. Speaker, this man says that Mr. McKay told him this story; but Mr. McKay denies it in toto. I do not know this man Smith; he is an entire stranger to me; but I want to say to members of this House that the statement he makes is absolutely false in every particular. Neither Nathaniel McKay nor any living man since I have been chairman of the War Claims Committee has ever approached me in reference to any bills—not even Mr. McKay—excepting as attorneys before the committee. I want to state further that no committee—Congressional, State, or district—has ever contributed a dollar to my election. I pay my own election expenses. I am able to pay them, and I do so.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I have been in this House ten years. This is the first time I have risen to a question of personal privilege. I, like all other men who have been engaged in politics, have been attacked by papers of the opposite side, and attacked by some of my own side; but I take such attacks and make no more ado about them. But a man who will deliberately make a charge of this kind without any foundation—a man who is a stranger to me—and circulate it among members of this House—a man who will do that has a heart as black as the soot in the flues of hell; and I do not care who he is.

Now, as I said, I do not know this man, but I have investigated him. I have been making inquiries of some of the members of this House as to who he is, and I am told that he is a lobbyist, a drunken lobbyist, that he has been hanging around this Congress since he lost his position as an officer of this House; that his life is utterly worthless, and that he is a man who makes it his business to carry his point against anyone against whom he has a grievance, by issuing these circulars.

Like other members of the House, I propose to fight my own battles. As I say, I am a stranger to this man, and I denounce this as an absolute falsehood, and I propose to consult an attorney in the city of Washington before the sun goes down, and this Henry H. Smith will either retract that statement or I shall put him behind the bars. [Prolonged applause.]

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, pending that motion, upon the request of my colleague from Louisiana [Mr. MEYER], I ask that general debate be closed to-morrow at 3 o'clock upon the naval appropriation bill. Is that agreeable to my friend?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. That is agreeable, Mr. Speaker, inasmuch as I have been assured by my colleague that this side of the House will certainly have five hours' time.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent that general debate be closed on this bill at 3 o'clock to-morrow.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, pending that I would like to ask the chairman of the committee if I may be accorded an hour of the time controlled by him.

Mr. FOSS. Yes; and, Mr. Speaker, I ask further that the time be controlled by the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. MEYER] and the chairman of the committee.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois couples with the request the further request that the time be controlled by himself as chairman and by the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. MEYER].

Mr. VANDIVER. Mr. Speaker, on the statement of the gentleman that we are to have five hours on this side I will not object.

Mr. TATE. We already having had two.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The question now is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H. R. 14046) making appropriation for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, and for other purposes, with Mr. SHERMAN in the chair.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that any member of this committee who may speak on the bill be also extended that privilege.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Louisiana asks unanimous consent that any member who speaks on this bill may extend his remarks in the RECORD.

Mr. ROBERTS. For how long is that?

Mr. PAYNE. I object to it, indefinitely.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair was about to say that that was an order that ought to be made in the House, while individual leaves can be granted in the committee.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield an hour to my colleague from West Virginia [Mr. DAYTON].

Mr. DAYTON. Mr. Chairman, in approaching my part of this discussion of the bill providing for the naval establishment this year I do so with a sense of sadness that I can not help referring to. When I came to Congress seven years ago and became a member of the Naval Committee, it had for its chairman Charles A. Boutelle, of Maine. The ranking member on the Democratic side was Amos J. Cummings, of New York. It is a matter of intense regret that during the last year both of these gentlemen have crossed to the great beyond. The past associations with both on the part of the older members of the committee will be cherished for many years to come.

These men, in some particulars alike, in many different, were able, patriotic, and generous, and their loss to the country is a distinct one. In addition to this, within the last ten days the Navy establishment has lost one of its great admirals—William T. Sampson—who has been closely identified with the practical work of building up the Navy. His character, I undertake to say, has not been thoroughly understood by the citizens of his country, but that that character will be understood in the years to come, and that all will recognize that he was a brave man, a true man, a patriotic man, and that he did his duty well, I feel, is assured. Besides all this, in the last year the Navy Department, and this committee in its close relationship with it, has seen its Secretary, John D. Long, sever his connection with it as its chief and pass again into private life.

It will certainly be the pleasure of us all to bear testimony to the fact that there never was a more genial, kindly, or able man in public station than he. Every one of us will recognize his uniform courtesy, his calm serenity, and the ability and patriotic motives that constantly were the mainspring of his conduct. While we regret that this Secretary, one of the greatest that this country has ever known, during whose administration more than half of the naval establishment, so far as its material is concerned, was built up, is no longer at the head of the Department, all of us will rejoice that his mantle has fallen upon the shoulders of one of our colleagues in this House, and we all know from our associations with him that the Department has passed into able hands that will maintain the usefulness and greatness of the American Navy.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in the opening of this discussion I desire to say a few words in regard to the naval establishment and the necessity for it. Ever since the fall of Adam man has been compelled to spend a vast amount of his individual resources and energies in his own self-protection. It seems to me that we do not appreciate how much of our energies are directed in this channel. We build fences around our farms; we build walls around our cities; we build houses for ourselves, we establish law and all the machinery of the courts for the simple purpose of the protection of the citizen.

The man who presumes that the Navy is built up simply for the purpose of giving vent to the savage instinct that demands war and bloodshed makes the greatest mistake possible. We do not build navies for war. We build navies to procure and maintain peace, and the Navy is just as much necessary for the defense and maintenance of the peace of the nation as houses are necessary for the protection of the individual; just as much necessary as police are necessary for the protection of cities.

It seems to me that the saddest spectacle in American history was that one when, under one of its most enlightened intellects, and one of its greatest statesmen, Thomas Jefferson, this country deemed that all the navy it required was a few gunboats to defend our coasts. We soon found the error of that, because in a little while we were paying tribute to the pirates of Tripoli, and it was not long until the cry came forth from the American people that they had millions for defense, but not a cent for tribute. From that moment I undertake to say that the generous sentiment of the great masses of the common people of this country

has been that the dignity, the honor, and the defense of this country demands a strong navy, that will command respect for us as a nation among the nations of the earth.

Mr. Chairman, I listened with close attention and with a great deal of interest to the remarks of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] yesterday evening. The latter part of those remarks was to the effect that this Navy is a costly institution and that it requires large sums from the American Treasury to maintain it—thousands of dollars a day to man and run the ships when in commission. I grant that.

Liberty is always costly. Peace comes at a high price. But when we look back into our own national history and recall the fact, which every earnest, thoughtful man must admit, that the great civil war would not have occurred had we had a strong navy that could have silenced rebellion, and that we would have been saved the \$8,000,000,000 and the countless lives that that struggle cost us, it seems to me all of us will recognize that in time of peace we must make those preparations that will find us strong in time of war.

Men may defend themselves upon the principle that—

He who fights and runs away
May live to fight another day.

But that man may be sure that the day will come when he must fight again, because his adversary, seeing his cowardice and weakness, will corner him some time with the absolute confidence that he can whip him, and he will do it; but the strong man who stands up armed and meets his adversary, and makes him realize that he is ready for that conflict, will prevent the conflict in more instances than one. That is the principle upon which we build the American Navy. It is for the purpose of maintaining peace and not for the purpose of carrying on war. That is the primary object. The secondary object is that if war does come to us we shall be prepared to meet it as a great nation ought to meet it.

Another thing in this connection, Mr. Chairman. When we build up the American Navy it must be with a sense of satisfaction that conditions have changed in this country so that the reasons given by Mr. Jefferson for the building of the gunboats for the protection of this country have passed away. We no longer are under the conditions that then surrounded us. The excuse for no Navy in those days was the fact of the limited revenues of this country and the burden of taxation upon the people.

In this day and generation it is not a question of how we shall raise revenue, but the question is, How shall we decrease the revenues that are so remarkable as to command the attention of the nations of the earth? The man who stands up on the floor of this House to proclaim that the money expended in the erection of a naval defense for this country and for its commerce is a burden upon the pocketbooks of the people of this great land of ours simply makes a statement that is laughed at by a people who are the most prosperous, and who have the most money to expend in the necessities, luxuries, and extravagances, if you please, of life of any nation in the world.

Then, too, Mr. Chairman, I want to call your attention to another thing in relation to this work of building up the American Navy, and it, too, brings gratitude to every American heart. When we started this work under Thomas Jefferson we did not have a single shipyard in this country, and the work had to be done in foreign shipyards. At this time there is not a bolt that enters into our great battle ships, or any of our ships, if you please, the material for which does not come from American soil. It is forged in American furnaces and nailed home by the hand of American laboring men.

Every dollar, therefore, that we expend in this work is not lost, but it is simply an investment of the revenues of this country for the beneficial purpose of establishing its peace, maintaining its dignity, protecting its commerce, and giving it a proper standing among the nations of the world. [Applause.] Under these circumstances, gentlemen, I ask you if there can be any excuse for the carping, criticising cry that it is going to cost dollars and cents to do this.

When we entered on the Spanish war the Navy of the United States was scarcely known among many of the nations of the world. We were called by the Spaniards "a nation of shopkeepers;" and it was supposed that they could send their fleet of torpedo boats over to this country, rake our coasts, and bring us absolutely to our knees. Spain found out the mistake of that. Over in the Philippine Islands, at Manila, the old atlases that were used in the schools pictured the American Republic as the size of your hand, while the Spanish dominions were made to appear as big as the side of a wall.

We do not bear in mind frequently, gentlemen, that in the history of this country there are two triumphs that have come to us. For years the agricultural growth of this country was phenomenal. Cotton was king. We triumphed in agriculture. We raised more

products from the soil than any other nation in the world. Then we advanced in the manufacturing industries. Iron became king. And in the last few years we have turned the balance of trade in our favor, and we are recognized as the greatest manufacturing country on earth.

Every thoughtful man will realize that there is yet another victory that must come to the American Republic, and that victory must be when our commerce shall be, not supreme, but dominant upon the seas, and when our Navy must go to protect it, and when the United States must be first in agriculture, first in manufacturing, and first in commerce. [Applause.] We can no more expect to defend that or build it up without the strong arm of the law in its representative by the naval power than we can expect to prepare our cotton without the cotton gin, cut the wheat of the Northwest without the reaper, or raise corn without the hoe. Another thing, gentlemen, I want to call your attention to.

The world's history shows that in wars, contests—I think there is no great exception—the victories have followed the banner of that nation which controlled the sea power. Hannibal would have conquered Rome had he controlled the narrow neck of water that separated his country from that of his adversary, so that he could have made his transportation of provisions and men without that long trip across the mountains that so weakened his forces.

Napoleon would have accomplished his gigantic ambitions and rearranged the map of Europe, he would have achieved success instead of sinking all at Waterloo, if it had not been for Nelson's victory at Trafalgar; and the great civil war of this country might have had a different issue had it not been for the *Monitor* and the sea power of the North that closed up the South Atlantic and finally the Mississippi River, shutting off all supplies. So it is with all historic incidents.

So my appeal to-day, gentlemen, in behalf of this bill is for us not to consider, not to spend our time upon the mere criticising, carping idea that we are to cut down the naval establishment to save dollars and cents. Let us look at it from the broader and more patriotic standpoint that it is our duty to keep step with the progress of this nation; that it is our duty in this particular bill to build up this Navy, not as a means of war, but as a means of defense.

I want to say in behalf of this naval appropriation bill that I have never seen the care and attention given to any one of these measures that has been given to this one. It has been gone over in the subcommittee and in the full committee four different times. Every item in it has been carefully and earnestly scrutinized and considered. So far as I know, so far as I can see and understand, not a single thing that has been absolutely necessary has been omitted. On the other hand, not a single item has been included in it that is extravagant or that should be left out in the general items for the maintenance of this establishment.

I want to call the attention of the members of the House to another thing: There has never been in the world's history—and I challenge any man to deny this statement—there has never been in the world's history as remarkable an example of bravery, honesty, character, integrity as the Navy personnel of the United States from the beginning to this day presents to the world. No navy has such a record.

The spirit of the naval corps stands without a parallel; it stands alone in the world's history. That very thing has kept out of it any corruption. Its organization from the Secretary down has been efficient. Any of you who may have had occasion to communicate with it during the time of war could not but be impressed with how promptly information sought was given to you, and what a contrast there was between the Navy Department and some others in this particular. There is not one of you but what was impressed with the fact of the readiness of this branch of our service for that war and with its promptness when action became necessary.

My friend from Virginia criticises the organization of the Navy Department—the bureau organization. Gentlemen, I want to say to you that men will differ. I have no doubt that he is absolutely sincere in the position he takes. But to show you how far men may differ, I want to make the statement here that I have, after fair and careful consideration of this matter, reached the conclusion that that bureau organization is the very best that could possibly be obtained.

Let us look at it a moment. The Secretary of the Navy comes from civil life. There are eight bureaus, three of them alone coming from the Navy proper; three of them are filled alone by naval officers. They only fill it for a term of four years. Their appointment has to be scrutinized by the Senate of the United States and has to be confirmed by that body. The other five come from the staff division, the Engineer Corps, the construction corps, the Pay Corps, the Medical Corps. These men from these corps are selected from the very strongest and the best men. As I say, their appointments are, like other civil appointments, for

a period of four years and must be confirmed by the Senate. This gives the Secretary of the Navy full control and power over these bureau chiefs.

It is not so in the Army. The Adjutant-General holds his position for life, the other heads of the Army Corps here in Washington hold their positions for life. To a certain extent they are independent of the Secretary of War and therefore he has not his hand on that organization as does the Secretary of the Navy. It is a matter of great interest—it seems to me it is a matter of great importance—that this organization should continue.

Oh, but they say it leads to additional expense, and it brings about conflicts and disagreements. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] refers to Secretary Long's recommendation in regard to the consolidation of three of these bureaus. No man will yield to Secretary Long a higher or more cordial respect or esteem than I do. But I want to say to you gentlemen I disagree entirely with him on this matter, and I have so stated to him. He abandoned any idea of this consolidation of bureaus in his last report, and substantially told us so, and since he has left the Navy, at his home, he has paid the highest compliment that could be paid to any set of men by saying that the success of his administration depended almost entirely upon the efficiency of the bureau chiefs that served under him.

Gentlemen, I would not give a snap for great, strong, earnest, brilliant American citizens in high Government places who did not disagree with each other. Disagreements as to what is best to be done are healthy. These men form a body to whom are referred the great problems of building up the Navy. They meet, they disagree, they talk, they discuss, and out of the whole sum total of their discussion comes the final result, and one of the results has been the finest battle ship that rides on any sea. It has also brought about the closest and most economical administration of naval affairs found among the nations.

It is true the duties of bureau chiefs will run once in a while close together, but ordinarily they are very wide apart. Do you not think that a man who has given his attention to steam engineering all his life is better able to tell and be held responsible, if you please, for the engines and machinery that enter into these great battle ships? Do you not think a man like George W. Melville, who made it his life study, is better able to determine upon the engineering subjects than a line officer who has had no experience of any kind or character?

Do not you think a man like Royal B. Bradford, who has made a life study of the questions of electricity, of questions of equipping naval vessels, would be better able to equip these vessels than a constructor whose whole life has been devoted simply to the study of the manufacture of hulls of vessels? And when you bring three experts together side by side, would you not rather trust their combined judgment than that of any single one of them? I say that, on this question of bureau organization, it is the three experts in their separate lines whose joint judgment is to be preferred rather than that of one man.

Then I insist on another thing. I insist that never do we want to put \$30,000,000 or \$40,000,000 of the Government money into the hands or under the administration of one man. One man would not be able to even answer the letters that would come to him in a single day in connection with the management of affairs so vast.

So much for this statement of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] as to the great extravagance and other great evils which, as he maintains, grow out of the bureau organization. In closing my remarks on this subject I want to call attention to the fact that the system which the gentleman advocates was tried and found wanting. In 1842, under Secretary Upshur, the bureaus as then organized were fixed at five.

The works of construction, repair, and equipment were under one head. Constant complaints arose upon the ground that the man who was in charge was not qualified for these separate and distinct duties. So in 1863, under Secretary Welles, and upon his recommendation, the system was changed to the present one. The modern system has been universally favored until Secretary Long made the mistake of recommending a consolidation, a return to the old policy that the Navy followed from 1842 to 1862. And the failure of the system, to which I have referred, came, mark you, when the naval appropriation bill amounted to less than three or four million dollars, while now it aggregates \$78,000,000.

I quote from our hearings of last year the statement of Admiral Bradford in regard to this matter, which is so full, clear, and convincing as to set at rest all future consideration, it would seem to me.

MR. DAYTON. I do not know that I asked the question, and I do not know what your views are in regard to it, but there is one other matter which has come before the committee, and about which I asked Admiral O'Neil, and I want to ask you—What is your view concerning the consolidation of the bureaus?

Admiral BRADFORD. I presume you refer to the proposition to consolidate the Bureaus of Equipment, Steam Engineering, and Construction and Repair.

If a careful study of the history of the organization of the Navy Department is made, it will be clearly seen that the present system is founded entirely on the principle of a necessary division of duties, which, in the main, are widely separated, but which must, in the nature of things, approach and possibly at times overlap, and for which specific appropriations are made by Congress.

The present organization has been urged in the past by various Secretaries of the Navy for the reason that it has been found impossible for the duties of the Department to be performed by a less number of bureaus than now exist. Congress in the past has also recognized the necessity for the present system in order that specific sums for specific purposes may be appropriated, with individual responsibility for their expenditure. If the three bureaus referred to were consolidated into one, there would be during the present fiscal year more than \$25,000,000 to be expended by one chief. It is submitted that this is too great a sum to be placed at the disposal of any single individual.

Mr. DAYTON. In your judgment better work can be obtained by having the conference of a number of the bureau heads than could be obtained by following the leadership of one man?

Admiral BRADFORD. Undoubtedly. Of the eight bureaus there are only three now with a military head who are conversant with the duties of commanders of ships and fleets. They are at present much overworked, have immense responsibilities, and probably would soon break down in time of war under the present organization of the Department. In the latter respect I speak from experience.

Mr. DAYTON. Is there any practical ground for the complaint that there is any disagreement between these bureaus involved which has caused friction, trouble, and delay in the work?

Admiral BRADFORD. There are disagreements at times between chiefs of bureaus, it is true, and there always will be disagreements among men who are conscientious, earnest, and ambitious in their efforts to advance the interests of their profession and make an honorable record for themselves. I regard such manifestations as a healthy sign. It is simple enough for a chief of bureau to have no disagreements; he has only to float with the current, as a chip passes to the sea, never to originate anything, and to allow other ambitious men to encroach upon his duties if they wish.

In the meantime his salary remains the same. In this connection I may say that I have always believed it would be wise to have a board of five officers for the purpose of harmonizing difficulties between bureaus, settle upon a shipbuilding policy, and other matters that embarrass the head of the Department on account of a lack of professional knowledge. As for delays in Government work, they are incident to Government methods of accountability in accordance with law. I believe they would be greater if the duties of the three bureaus were concentrated in the hands of one man, not subject to the criticism of others.

Mr. DAYTON. Do not these differences bring out more strongly and more forcibly the ideas?

Admiral BRADFORD. It is a proverb that "Two heads are better than one." It is the custom for the head of the Department to refer subjects pertaining to two or more bureaus to each bureau for an expression of opinion and recommendation. The result is beneficial as, on account of the rivalry between bureaus, the subject-matter is, as a rule, presented from every point of view and fully discussed. This would probably not be the result if considered by one bureau only. I have not discussed the proposed consolidation of bureaus, nor mentioned the subject in my annual reports, for the reason that I did not wish to appear as opposing a measure recommended by the head of the Department. I have, however, positive ideas on the subject, and have considered the matter a great deal in order that I might be prepared to give an opinion as to the wisdom of the proposed change in the organization of the Navy Department, should it be called for.

Mr. DAYTON. I know that, and we have the very highest respect for his views, or at least some of them, about the matter, but we want to get at what would be good for the naval service, and we thought it right and proper to call on you for your judgment; and I suppose you recognize that Congress, after all, is the supreme authority?

Admiral BRADFORD. I do.

Mr. DAYTON. I do not want you to fail to express your opinion—

Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. He may feel better not to have his opinion recorded, perhaps.

Mr. DAYTON. No; we want this. One of the objections made on the floor of the House last time was to "the iniquitous bureau system," as it was called, and if any such statement shall be made this year I want the statements of men whom I have not spoken to about it, but who have, by reason of their great experience, an ability to speak of that with more knowledge than those of us who have to learn such things from just such men.

Admiral BRADFORD. I believe it would be very detrimental to the interests of the Navy if the bureaus proposed were consolidated, and I will give in writing some reasons for this opinion.

During the Revolutionary war and until the year 1789 the Navy suffered many vicissitudes of direction, being at different times under the charge of a "marine committee," a "naval marine committee," a "continental navy board," a "board of admiralty," and "agent of marine," etc. It was universally admitted that these various authorities constituted by Congress to administer upon the Navy lacked sufficient professional knowledge to successfully perform the task allotted.

In 1789 a War Department was created, and both the land and naval forces placed under it. The War Department continued to administer upon naval affairs until 1798, when Congress established a Navy Department. It was stated in Congress, during a discussion of the act, that it was necessary "from a want of knowledge of naval affairs in the War Department."

The Navy Department first consisted of a Secretary of the Navy, a chief clerk, and such other clerks as were necessary. This organization continued until 1815, when, by act of Congress, a board of Navy commissioners, consisting of three captains, the highest grade then in the Navy, was authorized for the purpose of assisting the Secretary of the Navy in the discharge of his ministerial duties and for the express purpose of taking charge of all matters in reference to the construction, armament, and equipment of ships of war.

The Secretary, in asking for a change in the organization of the Navy Department, expressly stated that "the multifarious concerns of the naval establishment, the absence of wholesome regulations in its civil administration, and the imperfect execution of duties, owing to want of professional experience, lead to confusion, waste, and abuse."

The members of the board of Navy commissioners were appointed by the President and subject to confirmation by the Senate.

This organization continued for a period of twenty-seven years and was far more efficient than any previous organization. The mistake was made, however, of requiring the three Navy commissioners to act as a unit, thereby greatly limiting their capacity.

In 1842 the Department was again reorganized. After much discussion and debate a system of seven bureaus (practically the same as at present, with the exception of Steam Engineering) was recommended by the Board of Navy Commissioners to the Secretary and by him to Congress. A bill providing for such an organization passed the Senate and was recommended by the

Naval Committee of the House. The House, however, reduced the seven bureaus to five by combining the Bureaus of Ordnance and Hydrography and Equipment and Construction and Repair.

When the organization was complete, the Department was divided into the following five bureaus: Yards and Docks; Construction, Equipment, and Repairs; Provisions and Clothing; Ordnance and Hydrography; Medicine and Surgery. A captain was made the chief of each bureau, with the exception of Provisions and Clothing and Medicine and Surgery.

This organization was not satisfactory to the Secretary of the Navy, who continued to recommend the seven bureaus proposed in 1842. Secretary Upshur, in discussing it in his report, after it had been in operation about six months, made use of the following language:

"The law for the reorganization of this Department has been carried out as far as it has been found practicable. The advantages of this change in the increased facilities of transacting business and in the concentration of responsibilities are manifest and great. I regret to say, however, that the system is yet very imperfect."

"The bill as it passed the Senate (providing for seven bureaus) would, it is believed, have proved as complete and effective in its provisions as could reasonably be expected of any new measure running so much into details, but the changes made in it by the House of Representatives (combining Equipment with Construction and Repairs, and Ordnance with Hydrography) have produced difficulties and embarrassments in practice which were not foreseen at the time."

"The Bureau of Construction and Repairs, for instance, is charged with the duties of the Bureau of Equipment. It requires a ship carpenter to build or repair a vessel of war; it requires a naval officer to equip her."

"It would probably be impossible to find any one man properly equipped to perform all the duties of building, repairing, and equipping a vessel of war."

"In providing a Chief for the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs the alternative lay between a naval captain qualified to equip and a naval constructor qualified to build and repair. I did not hesitate to prefer the former, and the place is filled by a member of the late board of Navy commissioners."

Owing to the increasing importance of steam machinery, Charles H. Haswell, a navy engineer, was attached to the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs in 1846, and that Bureau continued to perform the duties of the Bureau of Steam Engineering until 1862. In 1853 John Lenthall, a naval constructor, was appointed Chief of Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs, a captain having previously been chief of that Bureau.

In accordance with the recommendation of Secretary Welles and preceding Secretaries, a bill for the reorganization of the Navy Department was introduced in Congress in 1862. Senator Grimes, then chairman of the Senate Naval Committee, in presenting the bill to the Senate had a statement printed to the effect that the granting of three additional bureaus would actually cause "a diminution of the expenses of the Government" and the naval service "be made much more efficient."

The bill passed both Houses and was approved July, 1862.

The new bureaus created were the Bureau of Navigation, Bureau of Equipment, and Bureau of Steam Engineering. This organization has continued to the present time.

It appears, therefore, that the proposition now made to consolidate the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment is one that has been tried and found unsatisfactory. In fact, the lesson to be learned from the changes in the organization of the Navy Department at various times is that expansion and specialization, rather than contraction and generalization, are necessary as the Navy is enlarged.

Since 1815 three officers of command rank have been in the councils of the Navy Department. In this respect there has been no increase, there being the same number now, all captains, but holding the rank of rear-admiral while chiefs of bureaus.

Should the three bureaus be consolidated as proposed, the chief thereof could not even read his mail, and he would be in the hands of subordinates without responsibility.

Figures are often given to prove that a consolidation of bureaus will result in economy by decreasing the number of employees. It is not claimed that an unnecessary number of employees exists now, and it is difficult to understand how a consolidation will decrease the amount of work to be performed.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to say a few words in regard to the character of the Navy that we must build. Let no man deceive himself. As the chairman of our committee said yesterday, let us not get into our heads the idea that the American Navy is a finished product or that we can stand up to-day and boast of its size. No man can say but that the battle ship of the American Navy, side by side with the battle ship of any other country, will stand up equal, if not superior. But when it comes to quantity, we are sadly deficient. We have 10 battle ships, with 8 more building. England has three times that number. So it goes.

The Navy substantially must depend upon its battle line—the battle ships, the armored cruisers, and to a limited extent the protected cruisers, although those protected cruisers are not in the full sense of the term fighting machines; they are simply the messengers of the sea that go quickly from one part of the field of battle to another. I say to you, gentlemen, we are not able to stand up with our battle line against the navies of either France, Germany, or England. And when you take into consideration that Germany, according to her naval programme, will in the next fifteen years double her navy, and that England's navy is already three times as great as ours, and that she is adding to it yearly a great many more vessels than we are adding to ours, it seems to me that it is time for us to look to our battle line.

I deprecate greatly, gentlemen, an idea which has been circulated throughout this country and which we have followed to our sorrow, that there are other machines, mechanical inventions, that will do away with the battle ships. For instance, our attention is constantly being called to one type or another of what are known as submarine torpedo boats—boats that are calculated, according to human imagination, to dive under the water and come up, to send at will their torpedoes right into the bowels of a great battle ship and blow it out of the sea. And from this the deduction is made, "Oh, well, let us get a lot of

these submarine boats, with which we will blow up the battle ships, and therefore it is not necessary to build any battle ships."

Gentlemen, I want to call your attention to the fact that a human being is better able to protect himself on land than anywhere else. When he stands on terra firma he has his full powers and capacities. Put him on the sea and he must necessarily lose some part of his abilities. If, then, you put him into a little narrow space where he is covered up and locked in he is deprived of another part of his power. Now, put him under water, where he can not tell where he is going or what he is doing, or whether he is going to come to the surface or not, and you deprive him of another part of his power. These inventions are mere mechanical inventions, the outgrowth of the human disposition to get something or other that will do in the nature of supernatural or unnatural things.

The great strength of a navy is its battle ship, manned by its trained seamen and its trained officers, who can stand with every faculty alert, protected by the armor of that ship and strengthened by the confidence which comes from its stability. I say that the fighting machine armed in that way is the one that will always do the most effective service. If you could have a battle ship quiet and at rest, and have one of these torpedo boats or submarine boats come under it and get its bearings and inflict its blow, the ship making no defense, then it might be possible for such a contrivance to do damage—to blow up a battle ship. But when you remember that 600 men are aboard the battle ship, that it is moving, that the tides are moving, that the currents are moving, that the men in command are looking out for all these things that may happen, I undertake to say that a submarine boat is in effect of little or no consequence in modern warfare. Every single experiment that the American Navy has tried in regard to these mechanical inventions has practically proven to be a mistake and a failure.

The *Vesuvius* was to accomplish wonderful things. We were to throw dynamite for miles into the forts and blow things right and left. The battle ships, too, were to be destroyed by it. But the *Vesuvius* proved itself in the Spanish war to be substantially of no value whatever. Then we got the ram *Katahdin*, which was to run with a speed that would enable it to cut with its knife-blade front right into a battle ship and destroy it. To-day the *Katahdin* is another illustration of the fact that it was so much money thrown away to gratify the mechanical imagination of inventors who thought they had got something that would accomplish, in a measure, superhuman things.

Now, there is another thing in this bill to which I wish to call attention and consideration of which I ask of the members of the House. We have been constantly building up the matériel of the Navy. As I stated in the beginning, half of the Navy vessels, when you take tonnage into consideration more than half, have been built during the five years of the administration of John D. Long. At the same time we have not been preparing ourselves to man those vessels, and it is an absolute fact that you may take the vessels of the United States Navy to-day and you could not officer them if they were all ordered into commission.

Every single officer taken from every single bureau, taken from every yard, and placed on these vessels would not be sufficient to man them. Why? Simply because no provision has been made for a relative increase of the officers in proportion to the increase of the vessels. This increase must necessarily be made. Some people charge the Navy of the United States with being exclusive, aristocratic, if you please. I want to say to you that the preparation of a naval officer must necessarily be different from that of an Army officer. He must not only be trained in military discipline, but he must be trained in a number of things that are necessary to make up the education of a naval officer.

Under and since the personnel bill he must know all about mechanics and machinery; he must be an engineer; he must be not only a mechanical engineer, but he must be an electrical engineer. Upon these great vessels of war we have the most complex machinery, mechanical and electrical in character, and therefore the officer must be thoroughly conversant in these things. In addition to that he must be an educated man; he must be a lawyer to a certain extent. He must be thoroughly acquainted with the principles of international law, because he does not stay here at home, but he goes to the foreign nations; and when in the foreign ports he is a representative of the Government and must be the arbiter of those questions which arise, not only of courtesy, but also of business and commerce and of the disagreements between his nation and the foreign nation.

Away back yonder, one hundred and twenty-five years ago, Paul Jones, the father of the American Navy, defined what an American naval officer must be. I quote it in my remarks, because while that article was written a century and a quarter ago by the hero that fought the greatest and most romantic battle that was ever fought in the history of the world, a battle that took to the bottom of the sea his flag in triumph flying, upon the vessel that

won it, yet those remarks are absolutely true and define what the character of a naval officer should be to-day.

Mr. TAYLER of Ohio. Will the gentleman just permit an interruption? Did not John Paul Jones exhibit in his diplomatic knowledge and achievements quite as great ability as he did as a naval officer?

Mr. DAYTON. I thank the gentleman for his suggestion. Why, Mr. Chairman, I undertake to say that until right recently no man in American history was worse misjudged or as little understood as Paul Jones. He was a statesman that stood side by side with Washington and Jefferson and Adams, and he made fewer mistakes than John Adams did. He was a diplomat, he was a gentleman, he was a scholar, and, above all things, he was as noble a patriot and as devoted to the flag of this country as any man who ever drew breath in it. [Applause.]

But let me read his letter to a committee of Congress under date of September 14, 1775, referred to:

As this is to be the foundation, or I may say the first keel timber, of a new navy, which all patriots must hope shall become among the foremost in the world, it should be well begun in the selection of the first list of officers. You will pardon me, I know, if I say that I have enjoyed much opportunity during my sea life to observe the duties and responsibilities that are put upon naval officers.

It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.

He should not only be able to express himself clearly and with force in his own language, both with tongue and pen, but he should also be versed in French and Spanish—for an American officer, particularly the former—for our relations with France must necessarily become exceedingly close in view of the mutual hostility of the two countries toward Great Britain.

The naval officer should be familiar with the principles of international law and the general practice of admiralty jurisprudence, because such knowledge may often, when cruising at a distance from home, be necessary to protect his flag from insult, or his crew from imposition or injury in foreign ports.

He should be conversant with the usages of diplomacy and capable of maintaining, if called upon, a dignified and judicious diplomatic correspondence, because it often happens that sudden emergencies in foreign waters make him the diplomatic as well as military representative of his country, and in such cases he may have to act without opportunity of consulting his civic or ministerial superiors at home, and such action may easily involve the portentous issue of peace or war between great powers. These are general qualifications, and the nearer the officer approaches the full possession of them the more likely he will be to serve his country well and win fame and honors for himself.

Coming now to view the naval officer aboard ship and in relation to those under his command, he should be the soul of tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity. No meritorious act of a subordinate should escape his attention or be left to pass without its reward, if even the reward be only one word of approval. Conversely, he should not be blind to a single fault in any subordinate, though at the same time he should be quick and unfailing to distinguish error from malice, thoughtlessness from incompetency, and well-meant shortcoming from heedless or stupid blunder; as he should be universal and impartial in his reward and approval of merit, so should he be judicial and unbending in his punishment or reproof of misconduct.

In his intercourse with subordinates he should ever maintain the attitude of a commander, but that need by no means prevent him from the amenities of cordiality or the cultivation of good cheer within proper limits. Every commanding officer should hold with his subordinates such relations as will make them constantly anxious to receive invitation to sit at his mess table, and his bearing toward them should be such as to encourage them to express their opinions to him with freedom and to ask his views without reserve.

It is always for the best interests of the service that a cordial interchange of sentiments and civility should subsist between superior and subordinate officers aboard ship. Therefore, it is the worst of policy in superiors to behave toward their subordinates with indiscriminate hauteur, as if the latter were of a lower species. Men of liberal minds, themselves accustomed to command can ill brook being thus set at naught by others who from temporary authority may claim a monopoly of power and sense for the time being.

If such men experience rude, ungentle treatment from their superiors, it will create such heartburnings and resentments as are nowise consonant with that cheerful ardor and ambitious spirit that ought ever to be characteristic of officers of all grades. In one word, every commander should keep constantly before him the great truth, that to be well obeyed he must be perfectly esteemed.

But it is not alone with subordinate officers that a commander has to deal. Behind them, and the foundation of all, is the crew. To his men the commanding officer should be prophet, priest, and king! His authority when on shore being necessarily absolute, the crew should be, as one man, impressed that the captain, like the sovereign, "can do no wrong."

This is the most delicate of all the commanding officer's obligations. No rule can be set for meeting it. It must ever be a question of tact and perception of human nature on the spot and to suit the occasion. If an officer fails in this he can not make up for such failure by severity, austerity, or cruelty. Use force and apply restraint or punishment as he may, he will always have a sullen crew and an unhappy ship.

But force must be used sometimes for the ends of discipline. On such occasions the quality of the commander will be most sorely tried. You and the other members of the honorable committee will, I am sure, pardon me for speaking with some feeling on this point. It is known to you and, I presume, to the other gentlemen, your colleagues, that only a few years ago I was called upon in a desperate emergency and as a last resort to preserve the discipline requisite for the salvation of my ship and my fever-stricken crew to put to death with my own hands a refractory and wholly incorrigible sailor.

I stood jury trial for it and was honorably acquitted. My acquittal was due wholly to the impression made upon the minds of the jury by the testimony of my crew. * * * I do not reproach myself, but it is a case to illustrate the truth of what I have already said, namely, that the commander should always impress his crew with the belief that whatever he does or may have to do is right, and that, like the sovereign, he "can do no wrong."

When a commander has by tact, patience, justice, and firmness, each exercised in its proper turn, produced such an impression upon those under his orders in a ship of war, he has only to await the appearance of his enemy's topsails upon the horizon.

He can never tell when that moment may come. But when it does come

he may be sure of victory over an equal or somewhat superior force, or honorable defeat by one greatly superior. Or, in rare cases, sometimes justifiable, he may challenge the devotion of his followers to sink with him alongside the more powerful foe, and all go down together with the unstricken flag of their country still waving defiantly over them in their ocean sepulcher!

No such achievements are possible to an unhappy ship with a sullen crew. All these considerations pertain to the naval officer afloat. But part, and often an important part, of his career must be in port or on duty ashore. Here he must be of affable temper and a master of civilities.

He must meet and mix with his inferiors of rank in society ashore, and on such occasions he must have tact, to be easy and gracious with them, particularly when ladies are present; at the same time without the least air of patronage or affected condescension, though constantly preserving the distinction of rank.

It may not be possible to always realize these ideas to the full, but they should form the standard, and selections ought to be made with a view to their closest approximation.

In old-established navies, like, for example, those of Britain and France, generations are bred and specially educated to the duties and responsibilities. In land forces generals may and sometimes do rise from the ranks. But I have not yet heard of an admiral coming aft from a fore-castle. Even in the merchant service master mariners almost invariably start as cabin apprentices. In all my wide acquaintance with the merchant service I can now think of but three competent master mariners who made their first appearance on board ship "through the hawse hole," as the saying is.

A navy is essentially and necessarily aristocratic. True as may be the political principles for which we are now contending, they can never be practically applied or even admitted on board ship, out of port or off soundings. This may seem a hardship, but it is nevertheless the simplest of truths. Whilst the ships sent forth by the Congress may and must fight for the principles of human rights and republican freedom, the ships themselves must be ruled and commanded at sea under a system of absolute despotism.

I trust that I have now made fairly clear to you the tremendous responsibilities that devolve upon the honorable committee of which you are a member. You are called upon to found a new navy, to lay the foundations of a new power afloat that must some time, in the course of human events, become formidable enough to dispute even with England the mastery of the ocean. Neither you nor I may live to see such growth.

But we are here at the planting of the tree, and maybe some of us must, in the course of destiny, water its feeble and struggling roots with our blood. If so, let it be so. We can not help it. We must do the best we can with what we have at hand.

I hope the members of this House will take occasion, if they have not already done so, to study this statement, the definition, if you please, of what a naval officer should be, made by Paul Jones.

For the reasons given by him it is necessary for us to educate these naval officers. It is necessary that this education be not only a liberal literary education, but an education in all these other things that enter into and make a part of the naval officer's life.

We have a great school at Annapolis, where this education goes on. Necessarily you can not pick up men in civil life and enlist them as officers in the naval establishment and expect them to come up to these high requirements. They must be educated, not alone like the man in one of our ordinary colleges who takes a special course, it may be in law, it may be in literary matters, it may be in engineering; but he must have an education in all of these branches, and, in addition to that, he must have an education in seamanship.

This is the sole reason why the naval organization up to this time has drawn its officers from its naval school. To meet this requirement, because of the insufficiency of officers, we have provided in this bill for 500 additional cadets to be appointed to the Naval Academy. A number of our vessels will be completed in four years. It is confidently believed that this provision will give us from 300 to 360 additional officers.

Mr. HEPBURN. Will it interrupt the gentleman if I should ask him a question here?

Mr. DAYTON. Certainly not.

Mr. HEPBURN. I should like to know how many officers of the Navy are now detailed in the Navy Department here in this city.

Mr. DAYTON. I really am unable to tell you accurately.

Mr. HEPBURN. I have heard the statement that there are 151.

Mr. DAYTON. That is an impossibility.

Mr. HEPBURN. It is?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes; absolutely. My judgment is that there are not actual naval officers detailed in the Department here at Washington to exceed 40 or 50. If the chairman of the committee has an accurate statement, I hope he will correct me if I am wrong. There are a number detailed at Annapolis, who are engaged in instructing the cadets there.

Mr. HEPBURN. How many are there?

Mr. DAYTON. Of course there are not as many there now as there were during the session of the school. I think 51, if I counted rightly, were at Annapolis the first of this year in charge of the school there. A number of those have been detached. In fact, the class was graduated in this month, rather than in June, in order that the officers might be detached and sent to the Philippine Islands, and a number of them have already been sent there.

Mr. HEPBURN. Does the gentleman remember how many cadets there were at the Naval Academy, say, about the 1st of May, at the time of the graduating exercises, whenever they were?

Mr. DAYTON. About 400, according to my recollection.

Mr. HEPBURN. So many as that?

Mr. DAYTON. I think so.

Mr. BUTLER. Is not the gentleman mistaken about that?

Mr. DAYTON. I may be. What is your recollection?

Mr. BUTLER. Between 350 and 375.

Mr. DAYTON. I may be wrong in my statement. There ought to be about 400, but there may have been some vacancies, growing out of the fact that the members of Congress had not their districts represented. I was speaking as to the number that ought to be there, but I could not speak as to the number of vacancies.

Mr. HEPBURN. How many were there in the graduating class?

Mr. DAYTON. My recollection is there were 58.

Mr. BUTLER. Fifty-eight.

Mr. HEPBURN. And 51 officers acting as professors?

Mr. DAYTON. There were 58 in the graduating class.

Mr. HEPBURN. How many professors were there in addition to the naval officers?

Mr. DAYTON. Not very many; I would not undertake to say how many, but not very many. The teaching force is almost entirely made up of officers, and this must necessarily be so, because of the fact that they have to train and discipline these cadets in seamanship and in military discipline, and in the things that make up an officer. I do not undertake to say that my statements are absolutely accurate as to numbers.

Mr. BUTLER of Pennsylvania. Do I understand from the gentleman that any of the recent graduates will be assigned to the construction corps?

Mr. DAYTON. I really do not know.

Mr. HEPBURN. I should like to ask the gentleman another question or two.

Mr. DAYTON. I am very glad to yield to the gentleman, but my time is limited.

Mr. HEPBURN. Very well.

Mr. DAYTON. But I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HEPBURN. The question I wanted to ask is whether the course of instruction there is uniform to all the cadets.

Mr. DAYTON. It is now. It was not so formerly.

Mr. HEPBURN. All cadets have that primary information to put them in the department of constructors?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes.

Mr. HEPBURN. To put them in the department of steam engineering?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes; in steam engineering since the personnel bill.

Mr. HEPBURN. To put them in the department of naval engineer?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes.

Mr. HEPBURN. They are all so instructed?

Mr. DAYTON. They are all instructed alike, I think.

Mr. HEPBURN. Yet only a few can serve in these various departments?

Mr. DAYTON. Simply because the number in the corps is limited by law. For example, the constructor corps so many.

Mr. HEPBURN. Yes.

Mr. DAYTON. The Engineer Corps is a part of the line, you know.

Mr. HEPBURN. Is it wise to educate all in that class, or would it be wiser to educate a certain number?

Mr. DAYTON. I think it is wise to educate them all, for the reason that you can not tell at all until after years of experience has demonstrated what a boy's capabilities will be. That is one reason why I advocated the amalgamation of the Engineer Corps and the line. Some men are in line whose natural predilections would have been for the Engineer Corps. So I think it better for them to be educated for both.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. DAYTON. Certainly.

Mr. SNODGRASS. I understand the gentleman to say that this bill provides for the appointment of 500 additional cadets?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes; in addition to the present law, which goes right straight on.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Will that necessitate any additional buildings or facilities for instruction?

Mr. DAYTON. No; this provision is to be extended over a period of four years. Each Senator is to have the appointment of one cadet, each Member of Congress and each Delegate under the new apportionment of next year is to have one cadet, and the President is to have 24. Under the provision of the bill 125 are to be appointed each year for four years, and the Secretary of the Navy is to determine by lot which ones shall be appointed.

Mr. SNODGRASS. They have ample facilities there now for this additional number of cadets.

Mr. DAYTON. They have ample facilities. We are already expending \$8,000,000 on the Naval Academy in rebuilding.

Mr. KLUTTZ. I want to ask the gentleman if he does not think the provision in the bill for the selection of these cadets to be made by lot should be made absolute? I do not wish to accuse the Secretary of the Navy of partiality or anything of the kind.

Mr. DAYTON. I want to say this to the gentleman: I think I do not abuse any confidence of the committee room when I say that I have given personally a great deal of attention to this matter. To make any such provision as the gentleman suggests would increase the verbiage, and there was some objection made—not here, but elsewhere—to the provision being extended into minute details. The matter, however, was thoroughly discussed with the Navy Department, and that was the understanding, that it would be done by lot, and I supposed that would be satisfactory.

Mr. KLUTTZ. I have perfect confidence in the present Secretary of the Navy, and am satisfied with the gentleman's explanation.

Mr. DAYTON. However, the first year, because the Senate never had any cadets, theirs shall first be taken. Gentlemen will understand that the President's 24 will be divided over the four years, 6 each year, just like the rest of us.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I do not desire to occupy but a moment longer. I earnestly hope, from what I have already said, that we may pass this bill without any material objection on either side. This, it seems to me, when it comes to building up the American Navy, is common ground for both sides of the Chamber to stand upon, and that politics should not enter into the consideration of these great questions. My plea is for the upbuilding of the Navy and for investing American resources in this necessary arm of defense. It is a work that we can all go hand in hand in; and for my part, I would favor a larger increase, a larger building programme this year than provided for in this bill.

But certainly there can be no objection to this programme when it is remembered that we have, with two small exceptions, two gunboats provided only for the vessels that the last Congress directed the Department to prepare and report plans and specifications for. We built none last year, and we certainly ought to have no objections to the building of these four this year. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, if I have any time remaining, I yield it back to the chairman of the committee.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

The committee informally rose; and Mr. BUTLER having taken the chair as Speaker pro tempore, a message from the Senate, by Mr. PARKINSON, its reading clerk, announced that the Senate had passed joint resolution of the following title; in which the concurrence of the House was requested:

Joint resolution (S. R. 99) fixing the time when certain provisions of the Indian appropriation act for the year ending June 30, 1903, shall take effect.

The message also announced that the Senate had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13996) making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service in the Republic of Cuba.

The message also announced that the Senate had further insisted upon the amendments to the bill (H. R. 8587) for the allowance of certain claims for stores and supplies reported by the Court of Claims under the provisions of the act approved March 3, 1883, and commonly known as the "Bowman Act," disagreed to by the House of Representatives, had agreed to the further conference asked by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and had appointed Mr. WARREN, Mr. TELLER, and Mr. MASON as the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed without amendment the following resolution:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring). That there be 6,000 additional copies of the report of the Director of the Mint on the production of the precious metals for the calendar year 1900, bound in cloth and wrapped; 2,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives, 1,000 for the use of the Senate, and 3,000 copies for the use of the Director of the Mint.

Resolved. That there also be printed 8,000 additional copies of the report of the Director of the Mint covering the operations of the mints and assay offices of the United States for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1901, to be bound in cloth and wrapped; 3,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives, 2,000 for the use of the Senate, and 3,000 for the use of the Director of the Mint.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed, with amendments, bill of the following title; in which the concurrence of the House of Representatives was requested:

H. R. 13895. An act making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

The committee resumed its session.

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I now yield one hour to the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, this bill will pass, but not until after there have been some efforts made to amend it, because a bill of this magnitude, dealing with so many different items, carrying so much money, can hardly be presumed to meet the ideas of all the members of the House or even of the Committee on Naval Affairs itself. There are many items in this bill that I do not indorse. I have not the time to refer to all the items on which I differ with the majority of the committee.

But, Mr. Chairman, upon an important one I desire to be heard. There is no disposition upon the part of those members of the committee whose views I share to cut down or in any way hamper the Navy Department or the development and healthy growth of the Navy itself. I indorse those patriotic utterances of the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. DAYTON] that he delighted in giving to the House a few moments ago in eulogy of our great Navy. I do not think that he intended to say that anybody on this side wanted to cut down the Navy. I take it that there is not a man in this body who does not want to see the American Navy go on in strength and power, but there is some difference of opinion as to how rapid the strides shall be with which we advance to the final point of perfection.

I do not believe that there is anything in our environment that requires us to undertake to compete with the navy of England in the number of ships or in tonnage. While I believe to-day that we have a better Navy, a stronger Navy, a more effective Navy than Germany, I do not believe the conditions require us to measure our Navy and its strength and its glory by the navy of Germany. Under Germany's programme, which I believe was originally intended to be completed by 1916, but which I understand the chairman of the Naval Committee thinks will be completed by 1908, Germany will then have 56 battle ships. We will have more than that number of first-class machines of warfare by that time, even at a more moderate rate of increase than is indicated in this bill. We to-day have, built and building, 47 first-class machines of war, including 18 battle ships, 21 protected cruisers, and 8 armored cruisers. For all practical purposes a protected cruiser and an armored cruiser is a battle ship, whether you call it so or not. In actual war the protected and armored cruiser is as powerful as the battle ship, in my judgment, and I think naval experts bear me out. These cruisers are about as expensive as first-class battle ships.

I deny that it is necessary to take these immense strides year by year, entailing annually on the people \$30,000,000 expense to increase this Navy, to say nothing of the vast sums for maintenance. The new Navy we already have has cost us about \$250,000,000, and we ought to be and are proud of it.

The 6 new ships, which include 2 battle ships, 2 armored cruisers, and 2 gunboats, provided in this bill, will cost about \$30,000,000. As far as I am concerned I believe we could well do with 1 battle ship and 1 cruiser, and if we should adopt the plan of building annually 1 battle ship and 1 cruiser for the next several years I think that would be fast enough to increase our Navy. European nations living right at each other's doors need to have larger standing armies than the United States; they need to be more readily prepared for war at all times than the United States, and they need greater and larger navies to defend themselves than the United States. An ocean divides us from any powerful possible enemy. Another thing: I believe some of the bureaus of the Navy Department ought to be consolidated. For instance, we have a Bureau of Construction and Repair, a Bureau of Equipment, and a Bureau of Steam Engineering, every one of which pertains directly to the building and completion of ships.

Why should they not be united? Secretary Long, who gave protracted study to this matter, earnestly recommended it. Why, Mr. Chairman, the great reason, in my judgment, why such consolidation is opposed is that the heads of these bureaus and the clerks under them do not want to lose their places, and men aspiring some day to fill these positions want the offices retained. I believe this lies at the bottom of the opposition, because if we were to conduct our business as any man of ordinary prudence would, we would consolidate these bureaus pertaining to the construction of ships, and thus save many salaries. So, Mr. Chairman, I differ with the gentleman from West Virginia on that point.

Another thing: I believe we ought to have more submarine boats, and that we ought to make provision for some in this bill. Ever since the submarine boat has been before the public I have shared the opinion that these boats are the best instrument of defense for our harbors, and I was strengthened in this opinion two years ago by the testimony of Admiral Dewey, who showed the highest respect not only for the effectiveness of these submarine boats, but for the protection which the moral force of their very presence would afford in a harbor.

I do not pretend to quote exactly, but according to my recollection Admiral Dewey testified before our committee that if he and his men had known that there were two submarine boats in

the harbor of Manila, had such boats been there, the men in his fleet could never have carried their vessels into that harbor. The moral and mental strain would have been too much for human nerve. Why, sir, the reason is apparent. Is there a commander anywhere who would take a fleet into a position that meant almost certain destruction to a battle ship or to several battle ships? If a commander under such circumstances should lose a battle ship and with it hundreds of lives, historians to the remotest times would criticize him and he would be denounced throughout the civilized world for doing so reckless an act. I am reminded by my friend from North Carolina [Mr. KLUTTZ] that a late distinguished member of this committee, Mr. Cummings, was an earnest, hearty advocate of the submarine boats. Seacoast cities throughout the land want these submarine boats in their harbors. I have received many communications from Wilmington, N. C., desiring submarine boats for the protection of that city. They can not be procured until more of those boats are in our Navy.

But, Mr. Chairman, the main thing that I wish to advocate for a few minutes is the proposition to build more of our ships in the navy-yards—whether we are to build all of them there or not, certainly to build more than one in our navy-yards.

Mr. Chairman, there are members in this body who kept up with the great fight that was made against the Government paying to private factories exorbitant prices for its armor plate. There were gentlemen then in this House—and, if I recollect correctly, the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. DAYTON] was one of them—who argued strongly against the position we took and in favor of allowing the conditions that then existed to continue, under which our Government would have paid the armor-plate factories \$545 per ton for every ton of armor plate used by our Navy. But some of us on the Naval Committee saw fit to protest against the then existing policy and to advocate a change in the method of acquiring our armor plate.

What has been the result? Instead of paying \$545 per ton—which was the lowest price at which armor plate was then offered to us—owing to the fight that we made for lower prices, although we did not succeed in having an armor-plate factory erected by the Government, yet the Government succeeded in getting armor plate at \$420 per ton, plus the royalty. And by that one struggle made on this bill two years ago the Government has saved something like three million and a half of dollars upon armor plate alone.

As I understand, under the law that was then passed, there have been 37,000 tons of armor plate purchased—purchased at a cost of about \$100 a ton less than these plate factories had demanded theretofore; and that reduced price means a saving to the people of this country of \$3,700,000. We shall hereafter need other armor plate, and we should take steps to get it cheaper, for I believe that \$420 a ton is still too much to pay for it. In the committee I unsuccessfully tried to have a provision incorporated in this bill giving the Secretary of the Navy the power to erect an armor-plate factory.

And now, Mr. Chairman, we contend for the building of more ships in the navy-yards of the Government. We believe it will save to the people of the country more money than the fight that we made for armor plate saved to the people in that direction. We believe that if this Congress will authorize the building of one of these ships to be authorized by this bill at Mare Island, another at Brooklyn, another at Boston, and another at Norfolk, we shall save a large sum of money on these ships, and that the building of these ships in this way will demonstrate to the country that the private contractors have been charging us exorbitant prices for ships; that we shall thus get data which will inform us of the actual cost of ships, and that hereafter, having this information which will be absolutely reliable, we shall be prepared to make contracts intelligently, and if we are going to continue to build up the Navy it will mean a saving of many millions of dollars in the years to come.

The question is whether we are willing to branch out in this line and try to save this money to the taxpayers of the country. We believe that it will be an economical method of building ships; that it will improve the mechanical force and the general efficiency of our navy-yards and enable us to do the repair work for the navy in a more economical manner. We believe, as Admiral Bowles believed before he became connected more intimately with the Administration as head of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, that there are nine reasons which ought to induce Congress to require the building of some of our ships in the Government navy-yards. The nine reasons or advantages which Admiral Bowles gave two years ago when he was in charge as constructor of the greatest navy-yard in the country were these:

1. Maintains efficiency of force and plant.
2. Renders repair work economical and rapid.
3. Will reduce the amount of repair work by removing the necessity for maintenance of force.
4. Maintains a standard of workmanship and design on basis of practical experience.

5. Provides training for those who must inspect contractors' work.
6. No profit to be made.
7. The indirect charges in commercial practice which makes a large percentage of cost are not included, because they are already provided and are maintained for other purposes, viz: Interest on plant, taxes, insurance, depreciation and care of property, large proportion of office and organization expense.
8. Cost of inspection is saved.
9. Cost of trial trip is saved.

These were the nine reasons that Admiral Bowles gave for building ships in the Government navy-yards. I will state also that he gave nine disadvantages in building these ships in Government navy-yards, but he summed it up by saying that in his judgment it was a wise thing to build ships in navy-yards. I quote from his testimony before our committee:

I will say a few words now about the general subject of building ships in navy-yards. I recommend the building of some vessels in the important navy-yards in the United States, because I believe it to be good business, and if I owned those yards and kept them for the purposes they are now kept, I should say it would be a sensible thing to do to build one ship in each important yard all the time simply to keep them in order and maintain a sufficient force ready for all emergencies.

Then he goes on to state what yards he thinks are prepared to build these ships. I will state that in Mr. Bowles's opinion, Mr. Stahl, then the constructor at Norfolk Navy-Yard, and Mr. Baxter, who was on the Pacific coast, as I recall, concurred, all favoring the construction of ships in our navy-yards. Admiral Hichborn also, in his report dated September 29, 1900, being then at the head of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, was strongly in favor of building ships in Government navy-yards. I have his report on this subject, which is as follows:

BUILDING VESSELS IN NAVY-YARDS.

Much has been said both in favor of and against the building of vessels in the navy-yards. The progress made in the improvement of yard plants and the ever-increasing need for a permanent skilled force ready for and capable of at all times taking up repairs of any character which the growth in "matériel" of the Navy entails makes it desirable that the question should be given careful consideration. There is at the present time, in view of the prosperous condition of the shipbuilding industry and the number of naval vessels building and appropriated for, sufficient work to permit the assignment of a portion of the building work to the Government yards without there being a question of the withdrawal or withholding of necessary support and assistance, through work given out, to a private industry, the maintenance of which in a high state of efficiency is unquestionably of national importance.

These conditions make it possible to eliminate from the discussion any questions of policy except such as affect economy and efficiency. It has been the history of all the iron and steel navies in existence to-day that the building of the vessels was at first entirely confided to private industry, and that the existence of the nucleus of a steel fleet made it necessary that the governments who were their owners should themselves provide for repairing these vessels; and that, having provided the necessary plant for this purpose, the provision for the maintenance of the equally necessary though vastly more difficult thing to attain, viz, efficient working organization and adequate efficient personnel, forced them to undertake in their navy-yards a portion of the new building work. The extent to which this is being done by the principal naval powers may be seen by the table below:

Nation.	Number of Government navy-yards in which building is carried on.	Number of battle ships building in Government yards.	Number of armored cruisers building in Government yards.	Number of other cruising vessels.
England	5	8	5	3
France	5	3	10	4
Germany	3	3	1	4
Russia	2	3	1	2
Italy	2	1	-----	2

In the case of many of the European nations—for example, Denmark and Holland, maintaining smaller navies—so strongly is this necessity for a permanent efficient navy-yard personnel felt that practically all the naval building work undertaken by them is carried out at their navy-yards. What they have done and are doing is mentioned here solely to emphasize the fact that the unanimous testimony of experience has been and is that the execution of a certain amount of building work at the chief Government yards is necessary to the maintenance of such navy-yard staffs as a complete and efficient naval organization requires; and that, whatever disadvantages such a course entails, they are more than compensated for in the end. It is believed that we have reached that stage in a naval development—still considerably behind our national development—which forces upon us serious consideration of this step which other naval powers have found necessary and expedient.

At the outset the disadvantages to be labored under will be considerable. Time and experience will do much toward the alleviation or possibly the entire removal of many of these. While, under existing conditions, in the case of the first vessels built in our navy-yards it may be expected that the cost will not be greatly different from—may even be somewhat greater than for—the same work executed by contract in the private shipyards, the Bureau believes that such a course once entered upon would demonstrate its desirability and practicability in an increased efficiency and economy in naval administration, regarded as a whole, without interference with a judicious policy of such Government encouragement of the shipbuilding industry as will keep the greatest number of establishments in a position to undertake and execute promptly any naval work which may be required.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am aware that Constructor Bowles, since his promotion to the head of this Bureau, has modified his opinion. It is not for me to undertake to explain that. I know not how strong the influences, or how clearer the light, or how fuller the information may be that cause a man to modify views that

he entertained before becoming intimate with the Administration. Frequently we have evidences of such modifications. I do not know whether it is simply a change of judgment on the part of Constructor Bowles or a change of desires also.

I suppose I will do him no injustice to allude to a statement that has been published in one of the most reputable Republican papers on the Pacific coast, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, for I have not seen it denied, to the effect that the chief constructor of the Navy has contemplated some day becoming connected with private shipbuilding plants. I know not whether that is true, but if he should have the ambition some day to become the head of some great private shipbuilding concern, then I could see some reason for a change of his heart upon these matters. I could then see why he should want the Government to stay out of the shipbuilding business; I could then see why he should want the Government to continue to buy all of its ships from private contractors. That would account for a change of his wishes upon it. But I do not see that that would necessarily account for a change of judgment on his part.

As I understand, he has stated lately that building ships in public yards will cost 25 per cent more than building ships in the private yards. Now, let us consider that. What are the advantages that a private yard has as to the cost of construction over the Government yard? First, they say in a Government yard we give the mechanics fifteen days' leave of absence. Well, that is true. Fifteen days is what percentage of a year's work? Fifteen days is, I believe, about one-twentieth, which would be 5 per cent. Say that is 5 per cent added to the cost of labor. They say that in the Government yards the mechanics work only eight hours a day, while in private yards they work ten. In other words, the private yard has an advantage of 25 per cent over the public yard. Well, that added to the 5 per cent on the leave would make 30 per cent. Then, there is 30 per cent in the labor.

Now, the labor in the yards that goes into the construction of a battle ship is one-half of its cost, as I am informed; it is so estimated. Then 30 per cent of the labor is 15 per cent of the total cost of the ship. So upon that hypothesis you would find they would contend that the private yard has an advantage of 15 per cent. Now, let us see what they have to offset that 15 per cent. In the first place, by building your ships in the public yards you will have a better product, in my judgment. In the second place, the mechanics in the shipyards will be the best class of mechanics in this country working only eight hours a day, and they will do more work in eight hours than the ten-hour men will do in eight hours.

So that will diminish that per cent in some respects. Then, as Constructor Bowles says, the cost of inspection is saved, and, if my recollection is right, the cost of inspecting one of these big battle ships is from \$50,000 to \$75,000. So that will come off of the 15 per cent. The cost of the trial trip, which is always large, will be saved. That will come off of this 15 per cent. Then, again, no profit is to be made. I take it that certainly a reasonable man, under the evidence, will believe that as a matter of calculation in the cost these private yards can not build their ships for more than 10 per cent less than the public yards can build them. Is there anybody who believes that a private yard has ever yet taken a contract for Government work at a profit of 10 per cent? It has been asserted that private yards have made as much as 40 per cent, and even more; but suppose we assume that the private yards have been making only 25 per cent.

Then, Mr. Chairman, we ought to save at least 15 per cent in cash by building these ships in the Government yards, which will be a saving of nearly a million dollars on each great warship. Let me say that it has been demonstrated in these cards sent to the members of Congress by the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce, which cards, I believe, are in the main correct and just, that the public yards can build these ships just as cheaply as the private yards. But even if we should have to pay the same amount of money for our battle ships, who will get the profits? Why, this great army of mechanics who work in the public navy-yards would get the profits. The profits would be divided among the thousands who labor from early morn till evening, instead of going into the pockets of a dozen owners of private shipyards.

Is it not better, is it not more patriotic, that these enormous profits should be divided among the many, or else retained in the people's Treasury, rather than be given to the private shipowners, when they are no longer beggars as infant industries at our hands? The private yards are running on full time. They have more work than they can turn out upon contract time now, as I understand. They do not come to us as suppliants. They stand erect in their wealth, demanding of this Congress that we do not go into the business of building our own ships, for fear that it may take from them their great profits upon Government work.

Mr. RIXEY. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Certainly.

Mr. RIXEY. In the interesting statement the gentleman has

given us he says that the private shipyards work their men ten hours. Is it not likely that a law will be passed providing that these shipbuilding plants shall only work their labor eight hours upon Government contracts? I understand that the Committee on Labor have drafted such a bill.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. I think the gentleman from Virginia is correct; but, Mr. Chairman, I was arguing it from the other standpoint. Our public yards are no longer in the unorganized state that they were when the *Texas*, the *Raleigh*, the *Cincinnati*, and the *Maine* were built. There is no longer a deficiency in men or in machinery, but they are to-day provided with the best machinery known to the trade. They are located on good water fronts. They have every advantage that the private yards have. This great Government of ours has invested in its public yards something like \$100,000,000, and we turn out four or five million dollars' worth of repairs, when it costs us annually to maintain these yards something like eight or ten million dollars.

As Admiral Bowles said before he became the head of the Bureau, it is good business and it is good common sense to use these great plants that we have, this improved machinery that we have, the vast sums that we are compelled to pay for maintenance, in the interest of the American mechanic, in the interest of the American Navy, in the interest of the American Treasury; and no longer be held off or intimidated from this proposition by the whims and the desires of the private shipbuilders of this country, who, of course, want to continue to make millions of dollars upon the battle ships that we put upon the sea.

The suggestion that all this contest for building ships in public yards came from the Pacific coast and from the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce is not correct. Long before I ever heard of the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce I was in favor of this proposition. Long before this chamber of commerce began to send these cards the minority of the Naval Committee—the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. TATE], whom I see before me; the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY], likewise before me; the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. VANDIVER], the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER], and myself—filed minority views on the naval bill, two years ago, in which we set out at length our reasons for advocating the building of some of our ships in the Government navy-yards.

It was not a new proposition, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen on the other side can not escape from it by the cry of novelty in this matter. It is a disposition on the part of the people to relieve themselves from unjust extortion, as they believe, that is being committed upon the Government by the private shipbuilders. It is a disposition on the part of the people to use their navy-yards, not as toy establishments, but to do the great work that the Government requires. It is a disposition to maintain the navy-yards in a state of efficiency. It is a disposition to be just to the great labor organizations of this country and the mechanics who work in these yards and whose representatives have constantly favored it. This is not a new-born spirit.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that this spirit will grow, that it will increase until Congress will be compelled to adopt the proposition, in my judgment. You can not cry it down by this statement that it will increase the cost 25 per cent. What do we ask in this controversy? We ask for a fair trial of the proposition that we advocate. Give the navy-yards and the labor there employed an honest trial; and then, Mr. Chairman, if the prophecies that we have heard from the other side are true, if it turns out that it will cost 25 per cent more to build our ships in the navy-yards than it will by private contractors, then I for one will change my opinion upon it, and will say let us close the navy-yards against shipbuilding.

I would even go further than that, and would be willing that the private contractors should do our repair business as well as construction business. I do not believe it is good business to maintain this great army of mechanics in the navy-yards and expend vast sums in the maintenance of the plants, and keep vast amounts in plants, if we are only going to do four or five million dollars worth of repair work a year in them. We are asking a trial, and in order that we may have a fair trial we ask that the navy-yards at Mare Island, at Brooklyn, at Boston, and at Norfolk, that have the modern equipment, have a fair opportunity to demonstrate to the country and to the private shipyards that they can build a ship just as well and just as good a ship and build it at just as little cost as any private shipyard.

So, Mr. Chairman, it does seem that when the country has made a saving of over three millions in the matter of armor plate, against the earnest protest of many gentlemen on the other side, and when it is in the interest of the labor of the country, and patriotic members believe we can save more money by building our ships in the navy-yards than we did on the armor plate, Congress ought to yield to this demand and amend this bill so that it will

require not only one ship, but these four ships that are to be authorized in this bill to be built in the navy-yards.

Mr. Chairman, the bill as it now stands authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to build all these ships in the navy-yards, if he thinks it best. If the navy-yards are not ready and prepared, he is authorized to expend a sufficient sum of money to make them ready. The Secretary of the Navy is permitted to build four ships in the navy-yards, but he is required to build one of them in a navy-yard. We have that much in the bill over what we had last year and the year before. Never until this year, since I have been connected with this great committee, have we been able to get any proposition in the bill looking toward the construction of ships in the navy-yards.

Now, there will be a motion to amend, Mr. Chairman, to increase the number of ships to be built in the navy-yards. We want more than one built in the navy-yards. If there is only one to be built the work may be hampered—it may be allotted to the navy-yard which will prove to be not the best equipped for building economically. Now, if you have the four ships built in these four different yards, there will be very apt to be one or two of those yards which would build ships cheap the first time. We would be more apt to have sufficient correct information by building four than by building merely one.

We have now many ships being built in the private yards. We have eight battle ships and several protected cruisers and armored cruisers now on the docks of private yards. So we will know what they will cost ton for ton. Now, let us do the fair thing and have all these four ships built in the Government yards. Build these four ships, so that we will have these four different sources of information as to the actual cost in the navy-yards per ton.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the proposition that I intended to discuss. I believe it is understood that we will have some time under the five-minute rule to discuss this important proposition. I now return to the gentleman from Louisiana such portion of the time that he yielded to me as I have not consumed. [Loud applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, I call for a quorum. We have not anyone to hear the discussion of this important matter. It is an important discussion, and there is no quorum present.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee raises the point of order that there is not a quorum present.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.

During the count.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. I am willing that the debate shall go on, but I want the quorum to be present.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman withdraw the point?

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. No; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will finish the count. [After the count.] One hundred and four gentlemen present, a quorum.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, provision is made in the pending bill for two first-class battle ships, two first-class armored cruisers, and two gunboats. It has been customary to provide that new vessels authorized for the Navy should be built by contract. A departure from the established custom is made in the pending measure. By the terms of this bill the Secretary of the Navy is directed to build at least one of the battle ships or one of the armored cruisers in a navy-yard; and, further, it is made discretionary with him to build in the same way some or all of the other authorized vessels.

In its report the Committee on Naval Affairs states that—

In view of the fact that there is some public sentiment favorable to building ships in Government navy-yards, it has been deemed advisable by the committee to insert a provision in the appropriation bill of this year leaving it in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy to build any or all ships in Government yards, but making it mandatory on him to construct at least one battle ship or one armored cruiser in such navy-yard as he may designate, as an experiment.

It is true that there is not only some public sentiment, but there is a widespread conviction that the navy-yards of this country should be utilized for building purposes. In both sessions of the Fifty-sixth Congress vigorous efforts were made to have some provision similar to that contained in the pending bill inserted in the naval appropriation act. The movement for such legislation was not the result of hasty and ill-considered action. For some years naval architects had discussed the question; other great maritime powers had long since adopted the policy. Conditions that existed in respect to the contracts that had been made for the construction of war vessels for this Government were such that it seemed advisable that the Government should undertake building operations in its own yards, so that a comparison might be instituted as to the character of the work done in private yards, as well as the prices charged therefor.

I may be pardoned if I express at this time my personal gratifi-

cation at the committee's action in placing a mandatory provision in the bill for the building of at least one vessel in a Government yard. For more than three years I have devoted much time to the study of the question. Early in the first session of the Fifty-sixth Congress I became convinced that the wise and proper policy for this Government was that followed by Great Britain and the continental powers. To secure the adoption of such a policy I offered amendments to the naval appropriation bills in both the first and second sessions of the Fifty-sixth Congress which, if adopted, would have distributed the shipbuilding operations of the Government among the private and the Government shipyards. Continued investigation of the question has only strengthened my convictions, and naturally I am pleased to find the Committee on Naval Affairs incorporating such a provision in this bill.

Perhaps it would have been more nearly correct had the committee justified its action not upon the existence of some favorable public sentiment, but upon the widespread and almost universal expression of the existing public sentiment that was brought to the attention of the committee. Exhaustive hearings were held during the first session of the last Congress, to determine the advisability of building at navy-yards. Since then very little additional information has been contributed, and such that has been so contributed is the fruit of individual research and investigation. The diffusion throughout the country of the facts ascertained at those hearings, however, has awakened public interest to such an extent that the question can no longer be ignored nor evaded.

Upon two other occasions in this House I have discussed at some length the advantages and disadvantages of building at navy-yards. Briefly summarized, the advantages are that the mechanical force, the plant, and the shops of the navy-yards are maintained in an efficient condition; that it is possible to conduct the repair work more economically and rapidly; that the Government is enabled to maintain a high standard of workmanship and design, to which contractors can be made to conform; that the men detailed to inspect the work placed in private yards are trained in the most practical and thorough manner to render effective and satisfactory service to the Government; that there is no profit to be made, and the total cost is thereby so much lessened; that the indirect charges which exist in commercial practice and which make a large percentage of the cost—for instance, interest on plant, taxes, insurance, depreciation, care of property, and a large percentage of office and organization expenses—are not included in the Government charges; and that the cost of inspection, which when vessels are built by contract is very large, is saved to the Government.

The experience of the past has demonstrated that if no actual combination of the different shipbuilding plants in the country has existed in fact, that in nearly every instance when bids were invited for vessels authorized by the different appropriation acts an understanding, or, perhaps, a "gentlemen's agreement," had been made regarding the amounts of the bids to be submitted by those estimating and submitting bids. This I will undertake to show a little farther on in my remarks. So that an additional advantage resulting to the Government from the building in the navy-yards of some of the vessels authorized from time to time is that after the policy is once inaugurated it will be impossible for contractors to obtain excessive prices for the building of naval vessels.

It is not my purpose at this time to enlarge upon the advantages to be derived by the Government by the building of some vessels in navy-yards; my object, rather, will be to refute some additional arguments advanced against this policy.

Lately it has been urged with some flourish that the Government yards are not sufficiently equipped for building purposes; that they lack facilities possessed by all private plants doing Government work; that the lack of sufficient water by reason of the narrowness of the streams and other bodies of water upon which navy-yards are located would prevent, or, rather, make impossible, the launching of a battle ship or armored cruiser; that the Government would be unable to adopt the practice followed in all private establishments of purchasing large quantities of materials in the open market whenever the prices were favorable and retain such materials until required in the prosecution of some particular work; that the eight-hour law, under which mechanics in the navy-yards work only eight hours a day, as against a ten-hour day in the private yards, would result to the very great disadvantage of the Government, and that the fifteen days' annual leave which mechanics in Government yards now receive would increase the cost of work in Government yards to an enormous extent.

Careful investigation has convinced me that the only two of the above-mentioned objections that have any merit whatever is that urged because of the difference in the hours that a mechanic works in a Government yard and in a private yard and the increased expense resulting from the annual leaves. In a Government yard

a day's work consists of eight hours; in most of the private yards, ten hours; in some few, for some branches of trade, especially the metal-working trades, nine hours. In my opinion the extra cost of labor in the Government yards is largely offset, if not more than offset, by the profit that goes to the contractor. If a choice must be made between these two, then my choice is already made. I prefer that Government expenditures be distributed among a great number of mechanics for a reasonable day's work than to two or three or a selected few engaged in the shipbuilding industry at the expense of the mechanics employed by them.

While on this point I wish to make one further observation. In estimating the increased cost by reason of this difference in the number of hours that constitutes a day's work, it has always been claimed that the navy-yards are at a disadvantage which amounts to a difference of 25 per cent of the amount paid for labor. This computation undoubtedly would be correct if a man would do 25 per cent more work in a day of ten hours than he does in a day of eight hours.

I have been credibly informed, however, that representatives of some of the concerns which within a recent time have shortened the workday of mechanics engaged in the metal-working trade from ten to nine hours a day have expressed the opinion that the results are so much more satisfactory under the new conditions that they would under no circumstances return to the ten-hour day, so that it is fair to insist that whatever disadvantages the Government yards may be under from the shorter day it can not with certainty be said that it equals 25 per cent of the cost of the labor.

Mr. BELL. May I suggest to the gentleman that the Industrial Commission took evidence in Salt Lake as to the eight-hour workday, and the managers of every coal mine and practically of every metalliferous mine in the State, including the smelters, all swore that they got as much work now from the men in eight hours as they formerly got in ten or twelve.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think that fact is generally recognized.

Mr. BELL. Only one man could be found among the employers of labor who disputed that proposition.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think it is generally recognized that during a fair day's work covering a fair length of time the mechanic or laborer accomplishes better results than in a day the duration of which overtaxes his capacity for work.

Mr. BELL. The manager of the P. V. coal mine, a very large institution, stated that the machines broke as much coal now in eight hours as they formerly did in ten, and the mule drivers took as much out now under the eight-hour system as they formerly did under the other system.

Mr. FITZGERALD. There is another thing that should be considered. There has been pending before Congress for some years a bill to compel contractors doing Government work to limit the day of labor to eight hours. I am firmly convinced that it will not be long before the pressure of an enlightened public opinion will result in the passage of that bill, and as soon as that proposition becomes a law this objection will be completely obviated.

Opponents of the policy of building at navy-yards have placed much stress upon the fact that under the law passed during the last Congress employees in Government yards get fifteen days' annual leave with pay. It is true that under the operations of that law the cost of work done in Government yards is somewhat increased. Under no circumstances, however, can it exceed 5 per cent of the total cost. Besides the fifty-two Sundays in each year there are seven holidays upon which no work is done in the navy-yards. This leaves three hundred and five working days, 5 per cent of which are used for vacations, so that the fifteen days' leave with pay can not increase the cost more than 5 per cent.

This increase, however, is only on the cost of labor, and considering the increase in its relation to the entire cost of the ship, in all probability it does not amount to more than 3 per cent. During the hearings had in the Fifty-sixth Congress, the then Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long, stated that it cost twice as much and took twice as long to build in the navy-yards as it did in private plants. No figures have ever been adduced to support this statement. During the present session, Secretary Long produced a memorandum signed by Chief Constructor Bowles, in which he said:

In my judgment, a vessel built in the navy-yard under existing conditions as to administration, wages, hours of labor, leaves of absence, etc., would cost by the least estimate 25 per cent more than if built by contract.

Until the Chief Constructor gives detailed figures to justify this statement it serves no useful purpose to challenge it. With this statement of Admiral Bowles, however, I wish to place another made by him in November, 1897. In that month Naval Constructor William J. Baxter, United States Navy, read a paper on navy-yard expenses at the fifth general meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers. After the paper had

been read it was discussed by members of the society present, among others by Admiral Bowles, who said:

When Mr. Baxter wrote this paper, he wrote a very moderate and plain statement of the facts as they are to-day. Now, the facts ought not to be as they are to-day. The navy-yards ought to be properly organized, and they can be organized without much difficulty; and, further, I would guarantee that if I had three months to start it I could do in the New York Navy-Yard what can not be done in any organization in this country—I could build ships cheaper than anyone can, and I know it.

Since that time the condition of the navy-yard at Brooklyn, as well as of all the navy-yards in the United States, has been vastly improved. Every year since then large sums have been spent for the purpose of improving the plant and facilities at the yards. If, five years ago, Admiral Bowles could build war ships at the Brooklyn navy-yard more cheaply than they could have been built anywhere else in this country, with the superior facilities that exist at that yard at the present time, including the finest machine shop in the United States, completed since that statement was made, there should be less difficulty in doing the same thing to-day.

In the hearing in March, 1900, the Admiral made the following statement to the Committee on Naval Affairs, which it may be advisable to quote at this time:

I will say a few words now about the general subject of building ships in the navy-yards. I recommend the building of some vessels in the important navy-yards of the United States because I believe it to be good business; and if I owned those yards and kept them for the purposes they are now kept I should say that it would be a sensible thing to do to build one ship in each of the important yards all the time simply to keep them in order and maintain a sufficient force ready for all emergencies.

If the ships are built in that way and under the present system of management, I believe that they will exceed in cost those built outside; but I believe you can fully afford to pay that additional expense for the advantages obtained, and those advantages are fully worth the money that will be paid. That is my general view of the attitude that ought to be taken toward the navy-yards of the United States, but I want it clearly understood that I do not believe in building ships in every out-of-the-way navy-yard that we may have.

Whatever may have caused the chief constructor to shift on this question, or apparently to shift, I have only to say that the statement of no man in this country will be accepted as conclusive upon the relative cost of building in private and Government plants unless substantial reasons are given upon which such opinions can be based.

For the convenience of this discussion I shall consider together the objections that the Government yards are not sufficiently equipped for building purposes; that they lack facilities possessed by all private plants doing Government work; and that the Government would be unable to adopt the practice followed in all private establishments of purchasing large quantities of material in open market whenever the prices are favorable, to be utilized in the prosecution of work then under way or thereafter to be obtained.

Let me call attention first to two letters from Admiral Bowles, dated April 11, 1902, submitted by Mr. DAYTON to the Committee on Naval Affairs. In these communications the Admiral states that with an appropriation of \$175,000 for the preparation of a building slip with overhead traveling cranes and power communications the New York Navy-Yard would be in proper condition to build a battle ship or cruiser. An appropriation of \$225,000 for the Norfolk yard and the Mare Island yard would place those yards in condition to build. In these communications he also points out the condition of the Boston, the League Island, and the Portsmouth navy-yards.

The most effective way to determine whether these yards have the requisite equipment for building purposes is to compare their condition with some of the private yards wherein Government work is under contract. I have in mind a yard which has contracts for five naval vessels. I undertake to say that the facts when stated will excite at least some astonishment. At the outset I desire to emphasize that I have no prejudice against the concern about which I intend to speak at some length. I raise no issue as to its ability to perform satisfactory work. My purpose is merely to show the absolute worthlessness of some of the arguments that have been made against the utilization of the Government yards for building purposes.

The Fore River Ship and Engine Company, of Quincy, Mass., is located on the Weymouth or Fore River, which is tributary to Hingham Bay, Boston Harbor. This company has been awarded contracts to build two battle ships, a cruiser, and two torpedo-boat destroyers. The total of these contracts aggregates \$8,437,000. The vessels that are under contract to this company have all been authorized since March, 1899. If the contentions of those who oppose war-ship building at navy-yards be correct, then the Fore River Ship and Engine Company with contracts aggregating almost eight and a half millions of dollars should be one of the best and most completely equipped shipbuilding plants in the country. It should also be in a position to go into the open market and purchase great quantities of materials whenever the prices are

favorable and retain those materials until work is secured on which they can be used.

It should also be located at a place where there is ample water. I have in my hand a copy of the Saturday Evening Post issued on the 19th of April, 1902. This is an illustrated weekly magazine founded in 1728 by Benjamin Franklin and published in Philadelphia. It has an advertisement inserted by the Fore River Ship and Engine Company, in which the public is invited to subscribe for stock in the company. Let me read from this advertisement:

If you would behold the American spirit in its purest, strongest, and most buoyant phase, catch it on the wing, so to speak, learn the rate at which things under its inspiring influence can be made to happen, and see how truly robust and promising an infant is a shipbuilding plant reared under its guidance at the tender age of 22 months, go to Fore River.

At Fore River two things have been going on—the building of ships and the installing of a plant to build them. Logically, the plant should come first, of course, but as a matter of fact the two enterprises have been carried on so side by side and intermingled that the ships, during the confusion, have managed somehow to come out ahead. This is most distinctly an American way of doing things—to start at nothing, to keep moving at all hazard, and decide upon conveniences and methods afterwards.

No even-minded European could ever proceed in such a manner, yet the scheme is a good one, economical, and not without foresight.

This distinctly American spur-of-the-moment way of getting a great plant together is one of the principal reasons for our being so many years ahead of the rest of the mechanical world.

It seems to me that this statement completely refutes the argument heretofore urged against the navy-yards, that they are not as well equipped as private plants.

This advertisement, however, contains much more instructive information. Let me read again from it:

Work in progress in Fore River Yard April 1, 1902.—Battle ship *New Jersey*, 15,000 tons; battle ship *Rhode Island*, 15,000 tons; cruiser *Des Moines*, to be launched May, 1902; torpedo-boat destroyer *Lawrence*; torpedo-boat destroyer *Macdonough*; seven-masted steel schooner (11,000 tons displacement), the largest sailing vessel in the world, to be launched May, 1902; forgings for steamships now being built in other yards; steel bridge, 800 feet long, over Weymouth Fore River; 75 sets forgings for rapid-fire guns; miscellaneous structural work. The above, with other work in hand, will bring the total amount of contracts up to \$8,907,000.

The company states that its total contracts amount to \$8,907,000. Just a moment's consideration of this statement. The contract price of the *New Jersey*, one of the battle ships building at this plant, is \$3,405,000. The contract price of the *Rhode Island*, another battle ship, is \$3,405,000. The contract price of the *Des Moines*, the cruiser building at this yard, is \$1,065,000; of torpedo-boat destroyers *Lawrence* and *Macdonough*, \$281,000 each, or for both, \$562,000. The total of the Government contracts aggregates \$8,437,000, not including the prices of the 75 sets of forgings for rapid-fire guns.

The report of the Commissioner of Navigation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, shows that by its own statement the Fore River Ship and Engine Company on June 15, 1901, was building no vessels except under Government contract. It further appears from the report that on the 25th of June the company signed a contract to build a seven-masted steel schooner of 6,000 tons, to be completed in February, 1902, and to cost ready for sea about \$250,000.

Outside of the Government contracts, not including the 75 sets of forgings, and the contract for building this vessel, this company, according to its own statement, has not more than \$270,000 worth of contracts. This advertisement goes on to point out that this Ship and Engine Company offers for public subscription 10,000 shares of preferred stock with a bonus of one share of common with every two shares of preferred purchased. The capitalization of the company is \$4,000,000, equally divided into preferred and common stock, of which only \$2,000,000 (\$1,000,000 of each) have been issued.

It further appears that the preferred stock is a 7 per cent stock, and that the earnings of the company have been such that in the five months prior to January, 1902, they have been at a rate of over \$100,000 in excess of the amount required to pay the dividend on the entire \$2,000,000 preferred stock, and this without the advantage of having in the business the \$1,000,000 which will result from the sale of the stock offered in this advertisement and while at the disadvantage of constructing and continuing to complete the plant and works. I hope that no one will think that I am trying to promote or boom this company. Nothing is further from my purpose. I am trying only to point out what "an awfully good thing" this class of Government work must be when this company is able to do all it says with practically no work except Government contracts.

Mr. ROBERTS. This is a Massachusetts company. That is a good thing, too.

Mr. FITZGERALD. It is not surprising that there has been such strenuous opposition to the movement to have war ships built in Government yards. Here is a company able to earn 7 per cent on \$2,000,000 preferred stock and 5 per cent on \$2,000,000 common stock, of which at least \$1,000,000 is water, and at the same time accumulate enough to build its works. It would seem to reasonable men that with plants as well equipped as the navy-yards, the profit on such work, which many have believed

to be quite enormous, will more than offset the disadvantages under which the Government is alleged to labor.

A question naturally arises at this time, which I prefer should be answered by some one opposed to the policy about to be initiated. Until explained, I feel justified in ignoring the arguments that private plants take advantage of the market to purchase large quantities of materials to be utilized at some future time, when other work has been secured.

How does such a company as the Fore River Ship and Engine Company, which is seeking so assiduously for capital with which to complete its plant, find the necessary means with which to make purchases of materials for which they have no immediate and really no prospective use? And this in the face of the fact that it offers a bonus of common stock to subscribers to its preferred stock. It has been my belief that, except in trifling instances, no such practice is followed; and this belief has been strengthened by reason of my inability to obtain any convincing proof of the existence of the practice.

Another objection recently urged with much force is the impossibility of launching armored cruisers or battle ships at the different navy-yards of the country. Of the several navy-yards at which it has been believed there was adequate equipment to undertake building operations that at Norfolk was the one against which this objection was urged most persistently. It was based upon the fact that the width of the body of water on which the Norfolk yard is located was not sufficient to permit the launching of a large cruiser or battle ship. It might be sufficient to dispose of this objection merely by a reference to the statement contained in one of the letters of Admiral Bowles, heretofore referred to, in which he says, "at the Norfolk Navy-Yard it is possible to launch a battle ship or armored cruiser."

This objection, however, may just as well be disposed of now, completely and effectually. Permit me again to refer to the location of the Fore River Ship and Engine Company. Until within about two years the plant of this company was located on the Fore River just below the Braintree bridge. About two years ago the company removed its plant, or rather changed its location, to Quincy Point, at the junction of Weymouth Fore River and Town River.

The annual report of the Chief Engineer of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, states that—

Before improvement Weymouth Fore River was navigable at low water 4 miles for vessels drawing 18 feet, and the least low-water depth 3 miles farther was 3 feet. The existing project, approved by the act of September 19, 1890, and extended by the act of August 18, 1894, is to attain in Weymouth Fore River a navigable channel 6 feet at mean low water for a distance of 7,000 feet, 100 feet wide to near Weymouth Landing—

which carried the improvement beyond the present location of the Fore River Ship and Engine Company plant.

Town River, which sweeps past Quincy Point into Weymouth (Fore) River, is described in the same report as—

a small tidal tributary to Weymouth River, flowing into Boston Harbor. Before improvement it had a narrow, crooked channel with a least depth of 1½ feet at mean low water. The existing project is to dredge a channel 4 feet deep at mean low water, 100 feet wide, and 4,500 feet long to the head of navigation.

Everything connected with this engine and shipbuilding plant, it seems to me, must be most disheartening to those who have relied upon the objections enumerated by me for their opposition to building operations in navy-yards. Of course it is apparent, even to the most casual observer, that this Fore River Ship and Engine Company is not situated at a place where either the depth or the breadth of the waterways upon which it is located can be pointed to with exultation by the opponents of navy-yard shipbuilding. It seems peculiar that so much weight has been attached to this objection. It is a well-known fact that on the Clyde, where some of the greatest shipbuilding plants in the world are located, the river is so narrow that it has been necessary to build a number of turning basins.

If it were necessary to launch a vessel from five to six or seven hundred feet in length endwise into a stream only 100 feet wide, many shipbuilding plants would never be able to place even a moderate-sized vessel into the water. Some of these plants have built their slips obliquely instead of at right angles to the rivers, but the more progressive American genius has not been content with such an arrangement. The *Scientific American* for April 12, 1902, contains an article by Waldon Fawcett on broadside launchings. Let me quote from that article:

The launching sidewise of steel vessels of large dimensions is distinctively an American practice. The development of the idea in its application to vessels of considerable size has occurred on this side of the Atlantic, and, indeed, this is the only country where the plan is followed to any considerable extent. Broadside launchings have always been the rule at the shipyards on the Great Lakes, and of late years have been introduced to some extent in shipbuilding plants on the Atlantic coast.

The side launching is not claimed to have any advantage over the more common mode of getting a new hull into the water, but the adoption of the method has been dictated by limitations in the depths and areas of the waterways which have been available for launching at shipyards where this scheme has been employed. In other words, a vessel may be means of the broadside method be launched into a slip or river so shallow and narrow that the reception of the hull would be practically impossible were it sought to slide the

vessel into the water endwise, as is the custom at yards possessed of a generous extent and depth of water.

Further on in the article it is stated that—

There appears to be almost no limit to the size of vessels which may be successfully launched broadside, as several vessels, each approximately 500 feet in length, have been placed in the water in this manner.

It is further pointed out that at the plant of the William R. Trigg Company, at Richmond, Va., it was necessary to launch into a canal 100 feet in width and not exceeding 18 feet in depth.

It has never been claimed that the constructors in the Navy are lacking in genius, ability, or capacity. They have planned and designed and superintended the construction of the most effective fighting machines afloat, and I, for one, am firmly of the belief that the same genius, the same ability, and the same capacity displayed so highly in those fields in which they have been given opportunities will make just as brilliant a showing in every other field in which they may properly be exercised.

So much for the objection that it is impossible to launch battle ships or cruisers at navy-yards.

Early in the course of my remarks I stated that I believed that I could show that heretofore there has existed an understanding or a "gentlemen's agreement" as to the bids that should be submitted for naval vessels authorized by Congress. Without some such understanding it would be an utter impossibility for such similarity as is found to exist in the bids submitted from different firms. In 1893 the Newport News Company, never having bid upon naval work prior to this time, apparently was not deemed of sufficient importance to be considered. Upon gunboats Nos. 7, 8, and 9, now known as the *Nashville*, *Helena*, and *Wilmington*, the following bids were received:

Bidders.	Gunboat No. 7.	Gunboats Nos. 8 or 9.	Total for 7, 8, and 9.
Maryland Steel Co.....	\$370,000	\$370,000	\$1,110,000
Union Iron Works.....	400,000	350,000	1,100,000
Newport News Co.....	280,000	280,000	840,000
J. H. Dialogue & Co.....	395,333	395,333	1,186,000

Secretary of the Navy Hon. H. A. Herbert, in his report for 1893, speaking of these bids, said:

These bids are very much lower than ever heretofore received by the Government, but before accepting any of them the Department is having all the plans examined by a second board.

The contract was given to the Newport News Company.

In 1895 the following bids were received for the battle ships *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky*:

	One vessel.	Two vessels.
Cramps.....	\$2,820,000	\$5,500,000
Union.....	2,740,000	5,380,000
Newport News Co.....	2,350,000	4,500,000

On their first effort the Newport News Company bid \$270,000 less on three gunboats than the theretofore successful bidders; two years later on two battle ships their bid was \$1,000,000 less—20 per cent of the entire cost of the two vessels—than that of the Cramps and the Union Iron Works. That bid was effective. Competition proved too expensive. A different state of affairs prevailed thenceforth.

I do not care to encumber this speech with too many statistics, so I shall insert for the purposes of comparison only the amounts for which contracts were made for 6 vessels during the year 1901. And, in doing so, I wish to call attention to the fact that whereas in 1895 the difference in the bid of the Newport News Company and the Cramps on one battle ship was about \$500,000, in 1901 the difference is only \$5,000. More than that, the same difference of \$5,000 is found in the bids which they submitted on six armored cruisers during the same year, each receiving two of the vessels and the Union Iron Works receiving the other two.

And for the construction of three protected cruisers the bids of the Newport News Company and Neale & Levy Company and the Cramps were exactly identical, to wit, \$2,740,000, the Union Iron Works receiving a contract for one of the vessels for \$2,825,000. Under the provisions of the naval appropriation act, which authorized these vessels, one of them was to be built on the Pacific coast, providing that the cost did not exceed 4 per cent more than the amount of the lowest bidder. The bid of the Union Iron Works was well within the 4 per cent provision, and the contract had to be given to it. These figures, in my judgment, are conclusive of the existence of an understanding among the different shipbuilding concerns of the country regarding naval contracts.

Mr. RIXEY. Does the gentleman know any reason why the provision giving a differential preference to shipbuilding establishments on the Pacific coast should be continued in the bill?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I understand that it is claimed it has been necessary to get material for these vessels from the Far East; and

in order to encourage and build up the shipbuilding plants on the Pacific coast this differential in favor of the Pacific coast concerns has been inserted. It is in the nature of a subsidy or a bounty or a gratuity from the Government.

Mr. RIXEY. Does not the gentleman think that the shipbuilding plants on the Pacific coast are now old enough to stand upon their merits without any differential in their favor?

Mr. FITZGERALD. After what I have pointed out about the Fore River Engine Company, I think these shipbuilding plants can make a reasonable profit at any place without any such provision of law. It is difficult to imagine what would have happened had the Newport News Company been taken into the arrangement in 1893 and thus avoided cutting the price on three gunboats and two battle ships to the amount of \$1,270,000, which was nothing else than additional profit.

Statement of proposals for the construction of three protected cruisers, Nos. 20, 21, and 22, authorized by the act of June 7, 1900, received under the Department's advertisements of December 1, 1900, and March 6, 1901.

[Class 1—Department's plans. Class 2—Bidders' plans.]

	One vessel.	Two vessels.	One vessel.
Newport News Co.....	\$2,740,000	-----	\$2,741,000
Bath Iron Works.....	-----	-----	2,750,000
W. R. Trigg & Co.....	2,780,000	\$2,740,000	-----
Neale & Levy Co.....	\$2,740,000	-----	-----
Union Iron Works.....	\$2,825,000	-----	-----
Cramp Co.....	2,740,000	-----	2,740,000

* Contract awarded.

Statement of proposals for the construction of 6 armored cruisers, Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, received under the Department's advertisement of October 1, 1900.

[Under act of June 7, 1900.]

Class 1—Department's plans.

Union Iron Works.....	\$3,750,000
Cramp's.....	\$3,780,000
Newport News Company.....	\$3,775,000

* Contract awarded.

I have now exhausted the objections which I stated at the outset it was my intention to answer or to explain away. Two other great objections constantly urged against navy-yard construction is the excessive cost and the greater time for completion of navy-yard built ships. The comparisons heretofore made were between vessels built in private establishments and those built in Government yards at a time when the yards were absolutely barren of equipment. There are some additional considerations, however, which should not be overlooked at this time.

The Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair in his annual report for the year 1901 states that the Department's attention—has been specifically called to the probability of two years' delay in the completion of the 5 battle ships of the *Virginia* class and the 6 armored cruisers of the *Pennsylvania* class.

These vessels had just been begun when the report was compiled, and under the contracts for their construction were to be completed within thirty-six months from the date of the contract.

The reason given for the probable delay is the inability of the armor-plate manufacturers to provide the armor required for the vessels mentioned within the time required for their completion under the contracts.

The chief constructor further points out that the responsibility for such delay rests with the Government and renders it liable to suits for damages by the ship contractors. Members of this House who were in the Fifty-sixth Congress recall that a bill passed this House sending to the Court of Claims for adjustment claims of this character of the Cramps alone which aggregated more than a million dollars. This is an item of expense of very great proportions which would be entirely eliminated from the cost of vessels under construction at navy-yards.

The report of the chief constructor for 1901 further shows that the following vessels were the following number of months behind contract time of completion on July 1, 1901:

Battle ships.—*Illinois*, 3 months; *Missouri*, 17.2 months; *Maine*, 15.5 months; *Ohio*, 19 months.

Protected cruisers.—*Denver*, 3.8 months; *Chattanooga*, 6 months; *Tacoma*, 9 months; *St. Louis*, 6 months; *Des Moines*, 5 months; *Galveston*, 9.5 months; *Cleveland*, 1.5 months; *Milwaukee*, 2 months.

Monitors.—*Arkansas*, 15.1 months; *Florida*, 12 months; *Nevada*, 11.4 months; *Wyoming*, 9 months.

Torpedo-boat destroyers.—*Bainbridge*, 18.5 months; *Chauncey*, 31 months; *Decatur*, 19.3 months; *Hull*, 20.4 months; *McDonough*, 16.9 months; *Perry*, 19.8 months; *Stewart*, 26.7 months; *Whipple*, 19 months; *Barry*, 20 months; *Dale*, 20 months; *Hopkins*, 18.4 months; *Lawrence*, 16.9 months; *Paul Jones*, 19.1 months; *Preble*, 20.5 months; *Truxtun*, 19 months; *Warden*, 19 months.

Torpedo boats.—*Stringham*, 30.4 months; *Blakely*, 22.4 months; *Nicholson*, 23.6 months; *Thornton*, 23.5 months; *Wilkes*, 25.5 months; *Goldsboro*, 33 months; *DeLong*, 22.4 months; *O'Brien*, 23.1 months; *Tingey*, 27 months.

Submarine torpedo boats.—*Plunger*, 5.1 months; *Grampus*, 5.7 months; *Pike*, 5.2 months; *Shark*, 4.4 months; *Adder*, 5.9 months; *Moccasin*, 4.9 months; *Porpoise*, 4.4 months.

This statement shows that 48 vessels have been delayed beyond the time for completion, as required by the contracts, from one to thirty-three months. Under such circumstances the time required for the completion of such vessels under the terms of the contract can not be considered when estimating how long it takes

to build a ship by contract. Reference was made during the debate yesterday to the fact that representations have recently been made to the Navy Department by a number of contractors having contracts for the construction of torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers, to the effect that the contractors will lose more than \$2,000,000 on these various contracts, and that they desire the Government to share these losses with them by paying more than a million dollars in addition to the prices for which the contracts were awarded.

I have seen it stated that at the time these contracts were made naval constructors warned these contractors that it would be impossible to complete these boats for the prices submitted. This has some bearing upon the subject urged yesterday that there is no guaranty of performance from navy-yard-built ships. It seems to have been overlooked that the naval constructors design the vessels in their minutest details, including speed requirements, displacement, etc. They place a limit upon the cost, and not within ten or twelve years have contractors refused to take contracts at prices within the estimates of the naval constructors.

It will not be out of place to call attention at this time to a report made by Rear-Admiral Melville, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, in 1892. It was in reference to the machinery and boilers of the cruisers *Raleigh* and *Cincinnati*. Admiral Melville pointed out in that report that the cost of building the machinery and erecting it on board the vessels would be considerably less than the original estimates on which the contractors had refused to bid as being too low for the amount of work required.

He calls attention, too, to the fact that bids were requested for the furnishing of certain flange plates. The only bid received was for \$81,200. The Department directed that the work be done at the New York Navy-Yard, the result being that the total cost of the flange plates completed was \$51,081.50. Admiral Melville's own words in reference to this matter are worth quoting:

Expressing the above figures in words the Government has obtained these flange plates ready for assembling in the boilers for \$18,418.48 less than was bid for the same work, and has a hydraulic flanging machine to boot.

The flanging machine and the cost of erecting it amounted altogether to \$11,700. This is but one instance of many that might be cited where the Government yards have demonstrated their capacity to compete favorably under any conditions with private establishments.

The chairman of the committee yesterday stated that one of the cards issued by the Chamber of Commerce of Vallejo regarding the value of the navy-yard plants was misleading. No one who examined the card with any care whatever could have been misled by it.

From his own report it appears that the value of the navy-yard plants is about \$80,000,000, and it can not be disputed that the expenditures for maintenance and for improvements at the various navy-yards for the year ending June 30, 1901, aggregate some \$10,000,000, while the repair work done did not exceed \$5,000,000 or, at the outside, \$6,000,000.

These yards can easily be utilized in a manner that will be more beneficial to the Government. With very little, if any, additional expense of maintenance the amount of work done at the navy-yards of the United States can be more than trebled. It is a well-known fact that the machinery of such plants deteriorates very quickly when not used constantly. Unless the yards are to be utilized to their fullest capacity, it is the greatest legislative folly conceivable to continue to appropriate vast sums for their improvement and maintenance.

Great Britain and the continental powers do not build war vessels in the government yards out of any desire to "stifle genius." The policy of every maritime power worthy of the name, excepting the United States, has been to build new vessels in government yards. I have here a statement furnished by the office of Naval Intelligence, which gives the number and kinds of naval vessels building for England, France, and Germany, with tonnage and estimated cost, and showing whether building in government or private yards.

Number and kinds of naval vessels building for the principal foreign powers, giving tonnage and estimated cost and showing whether building in Government or private yards.

ENGLAND.

Class.	Number.	Total displacement.	Average cost.*
<i>Ships building in Government yards.</i>			
Battle ships	9	Tons. 134,350	£1,048,878
Cruisers	10	77,400	662,662
<i>Ships building in private yards.</i>			
Battle ships	7	101,650	976,986
Cruisers	14	143,020	779,141

* As it was impossible to give the total cost of ships building for England, owing to the fact that the estimations for a number of them have not yet been given out, the average cost per ship for those obtainable is given.

Number and kinds of naval vessels building, etc.—Continued.

FRANCE.

Class.	Number.	Total displacement.	Average cost.
<i>Ships building in Government yards.</i>			
Battle ship	1	Tons. 14,865	Francs. 35,236,042
Cruisers	4	47,664	112,132,966
<i>Ships building in private yards.</i>			
Battle ship	1	14,865	36,196,042
Cruisers	4	37,245	91,248,008

GERMANY.

Class.	Number.	Total displacement.	Average cost.
<i>Ships building in Government yards.</i>			
Battle ships	4	45,760	Marks. 83,910,000
Cruisers	6	42,000	73,870,000
<i>Ships building in private yards.</i>			
Battle ships	5	58,840	107,470,000
Cruisers	9	32,700	56,960,000

From this it appears that Great Britain, France, and Germany distribute their building operations very evenly between government and private establishments.

I have never urged that all Government constructions be done in navy-yards. I do not favor that policy now. In my opinion sufficient of the vessels authorized from time to time should be placed in the navy-yards for construction for the purpose of enabling the plants to be maintained in an efficient and economical manner, and as a check upon private concerns. This is not a blow at private enterprise. It will in no way cripple or injure any industry.

Two years ago I called attention to the fact that the Commissioner of Navigation in his report for 1899, after stating that our greatest annual production of ocean steam vessels was for the year then just closed, when it amounted to 43,871 gross tons, asserted that the construction "of 100,000 tons of ocean steel steamships (including those of the coasting trade) in addition to the naval contracts and contracts in other Government vessels on which they are engaged would overtax the present capacity of our shipyards."

His report for the year ending June 30, 1901, shows that the gross tonnage of ocean-going vessels built during that year in the United States aggregated 82,799 tons. The shipbuilding plants of the country are within easy reach of sufficient work to overtax—if not already overtaxed—their plants. The placing of some of the naval work in the Government yards can do no harm to them. It is beyond dispute that three of the Government yards are equipped for building operations, and I hope that all three of them will be given an opportunity to demonstrate their capacity and efficiency in the construction of three of the vessels authorized in this bill. [Applause.]

Mr. METCALF. Mr. Chairman, the bill now under consideration provides for the building, by contract, of 2 first-class battle ships, 2 first-class armored cruisers, and 2 gunboats. The Secretary of the Navy is directed to build at least one of the battle ships or armored cruisers in one of the Government navy-yards, and, in addition thereto, discretion is vested in the Secretary of the Navy to build any or all of the ships authorized by the bill in such Government navy-yards as he may designate. The provision making it mandatory that at least one ship be built in one of the Government navy-yards is a move in the right direction, but, in my judgment, it does not go far enough.

The committee in its report says that there is some public sentiment in favor of the building of ships in the navy-yards, and for the purpose of making the experiment it was deemed advisable to authorize the construction of at least one ship in one of the Government navy-yards. There is not only a strong public sentiment throughout the entire country in favor of building ships in the Government navy-yards, but there is a deep-rooted belief also that the time has now arrived for the Government to utilize its expensive navy-yards for the purpose of building as well as repairing its ships.

The value of the real estate and chattels of the 33 navy-yards and naval stations, according to the report accompanying the bill, is \$71,409,162.21, and of the machinery \$7,559,451.72. The value of the real estate and chattels, as also the machinery in eight of the largest Government navy-yards, is as follows:

Navy-yard.	Real estate and chattels.	Machinery.
Portsmouth	\$3,070,842.05	\$473,896.69
Boston	12,712,149.23	844,925.85
New York	21,306,010.37	1,488,374.99
League Island	3,562,722.56	325,802.68
Norfolk	6,313,919.67	863,164.57
Pensacola	1,781,450.39	134,580.94
Mare Island	5,387,301.86	660,146.49
Puget Sound	941,963.80	255,122.21
Total	55,076,389.93	5,046,014.42

making a total of \$60,122,404.35, practically a larger sum of money than is invested in all of the private shipbuilding plants in the United States. Appropriations are being made from year to year by Congress for the improvement of these plants, and most of the yards are now in a condition to compete, and compete successfully, with any of the great private shipbuilding plants of the United States. If it costs, as it is claimed, 40 per cent more to build a ship in the Government navy-yards than in the private yards, it will cost at least 40 per cent more to do the repair work upon the ships in the Navy; but there is no foundation in fact for this statement.

The *Texas*, built at the Norfolk Navy-Yard, is always singled out as an illustration of the great cost of building ships at the navy-yards, but at the time the *Texas* was built the Government navy-yards were run under a system radically different from that of to-day. The change was just being made from wooden to iron ships. The yard was not properly equipped. Most of the men employed were not skilled mechanics, and many of the men working at the yard were placed there through political influence.

Many of the tools that were furnished to the yard were charged to the construction of this ship. But notwithstanding the lack of experience and of modern tools and appliances, and notwithstanding the great delay, the *Texas* was successfully built, and to-day is one of the best ships in the United States Navy. She cost complete \$4,202,121.49. There is no ship in the United States Navy of the same class as the *Texas* with which we can make a comparison except the *Maine*, her sister ship. The *Maine* was built in the New York Navy-Yard and cost \$275,667.26 more than the *Texas*, but she was a heavier ship, and her displacement was 367 tons more than that of the *Texas*.

There is one ship, however, built in one of the private yards of the country with which we can make a comparison, and that is the *Columbia*. The contract price for hull and machinery of the *Columbia* was \$2,725,000; she cost complete \$3,909,011.26. She was built by the Cramps, and went into commission April 23, 1894. She received a speed premium of \$350,000 and has cost for repairs since completion \$147,449.18. She is now practically in the scrap heap, being used as a receiving ship in the New York Navy-Yard.

The *Texas* went into commission August 15, 1895, and has cost for repairs since the date of completion \$124,682.81. The *Texas*, built at the Norfolk Navy-Yard, is to-day one of the best fighting machines in the United States Navy, while the *Columbia*, built at one of the private shipbuilding yards at a cost to the Government of nearly \$4,000,000, is to-day used as a receiving ship at the New York Navy-Yard. The displacement of the *Columbia* is 7,375 tons and her gross tonnage 5,552.48 tons. The displacement of the *Texas* is 6,315 tons and her gross tonnage 4,050.31 tons.

To make a further comparison we will take the case of the two-turret coast-defense monitor *Monadnock*, built at the Mare Island Navy-Yard, and to which the chairman of the committee referred in such strong terms in the course of his remarks yesterday, and the two-turret coast-defense monitor *Monterey*, built at the Union Iron Works, San Francisco. The *Monadnock* was authorized under the act of August 3, 1886, and the *Monterey* under the act of March 3, 1887. The *Monadnock*, according to Senate Document No. 175, cost for hull, machinery, etc., \$1,526,268.65, and for armor to hull, equipment, etc., \$607,785.83, making a total cost of \$2,134,054.48.

Originally the contract for the construction of the *Monadnock* was awarded to the Continental Iron Works, but for some reason the work was not completed by this company, and the Government subsequently took the uncompleted hull and finished the work at Mare Island Navy-Yard. There was paid on account of the hull under the Robeson administration \$574,490.

When the hull was delivered to the Mare Island Navy-Yard a great portion of the work had to be done over, and it would have been cheaper for the Government to have begun anew. Adding this amount to the figures given in Senate Document No. 175, and we have as the entire cost \$2,708,544.48. From this should be deducted for a set of boilers never installed, \$112,000, making the total cost \$2,596,544.48.

And right here I want to say, in answer to the gentleman from Illinois, that no criticism can justly be made of the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce. It has simply exercised the right that every citizen in the United States has, and that is the right of petition. All the members of that chamber are well-known, reputable citizens. I know them all, and I know that under no circumstances would they knowingly make a misstatement or try to mislead the House or any member thereof.

The figures as to the cost of the *Monadnock* are taken from the report of the Secretary of the Navy as contained in Senate Document No. 175, less the sum of \$112,000 for a set of boilers never installed. Deducting this amount, and it leaves a difference of only \$2.65 between the figures given out by the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce and those of the Secretary of the Navy.

The people of Vallejo are deeply interested in the building of ships in the Government navy-yards. Most of the mechanics employed at the yard reside in Vallejo, and if Mare Island ever gets an opportunity to build a battle ship or cruiser, and I believe that she will, you will find that the mechanics at that yard, even though they work but eight hours a day, will turn out one of the best fighting ships and one of the speediest in the American Navy, and it will be built just as cheap if not cheaper than it could be built in any of the private ship-building yards.

The *Monterey* was built under contract by the Union Iron Works, and according to Senate Document No. 175 the hull and machinery cost \$1,861,232.69. To this should be added inspectors' charges of \$20,000 and the penalty remitted by Congress in 1901 of \$32,823, making a total of \$1,914,055.69. To this should be added the amount paid for armor to hull, gun protection, equipment, trial-trip expenses, etc., \$900,138.37, making the total cost of the *Monterey* \$2,814,194.06.

The *Monadnock* was commissioned February 20, 1896, and the *Monterey* was commissioned February 13, 1893. The gross tonnage of the *Monadnock* is 1,608.26 tons, and the gross tonnage of the *Monterey* is 1,589.74 tons, a difference in favor of the *Monadnock* of 18.52 tons. Up to August, 1898, the time of the arrival of these monitors at the Asiatic station, the *Monadnock* cost the Government for repairs the sum of \$48,658.30 and the *Monterey* \$70,902.34; and from August, 1898, to January 1, 1902, the *Monadnock* cost for repairs \$36,946.96 and the *Monterey* \$75,149.48—a pretty fair showing, especially when you consider that the yard was without modern tools, that many of the men were unskilled mechanics placed there by political influence and under political pressure, and that the appropriations at times were not sufficient to keep the men employed over two or three months during the year.

In a number of instances the navy-yards of the country have successfully competed with private yards for Government work, and in so competing have saved the Government large sums of money. As an illustration I cite the case of the Mare Island Navy-Yard. On October 30, 1885, bids were opened for the removal of the cofferdam in front of the dry dock at Mare Island. The bids ranged from \$39,750 to \$50,000. All of the bids, however, largely exceeded the amount allowed.

New bids were received on November 28 following, at which time 10 offers were made ranging from \$15,000 to \$49,975. The \$15,000 bid was from an irresponsible firm and was rejected. The other bids being excessive, the civil engineer of the yard undertook the work, and did it for \$20,492.19. About the same time a set of boilers was required for the dry-dock pump house. The lowest bid was \$26,200. This sum being regarded as excessive, the boilers were built in the shop of the engineering department at the yard at a cost of \$19,000, or \$7,200 less than the lowest bid.

One of the private shipbuilding yards in San Francisco offered to build a 100-ton pair of shear legs for \$80,200. This offer was declined and the work was done at the yard for \$44,375, including the foundation. And this is not all. The Government was charged, as is claimed, excessive prices for repair work on some of the transports in San Francisco. It was rumored that there was a combination on the part of the private shipbuilding yards, and the navy-yard was called on to furnish estimates.

It was generally known that the yard was to furnish estimates, and when the bids were put in for repairs on the transport *Sheridan* it was found that the Risdon Iron Works bid \$293,000, to do the work in 117 working days; the Union Iron Works, \$291,525; the Mare Island Navy-Yard's estimate was \$289,150, to do the work in 150 working days, and the Fulton Iron Works bid \$285,675, to do the work in 112 working days. The contract was awarded to the Fulton Iron Works, but it took 180 days to do the work, 30 days more than was estimated by the Mare Island Navy-Yard. The difference in price between the Fulton Iron Works and the Mare Island Navy-Yard was only \$3,475.

Subsequently bids were called for for repairs on the transport *Sherman*. W. A. Boole & Son bid \$399,045, to do the work in 90 working days; Fulton Iron Works bid \$390,000, to do the work in 110 working days; the Risdon Iron Works bid \$385,000, to do the work in 100 working days; the Mare Island Navy-Yard estimated \$387,771 if teak was used, and \$351,771 if Oregon pine was used, the work to be done in 75 working days; the Union Iron Works bid \$384,900, to do the work in 75 working days, or \$387,497.50, to do the work in 90 working days. The contract was awarded to the Union Iron Works, and the transport *Sherman* was, owing to a strike in that yard, on the ways for nearly a year before she was delivered to the Government.

Bids were also called for for repairs on the transport *Logan*. The Fulton Iron Works bid \$65,850, to do the work in 90 working days after the receipt of the material; the Risdon Iron Works bid \$69,100, to do the work in 100 days after the receipt of the material; The Union Iron Works bid \$70,337.50, to do the work in 100 working days after the receipt of the material, and the Mare Island Navy-Yard estimated \$33,072, to do the work in 40

working days after the receipt of the material—\$32,728 less than the bid of the lowest bidder. The ship was sent to the Mare Island Navy-Yard for repairs and she did the work within the estimate and within the time specified.

If it is a fact that it costs the Government 40 per cent more to build its ships in the navy-yards of the country than in the private yards, it naturally follows that it must cost the Government 40 per cent more to do the repair work. If this is the case, the sooner the Government closes its navy-yards and allows the work to be done by private contract the better it will be for the taxpayers of the country; but this is not the case, as the figures just given demonstrate.

The mechanics and foremen employed at the Government navy-yards are just as skilled and just as intelligent as those employed in any of the private shipyards, and I bar none. Political influence will not at the present time avail a man in securing work in any of the Government navy-yards. Under the rules and regulations of the Department preference is given to the veterans of the civil and Spanish-American wars and to former employees of the yard in good standing. All persons desiring work at the navy-yards must register, and they are employed in the order of registration.

If upon trial they are found to be incompetent, they are at once discharged, and the result is that we now have in the Government navy-yards an efficient and skilled class of mechanics. The foremen are all under civil service and are some of the best men in the United States. As an illustration: At Mare Island Navy-Yard eight of the foremen were foremen at the Union Iron Works when the *Oregon* was constructed. Many of the mechanics employed at the yard worked on the *Olympia* and *Oregon*, admittedly two of the finest ships of their class in the American Navy. There is no inducement to slur work in the Government yards, and all the work turned out by these yards is of the highest order.

I do not advocate the building by the Government of all of its ships in its navy-yards, but I do believe that the time has now arrived for the Government to build at least some of its ships in its own yards for the purpose of demonstrating that it can build just as cheaply if not cheaper than the private yards, and above all, for the purpose of preventing a combination and consolidation of the private shipbuilding yards.

The bid of the Newport News Shipbuilding Company on the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky* was nearly a million dollars less than the bids of the Cramps and the Union Iron Works. This was before the Newport News Company entered the combination and is another illustration of what competition will do. The Government exacts but eight hours a day from its employees in its yards; the private yards from nine to ten hours a day; and if I had my way I would insist upon the Government inserting in every contract made by it with private shipbuilding concerns a clause that none of the men employed in the building of Government ships shall work to exceed eight hours a day.

All the guns used by the Navy are manufactured in the Government navy-yard at Washington, and the same is true of the guns used by the Army. Until recently the Navy Department paid for smokeless powder 90 cents a pound. The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance recommended the establishment of a gunpowder factory, and an appropriation was made therefor.

The factory was built and experiments were made in the manufacture of smokeless powder. The two powder factories supplying smokeless powder to the Government were informed that unless they reduced their price to 75 cents per pound the Government would manufacture its own powder. The result was that the price was immediately reduced. Numerous other instances could be cited, but to my mind these are sufficient. None but American citizens are employed in the navy-yards of the United States—no foreigner is permitted to work in these yards—and it is a wise regulation.

At the last session of the Fifty-sixth Congress a bill was passed giving to the mechanics and laborers employed in the navy-yards of the Government fifteen days' leave of absence with pay. The private shipbuilding concerns who have been fighting the bill providing for an eight-hour law on all Government work were in favor, so I am informed, of the bill giving fifteen days' leave of absence with pay to the employees of the navy-yards, and are favorable to the bill recently introduced, giving to the same employees thirty days' leave of absence with pay.

The employees of the yards have not asked for the passage of such a measure. All they ask for is steady, permanent employment, and many of them have protested against the bill allowing them fifteen days' additional leave of absence with pay. They would prefer to have Congress authorize the building of some of the ships by the Government in the Government yards rather than to have fifteen or thirty days' leave of absence with pay. England, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia build ships in the Government navy-yards, and there is no reason why such a course should not be pursued by this Government.

Many of the private shipbuilding yards of the country are congested with work, and one yard alone at the present time has 1 first-class battle ship, 2 armored cruisers, 1 monitor, 2 unarmed protected cruisers, 3 torpedo boats, and 2 submarine boats under construction, and on most of these ships a hammer has not been struck for eight or ten months. And you can not point out an instance when any of the ships built in the private shipbuilding yards have been finished within the contract time.

The *Maine* was to be finished June 1, 1901; now 67 per cent finished. The *Missouri* was to be finished August 30, 1901; now 60 per cent finished. The *Ohio* was to be finished June 5, 1901; now about 50 per cent finished. The *Illinois* was twenty-four months over the contract time; the *Indiana*, twenty-four; the *Iowa*, sixteen; the *Kearsarge*, thirteen; the *Kentucky*, sixteen; the *Massachusetts*, twenty-nine; the *Oregon*, thirty-two; the *Wisconsin*, seventeen; the *Baltimore*, fifteen; the *Newark*, sixteen; the *Olympia*, twenty-two; the *Detroit*, fourteen; the *Minneapolis*, sixteen; the *Marblehead*, twenty-four; the *Montgomery*, twenty-two; the *Bennington*, twenty-four; the *Castine*, thirty; the *Concord*, twenty-two; the *Machias*, fifteen; the *Petrel*, twenty-four; the *Yorktown*, fifteen; the *Helena*, eighteen; the *Nashville*, nineteen; the *Wilmington*, sixteen; the *Princeton*, fifteen; the *Davis*, nineteen, and the *Rowan*, twenty-six.

In most every case where penalties have been imposed the penalties have been remitted. Over three millions and a half have been paid by the Government as premiums for excess of speed, but this was done away with some time ago. The building of ships by the Government in the Government navy-yards will give permanent employment, will increase the efficiency of the force, and will greatly reduce the cost of construction as also the cost of repair work. It will give employment to a greater number of men, and the Government will secure better results.

Most of the Government navy-yards are now equipped for construction work; the men employed at the yards are skilled and competent mechanics; the yards are all under the control and management of naval officers.

All work done at the yards is done under the direction and supervision of skilled and eminent naval constructors, and those naval constructors favor the building of ships in Government yards.

The veterans of the civil war, the veterans of the Spanish-American war, the employees of the yards, as well as organized labor throughout the United States, are asking Congress to utilize the Government navy-yards. The arguments, to my mind, are all in favor of the proposition, and I sincerely trust that the bill will be amended so as to make it mandatory on the Secretary of the Navy to have at least three of the ships authorized under this bill built in the Government navy-yards. [Applause.]

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest to my friend from Louisiana [Mr. MEYER] that he use some of the time belonging to that side.

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield thirty minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. GRIFFITH].

Mr. GRIFFITH. Mr. Chairman, I desire to demonstrate that some part of this appropriation should be applied toward enforcing our rights upon the shores of Alaska. As a member of the Committee on Public Lands, I desire to call attention to the fact that Canada has encroached upon our lines and is to-day in possession of a strip of country half as large as the State of Indiana, and that whereas our flag from 1867 to 1898 waved over this section of our domain the flag has now been hauled down by the last and present Administration. Canada has moved upon our territory until she has an outlet through the arms of the sea down to the coast.

This contraction of our domain is in strange contrast to the policy of expansion as now advocated by the Republican party.

Whenever our country has been involved with any other power England has always seized the opportunity to assert some claim against us or to encroach upon some of our territory.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that, while we are measuring our "new possessions" and counting the spoils of conquest, it would be prudent in us to measure our undisputed territory and find out the boundaries of our domain. No farmer would try to fence in his neighbor's land until he had secured to himself the title of his own acres. Is not the United States forgetting the fable of the dog that jumped into the water to catch the shadow of the meat in his mouth and lost hold of the substance in the vain pursuit?

Do we own Alaska, the Alaska which we purchased from Russia at a cost of \$7,200,000 in 1867? This is a grave question. Mr. Chairman, for the answer to it depends on whether we shall be still fighting the Filipinos after England shall have conquered the Boers. If England shall succeed in her nefarious purpose of exterminating the intrepid burghers of South Africa, or, what is more probable, of cheating them by lying pretenses into a hollow peace, while we are still engaged in the business of making a

"howling wilderness" of the Philippine Islands, we may well doubt our dominion over the gold fields of the North, bought and paid for with our good money.

Our miners upon the Yukon and the shores of Bering Sea are crying to us for protection. They are remonstrating against having the British flag unfurled over their homes upon American soil; they are remonstrating against British dragoons destroying ancient landmarks and monuments erected by Russia a century ago; they are remonstrating against British surveyors setting up their theodolites and drawing their sinister angles upon territory which we have held for thirty-five years under a title that has never been challenged, and which Russia had held for forty-two years before ceding the same to us; they are remonstrating against British soldiers, with rifles on their shoulders and caps cocked impudently upon one side, enforcing the laws of England in American camps, far within the American borders; they are remonstrating against the exactions of the British taxgatherer on American soil, an outrage which is aggravated by the tax being four times as great as that levied by the Transvaal Government on the mining Uitlanders, one of the alleged grievances that caused Great Britain to begin the war.

These remonstrances from our fellow-citizens of the Northwest fall upon dull ears. How could it be otherwise? We are busy in the Tropics—too busy to resent insults or aggressions under the Arctic Circle. Will the impudent claims of Great Britain in Alaska be relaxed while the islands in the Asiatic sea demand our attention?

Does the history of England justify the expectation that she will voluntarily abandon any place on earth where her soldiers have once put their feet? The fact that the land belongs to somebody else is of not the slightest consequence to England, except that it increases her avidity in seizing it and her enjoyment in possessing it.

There is no such word as "justice" in her vocabulary; no such sensation as shame in her repertory of emotions. There is no land on earth that conceals wealth or possesses value that is not the object of her covetous desire. If the owner is poor and weak, or if he is otherwise engaged, so that her encroachments will not be resented, or if there be with him "an understanding, an agreement, an alliance, if you wish," England is sure to put in an appearance as the original owner of the property.

As I have said, however, it is not only the poor and weak who are the prey of Great Britain. She also robs strong nations when they are so preoccupied and hampered that they can not successfully resist the plunderer. Not once only or twice, but half a dozen times since the treaty of peace was signed with us in September, 1783, Great Britain has invaded our territory, scorned our pretensions, boldly violated that treaty, and on several occasions successfully deprived us of our own.

Before that treaty the people of all the colonies enjoyed unmolested the right to take fish of every kind off the banks of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and this right was in that treaty guaranteed and confirmed anew; but it has been denied ever since pugnaciously and almost to the point of war.

By the treaty of 1783 it was supposed that we had settled with Great Britain and obtained release from her exactions. But before a score of years had passed she required to be conciliated, held up her platter again and made new demands, and in 1802 we were compelled to pay her \$3,000,000 to satisfy alleged claims of alleged individuals who asserted that they were "loyal subjects" and had lost property during the Revolution.

By the treaty of 1783 the northeastern boundary of the United States was drawn from the headwaters of the St. Croix River to the Highlands and along the said Highlands, which became the watershed between the St. Lawrence River and the Atlantic, to the source of the Connecticut River. For more than a generation this was construed literally and the maps made in both England and America ran the boundary line up nearly to the St. Lawrence River, and included much of what is now Canada and New Brunswick.

Presently John Bull cast a greedy eye upon this region and formally insisted that our boundary should be contracted. The demand was resisted. The contention went on for many years till finally, in 1842, when the quarrel had become chronic and was verging upon hostilities, the British minister, Lord Ashburton, and our Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, came to an agreement. The incidents which led up to this agreement are obscure. They both lived on Lafayette square, and were near neighbors. They dined together often. They were generous livers, sometimes too generous.

The net result was that Great Britain was conciliated again. America surrendered 7,500 square miles of land—a territory nearly as large as the State of New Jersey. There was never any justice in this transaction. There was never any claim that it was not within the "Highlands." For sixty years the children of Eng-

land and the United States had studied geography on maps which included this territory within the United States, and after the surrender was made one of these old maps was found in the British Museum by Lord Brougham, bearing in the handwriting of George III the words, "This belongs to the United States." But England was "conciliated."

By this time our northwestern boundary had become involved. The United States claimed to own Oregon Territory, and this territory was held to extend for 500 miles above Puget Sound, joining the Russian province of Alaska. In the "treaty of amity and limits" concluded and ratified in 1821, Spain had formally quitclaimed to the United States all her rights to this territory. We had sent Lewis and Clarke thither, had established the town of Astoria, and had built forts upon the Columbia. Our vessels had traded upon its coasts as far north as Sitka.

But England, which had never acquired any right to the territory, except such as a few wandering half-breed hunters and fishers could bestow, now demanded again to be "conciliated." It was an auspicious moment. Texas had been admitted into the Union, and General Taylor was sent to the Rio Grande. Just then Packenham appeared upon the scene, bristling with demands. The United States Army was across the Mexican border; this was Great Britain's hour.

The American people raised the wild cry of "Fifty-four forty or fight," 54° 40' being the southern line of Russian Alaska. But the cry was untimely. We could not fight two nations at once, and Great Britain knew it. She therefore made a peremptory demand and our Secretary of State was compelled to concede it in the name of peace.

For two generations American maps and school atlases had marked as our own this vast territory north of Puget Sound, as large as the present States of Oregon and Washington together; but Packenham persisted in his peremptory requirement that the American flag should be hauled down wherever it was floating over this great empire of the Northwest, accompanied by the implied alternative threat that a brigade of British troops would be landed in Portland.

The American Government made peace. It hauled down its flag wherever it was unfurled north of Vancouver, between the ocean and the Rocky Mountains. This treaty, ratified under the menace of war, transferred to Great Britain the most of that region now known as British Columbia—not less than 160,000 square miles, capable of making 20 states like Massachusetts or 5 as large as the great State of Indiana. Again Great Britain was "conciliated."

Now, at the beginning of the twentieth century, as frequently through the nineteenth, Great Britain again asks to be conciliated—nay, she imperatively and arrogantly demands to be pacified. The party in control of this Government has affirmed that the American flag shall never come down where once it has floated. But as it has already been pulled down where it waved over 7,000 square miles of New Brunswick and 160,000 square miles of British Columbia, we can only interpret the Republican declaration to mean that the Star-Spangled Banner shall never be pulled down excepting where it floats justly and by right.

Is it to be pulled down permanently where it has been set by solemn treaty upon the summits of the Cascade Range in Alaska? Is it to be chased down the slopes of the mountains and driven into the sea by the Canadian mounted police at the behest of Joseph Chamberlain, whose hands are red with the blood of the Boers and who is diverting himself in the attempted destruction of the flags of two brave young Republics in South Africa? It has been said, if not in the Canadian Parliament, openly in the Canadian press, that Great Britain would have to pay for the services of the Canadian regiments in the Transvaal by transferring to them the mining camps of American Alaska. Is this indemnity about to be exacted? Are 10,000 square miles of American territory to be seized by England to compensate for the blunders of Kitchener and the bravery of De Wet, Botha, and Delarey?

"Oh, no," says Great Britain; "we do not at present propose to go to extremities, and drive Americans into the sea in Alaska; we only propose to submit the question to arbitration." It may as well be understood at once, if the fact has escaped the attention of Great Britain till this time, that there are some questions that are not subject to arbitration. If the United States was to claim Ireland as its own would England consent to arbitrate the claim?

If we were to seize Nova Scotia, would England and Canada submit it to arbitration, although more than half the population of Nova Scotia consists of the descendants of Tories who fled from this country during the Revolution? Would England consent to arbitrate a claim of France to the island of Jersey, although that island is within 12 miles of the French coast and more than 100 miles from England? No; possession which has been for generations undisputed is not subject to arbitration.

Let me pass the history of Alaska in quick review, and show

that the British claim is equally new and preposterous. The United States and Russia signed a treaty in 1824 in which they agreed on the parallel of 54° 40' as the division between their respective territories, and in February of the next year Russia and Great Britain signed a treaty which drew the following boundary line between their respective possessions in North America:

ARTICLE III. The line of demarcation between the possessions of the high contracting parties upon the coast of the continent and the islands of America to the northwest shall be drawn in the manner following: Commencing from the southernmost point of the island called Prince of Wales Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54° 40' north latitude, and between the one hundred and thirty-first and the one hundred and thirty-third degree of west longitude (Meridian of Greenwich), the said line shall ascend to the north along the channel called Portland Channel as far as the point of the continent where it strikes the fifty-sixth degree of north latitude; from this last-mentioned point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast as far as the point of intersection of the one hundred and forty-first degree of west longitude (of the same meridian); and, finally, from the said point of intersection the said meridian line of the one hundred and forty-first degree, in its prolongation as far as the frozen ocean, shall form the limit between the Russian and British possessions on the continent of America to the northwest.

ARTICLE IV. With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the preceding article, it is understood:

First. That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia.

Second. That wherever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast from the fifty-sixth degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the one hundred and forty-first degree of west longitude shall prove to be at the distance of more than 10 marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British possessions and the line of coast which is to belong to Russia, as above mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings (sinuosities) of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of 10 marine leagues therefrom.

In defining the boundaries of Russian America the Russian Government never failed to insist that it was entitled to a strip of seacoast (lisière, in the language of diplomacy) on the main land from the Portland Channel on the south to Mount St. Elias in the north, so as absolutely to cut off the British possessions from all access to the sea above the point of 54° 40'.

For more than half a century the British Empire never contested this interpretation, and after the cession of Russian America (afterwards called Alaska) to the United States, in 1867, England still quietly accepted the reading of the treaty, which declared that the boundary "shall follow the summit of the mountains parallel with the coast." Map after map was published by Russians, English, Canadians, and Americans, unanimously agreeing in placing the boundary upon the mountain tops, at least 30 miles from shore. They all agreed in shutting off England from all access to the sea at every point north of Portland Canal, even from Lynn Canal, an immense bayou, stretching inland.

When the Russo-British treaty was negotiated in 1825, Sir Charles Bagot, on behalf of England, contended urgently for a free access to the sea as far north as possible. He first proposed that the boundary line should run "through Chatham Strait to the head of Lynn Canal, thence northwest to the one hundred and fortieth degree of longitude west of Greenwich, and thence along that degree of longitude to the Polar Sea." To this proposition Count Nesselrode replied by insisting upon the frontier line defined in the treaty.

Sir Charles Bagot thereupon modified his plea and marked out a boundary wandering among the islands and giving the Hudson Bay Company access to the fiords and estuaries. The Russian plenipotentiaries insisted upon the boundary laid down in the treaty. Russia thus simply defended her territory, while England sought to obtain territory which she had never possessed. It was, as Count Nesselrode said in contrasting the policies of the two nations, "Thus we wish to retain and the English wish to acquire." England, after much discussion and a long and stubborn resistance, finally yielded at every point.

The mutual understanding of both the British and the Russians as to the boundary which they definitely arranged between their respective Empires in the treaty of 1825 is proved, first, by the overwhelming multitude of maps of the best cartographers of the leading nations of the world, including England and Canada, in recognizing the boundary always claimed in the beginning by Russia and afterwards by the United States; second, by the accordant acts of the British and Canadian authorities.

Not only had Great Britain recognized and confirmed in the official maps which she had published the boundary as defined in the treaty, but she had still further confirmed the mutual understanding by renting from Russia for a long term of years the very territory which she contended was her own. Great Britain agreed to pay and did pay from the year 1839 to the year 1857 \$7,500 a year for this very margin of coast which she now claims is British territory.

Probably the most important English map, indicating what the best geographers of the British Government thought was the true boundary until very recently, is the British Admiralty Chart, No. 787, giving the northwest corner of America, prepared in 1876 and corrected up to April, 1898.

On this chart of the British Admiralty the frontier of the

United States descends the one hundred and forty-first degree of longitude west from Greenwich, and then advancing follows the sinuosities of the coast, so as to give a continuous strip of territory completely cutting off the Dominion of Canada from all contact with the fiords or even estuaries which make their way into the continent. This boundary between British and American territory is drawn more than 50 miles from the coast. Thus the British Admiralty itself upholds and indorses the territorial claims maintained by both the Russian and the United States Governments.

This significant chart, it will be noted, was corrected up to April, 1898. On the 1st of August, 1898, the British Government for the first time presented to the Government of the United States a statement revealing the fact that it repudiated the provisions of the treaty of 1825 concerning the meaning of the Alaskan frontier as defined in the Anglo-Russian treaty, and on August 23, 1898, it claimed that the eastern boundary of Alaska should run across the estuaries and fiords, so as to give Great Britain access to the sea.

It is in exact accordance with British character that this demand was made during the very year that we got into trouble with Spain. As soon as it was obvious that we had a war upon our hands, England hastened to formulate and present demands which had not before occurred to her. As, during the rebellion, she took instant advantage of our plight by launching a privateer to prey upon our commerce, so now, when we were involved in trouble with another nation, she presented a demand for a new boundary that would give her a thousand or more square miles of territory.

It is to be further observed that her cupidity was tempted in still another way. Not only was an accession of territory desired, but the very year before, it had been discovered that that territory hid untold wealth. As poverty proved an ample protection to the South African Republics for scores of years, and as England made no assault upon their integrity until diamonds had been found at Kimberley and abundant gold in the Witwatersrand, so the greedy plunderer made no motion to climb over the mountains and invade Alaska till it had become an Eldorado.

Our Secretary of State is a most amiable and obliging person. His sensibilities were deeply wounded when he heard that the Alaskan miners had held a meeting and resolved to pay their taxes to Great Britain in lead, but not in any more valuable metal. He was also profoundly touched by the complaint of Mr. Chamberlain that the people of British America could not get down to the salt water, and the expression of his hope that the United States would consent to the abrogation of the treaty without insisting on any equivalent.

The Secretary of State is tender hearted. He sympathizes with distress wherever he beholds it, especially in great and powerful empires, and after residing several years in Great Britain he developed a fervent attachment for its style of government, which has broken out in a magnanimous concession almost without parallel in the history of nations.

It is less than three years since his susceptible heart was touched by an appeal from Great Britain for a temporary modification of the Alaskan boundary. The United States was at war, and England requested, in accents suggestive of a demand, that the boundary between her British possessions and the North Pacific should be rubbed out temporarily. She did not offer any reciprocal consideration. She did not take the trouble to define the word "temporarily."

Everybody knows that when Great Britain uses the word "temporarily" in this connection it always means "permanently." Whenever she takes transient possession of any land on the face of the earth, she remains there forever and a day. In the light of these facts must be read the official document printed by the State Department entitled "Modus vivendi between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, fixing a provisional boundary line between the Territory of Alaska and the Dominion of Canada about the head of Lynn Canal."

Concluded by exchange of notes October 20, 1890, by John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States, and Reginald Tower, chargé d'affaires of Her Britannic Majesty at Washington.

This remarkable document gave to Great Britain, without any equivalent and without any effort to define the word "temporary," the right to occupy thousands of square miles of our territory with her soldiers and surveyors and to harass its American inhabitants, and I give it in full, as follows:

It is hereby agreed between the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain that the boundary line between Canada and the Territory of Alaska in the region about the head of Lynn Canal shall be provisionally fixed as follows without prejudice to the claims of either party in the permanent adjustment of the international boundary:

In the region of the Dalton Trail, a line beginning at the peak west of Porcupine Creek, marked on the map No. 10 of the United States Commission, December 31, 1895, and on sheet No. 18 of the British commission, December 31, 1895, with the number 6500; thence running to the Klehini or

Klaheela) River in the direction of the peak north of that river, marked 5020 on the aforesaid United States map and 5025 on the aforesaid British map; thence following the high or right bank of the said Klehini River to the junction thereof with the Chilkat River, a mile and a half, more or less, north of Klukwan; provided that persons proceeding to or from Porcupine Creek shall be freely permitted to follow the trail between the said creek and the said junction of the rivers into and across the territory on the Canadian side of the temporary line wherever the trail crosses to such side, and, subject to such reasonable regulations for the protection of the revenue as the Canadian government may prescribe, to carry with them over such part or parts of the trail between the said points as may lie on the Canadian side of the temporary line such goods and articles as they desire, without being required to pay any customs duties on such goods and articles; and from said junction to the summit of the peak east of the Chilkat River, marked on the aforesaid map No. 10 of the United States Commission with the number 5410 and on the map No. 17 of the aforesaid British commission with the number 5490.

On the Dyea and Skagway trails, the summits of the Chilcoot and White passes.

"It is understood, as formerly set forth in communications of the Department of State of the United States, that the citizens or subjects of either power found by this arrangement within the temporary jurisdiction of the other shall suffer no diminution of the rights and privileges which they now enjoy.

"The Government of the United States will at once appoint an officer or officers, in conjunction with an officer or officers to be named by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, to mark the temporary line agreed upon by the erection of posts, stakes, or other appropriate temporary marks."

This is, indeed, a curious example of a *modus vivendi*. In the Century Dictionary we read that the *modus vivendi* is "a manner or way of living; a temporary arrangement pending a settlement of matters in debate, as between two nations." Hitherto when nations have established a *modus vivendi* it has been established by the nation actually in possession, and if it be a question of boundary, and if the boundary has been defined by a treaty, the *modus vivendi* operates in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

In this case of Alaska, however, the generous and susceptible Secretary of State establishes a *modus vivendi* in accordance with the claims of the party not in possession and conceding to him territory which he has never had the right to enter.

This is a new kind of *modus vivendi*, so absolutely novel that it ought to be secured to America by an international patent. Possession has hitherto been said to be nine points of the law; and if a man's right to his house is contested in the courts, he does not usually move out of it until some kind of a verdict has been found against him.

Much less does he invite the contestant to occupy the house jointly with him until some indefinite future year. The impudence of Mr. Reginald Tower in making the proposition finds its counterpart in the unsophisticated simple-mindedness of John Hay in conceding it. Or is it something else than simple-mindedness—perhaps the same lack of patriotism which induces him to permit and protect the establishment of British camps of supply at New Orleans in violation of our neutrality laws as defined by treaty?

I call your attention to the statement of Hon. J. W. Ivey, late collector of customs in Alaska, as published in the Washington Post:

Turning to the dispute over the boundary line, Mr. Ivey continued:

THE BOUNDARY-LINE DISPUTE.

"The United States made a most stupendous blunder when it submitted the boundary question to arbitration. The treaty of 1825 between England and Russia so clearly defines the line that it is not debatable. The Canadians are to-day occupying millions of acres of American territory at Forty Mile, the Porcupine, and other stations in that vicinity. Their surveyors and engineers have been actively at work for years, and I am satisfied that it will be soon proven to the satisfaction of our people that their zeal for their government has led them to destroy boundary monuments erected by the Russian Government more than half a century ago.

"Three years ago, when gold was discovered by American miners on American soil in the Porcupine district, the Canadians aggressively moved forward 21 miles, taking in most of the mines, subjecting the American miner to Canadian laws, executed by armed officers under the British flag while on American soil. Under these conditions Secretary Hay consented to a '*modus vivendi*' with the British Government, agreeing to postpone the settlement of the question, leaving the Canadians in possession of the territory. If this was done by our Government through ignorance it was inexcusable; if intentional, it was a crime.

"The Canadians should have been put back to their own line by persuasion, if possible, but by force, if necessary, and action should have been taken before the sun went down.

NO CAUSE FOR ARBITRATION.

"The United States should withdraw this question from arbitration, after which it should make the survey on the lines defined by treaty, erect its boundary monuments, and if that does not settle it, let it be settled the way George Washington settled with them."

The cuckoo warbles its curious note as far north as Alaska, and we must not forget its sinister habit of depositing its eggs in the nests of other birds to be hatched and the unpleasant habit which the usurping strangers have of killing the young of their entertainer and kicking them out of their own mother's nest.

Æsop lived a great while ago, but he has bequeathed to us a prophetic fable: A porcupine, looking for shelter, asked a nest of ground squirrels to admit him into their cave. Being good-natured, they granted him hospitality, and in he came accordingly; but he made such aggressive and ugly use of his sharp

quills that they soon repented of their easy compliance and entreated the porcupine to withdraw and leave them their home to themselves. "No," said he, "let them quit the place that don't like it; for my part, I am well enough satisfied as I am, and shall make it my home."

And the porcupine made it his home—"temporarily."

The full meaning of the *modus vivendi*, as I have given it, can scarcely be understood without reference to a map. Its very worst feature, except the surrender to England of territory to which she has no shadow of right, is its fragmentary and indefinite character. It represents the territory included in a circle of 200 miles around the head of Lynn Canal, the central highway to the Klondike.

Of this 200 miles less than 50 miles are covered by the provisional boundary in any way whatever. The Katschin River trail, the Taklin River trail, the Ferebee River Valley, and the great Chilkoot River route northward are all completely unprotected and are left with the open door. Indeed, the business centers of Skagway and Dyea are left with Canadians to share equally with ourselves if they approach by flanking the White Pass and the summit of the Cascade Range.

By the *modus vivendi* we concede to English soldiers and English surveyors the right to penetrate to the very heart of Alaska, giving them all advantages and acquiring nothing for ourselves. Acquiring nothing, do I say? O, yes; we have acquired something. We have acquired the permission of England to conquer and desolate the Philippine Archipelago, to turn Samar into a "howling wilderness" and to "kill everything over 10 years of age." If this was a duty which we needed to perform, perhaps the acquiescence of the Empire of Edward VII has not been dearly purchased.

Possibly, however, we might have continued to walk in the pathway of honor without seeking the approval of Great Britain. If England demanded to be bribed, or sought to blackmail us, we might have triumphantly quoted one of John Hay's admirable apothegms, published in his works: "Be not too anxious to gain your next-door neighbor's approval; live your own life, and let him strive to gain yours." And if the crime against the Boers and our course against the Filipinos should be mentioned in one breath, it would be cruel to embarrass Mr. Hay by quoting from his own poems this beautiful apostrophe to Liberty:

For all in vain will timorous ones essay
To set the metes and bounds of liberty,
For freedom is its own eternal law.
It makes its own conditions, and in storm
Or calm, alike, fulfills the unerring will.
For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light by which the world is saved;
And, though thou slay us, we will trust in thee.

The honorable gentleman has now discarded, as maudlin, this sentiment which he no doubt acquired from association with Abraham Lincoln. In fact, he has repudiated many of the principles of his callow youth. "Jim Bludso" was once his ideal hero—Jim Bludso, the brave and unselfish pilot of the Prairie Belle, who nobly did his duty and "held the nozzle agin the bank" till the passengers were saved.

Now, his ideal Jim Bludso trains a machine gun against an unprotected village or holds a burning torch under the thatch of a Tagal home. John Hay's opinion of little boys seems also to have undergone a change. He shed rhetorical tears when "Little Breeches" got lost, and when the child was found herded with the sheep the poet insisted that angels had protected him. The Tagal infants, "everything over 10," seem to have lost their angel guardians, and "loafing around the throne" in satin knee breeches has risen to a delightful profession.

We have not much to hope for from this Administration. It has discarded and repudiated the Declaration of Independence for the greed of conquest, and it has formed an unholy alliance in giving the British Empire permission and assistance in exterminating the gallant farmers of South Africa. The last Democratic President knew well how to defend the nation's honor, and if for nothing else, he should be honored.

When the British lion, roaming up and down the earth, laid its heavy paw upon little Venezuela and insolently growled, "This is mine," Uncle Sam, in the person of Grover Cleveland, took that voracious animal by the tail and gave it such a mighty twist that its roar of anguish echoed across the Atlantic Ocean. And straightway it took its wounded appendage between its legs and hastened home. When some other man of patriotism and unflinching courage shall stand at the head of our affairs, Alaska will be defended against the robber nation of the world, and our bright flag will be drawn again to the masthead wherever it has a right to fly. [Applause.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield forty-five minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. ELLIOTT].

Mr. ELLIOTT. Mr. Chairman, there is no measure now before Congress which is of more importance to the people of my State

and to the neighboring States of the South than the creation of the National Appalachian Forest Reserve.

In 1899 a movement was inaugurated by the Appalachian Park Association at Asheville, N. C., for the purpose of preserving the Southern Appalachian forests. The necessity that these forests should be preserved in order to prevent the washing of the mountain lands has long been advocated by geologists familiar with the country; but what has commended the subject to the favor of the country is "the increasing violence and destructiveness of the floods during the past few years, and the general recognition of the fact that the continued clearing of these mountain slopes would soon result in the absolute ruin of all the interests of this region and of the adjacent lowlands in the several States."

The agitation of the subject resulted in an appropriation by Congress of \$5,000 in the Agricultural appropriation bill for 1901 for the investigation, by the Secretary of Agriculture, of "the Southern Appalachian Mountain region of western North Carolina and adjacent States." This very prompt recognition by Congress of the importance of the project was due chiefly to its strong support by the press of the country, which has done more than all other agencies to awaken the American people to the importance of preserving the remnants of our forests before it is too late, and of educating them to a knowledge of the fact that these forests are for this generation to legitimately use but not to destroy.

In 1901 the Secretary of Agriculture made a short preliminary report on the subject, which was submitted to Congress by President McKinley with his approval, and in December last the Secretary of Agriculture made a most exhaustive and valuable report to President Roosevelt, who commended the subject to Congress in a message in which he said:

Its conclusions point unmistakably, in the judgment of the Secretary and in my own, to the creation of a national forest reserve in certain parts of the Southern States. The facts ascertained and here presented deserve the careful consideration of the Congress; they have already received the full attention of the scientist and the lumberman. They set forth an economic need of prime importance to the welfare of the South, and hence to that of the nation as a whole, and they point to the necessity of protecting, through wise use, a mountain region whose influence flows far beyond its borders with the waters of the rivers to which it gives rise.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL.

The purpose of the bill, stated in the report of the House Committee on Agriculture just filed, is—

To set aside in the Southern Appalachian Mountain region a national reserve for the preservation of the forests of that district, the perpetuation of the timber supply, the development of its farming resources, and the regulation of the water flow in its streams. It authorizes the purchase for the people, by the Secretary of Agriculture, under certain reasonable restrictions, of not more than 4,000,000 acres of land, to be selected in the mountain forest region of Virginia, West Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. It also authorizes the Secretary to accept and administer donations of land in the same vicinity for the same purposes.

While the purpose of the original advocates of this measure was chiefly to establish a park from considerations of pleasure rather than utility, the movement has been changed to the making of a forest reserve as distinguished from a park. Secretary Wilson says: "The idea of a national park is conservation, not use; that of the forest reserve conservation by use. I have therefore to recommend a forest reserve instead of a park."

PROVISIONS OF THE BILL.

The bill provides that the Secretary of Agriculture may purchase land suitable for a forest reserve in the Appalachian Mountains in the States of West Virginia, Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, not to exceed in all 4,000,000 acres; to care for, protect, use, and make accessible the same; that he shall advertise in said States for land to be purchased and, as between lands of equal value for the purposes of this act, he shall accept the lowest bids; he may also contract for the purchase of lands exclusive of the timber thereon of specified kinds and sizes, the same to be cut under regulations to be established; also, he may contract for the purchase of lands exclusive of mineral rights therein, and the mineral deposits may be mined under prescribed regulations, which regulations, as well as those for cutting timber, shall be embodied in the contract of purchase.

In purchasing lands the Secretary shall in each State conform to the conditions prescribed in the present or future acts of such States, but no lands shall be condemned against the will of the owner so long as the owner shall protect and perpetuate the forests on such lands, under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary for the other forest lands purchased under this act, as far as applicable. The Secretary may also accept gifts of lands for such purposes. He shall take proper steps to protect the United States as to the title to lands, and no payment shall be made therefor except after approval of the Attorney-General.

He shall also make provision for replanting of trees on cleaned lands when necessary for the protection of the soil or the water supply. He shall also make such rules and regulations and establish such service as he may deem necessary for the care, protection, control, and use of such forest, and may sell such wood, timber, and other products as may be removed without injury to

the forest, but no sale shall be made except under prescribed regulations, nor at less than the appraised value thereof, the proceeds to be covered into the Treasury of the United States.

Two million dollars are appropriated for the purposes of the act, to be available until June 30, 1906, but no part of the money shall be expended for land until a valid title to the same shall be vested in the United States and until the State in which the land lies shall have ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction of the same during the time the United States shall be or remain the owner thereof for all purposes except the administration of the criminal laws of said State and the service of any civil process therein. The Secretary shall annually make to Congress a detailed statement of his doings under the act.

DAMAGES BY FLOODS ON THE CATAWBA.

It is a matter beyond dispute and of common observation that in recent years disastrous floods and freshets have visited the above States with alarming frequency. The report of the Secretary shows that the damage to the farmers on the Catawba River alone, caused by the May, 1901, storm, on the Blue Ridge, about the sources of that river, amounted to a million and a half dollars, and that an August storm in the same year added a further loss of a half million more on the low lands of the same river.

I find the following in the March, 1902, number of Forestry and Irrigation:

The characteristics of the Catawba River floods have undergone a sudden and alarming change. In previous years all floods along the river rose slowly. The water stagnated like a mill pond over the bottom lands and, gently receding, left a deep, rich deposit on the already fertile bottoms.

The floods have changed, therefore, from an agency of good to the farmers to one of absolute destruction—a quick, tumultuous rise of waters and a swiftly rushing current that tears up the soil down to the rocks and hard clay and leaves barren wastes. This extraordinary and deplorable change in the characteristics of the flood has followed the laying waste in recent years of thousands of acres of woodland in the western part of the State.

There have been two notable floods in the Catawba River in the past. The first was in 1848 and the second was in 1876. In neither instance was there any damage to farm lands. The water rose slowly and receded gently, leaving the river bottoms richer by a deposit of fertile sediment. There is no Government record of the rainfall during those periods, but Catawba River land owners say that there was as much water in the bottoms during the freshet of 1876 as there was last May.

To show the protection against floods furnished by forests the same publication gives the results of a valuable experiment on 400 acres of land, made in the South Mountains, owned by the State hospital at Morganton, N. C., and from which it gets its water supply by a creek having its source in the above tract. For twenty years no timber has been cut on this tract, there have been no forest fires, and the ground is thickly covered with leaves, mold, and undergrowth.

Near by is another similar stream, but the trees have been cut from about its source and there have been frequent fires. Accurate measurements of the flow of water in May and August, 1901, show that while the first stream had lost only 10 per cent of its volume of water between those months the other had lost 88 per cent in the same time.

DAMAGE ON THE YADKIN AND OTHER RIVERS.

During 1901 the May floods caused destruction along the valleys of the Yadkin, the Kanawha, and the upper tributaries of the Tennessee estimated at the enormous sum of \$5,000,000, which, added to the damage during the summer and spring on other streams rising in this section, approximates the appalling total of \$10,000,000. These figures are enough to stagger belief, and yet they do not include the damage done in the region about the mountains nor to the rice fields on the seacoast.

While 1901 was a most disastrous year, yet similar losses to a less extent have been occurring for years past, and, as I will hereafter show, it is inevitable that if some such measure as this be not adopted, with each recurring year the damage will be greater and greater, just as in past years there has been a perceptible increase in the number and the destruction of these floods.

DAMAGE ON THE SAVANNAH RIVER RICE FIELDS.

This fact is clearly demonstrated by the conditions existing on the rice fields on the seacoast of South Carolina. Take, for example, the rice plantations on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River, which has its source in these mountains. Formerly they were most productive. The lands were exceedingly valuable. They were all cultivated in the most careful manner and yielded splendid returns. Whoever was so lucky as to own one of them was considered a rich man. What is their condition now? Many of them, including their elaborate and expensive systems of irrigation, have been substantially abandoned, and the remainder generally show a loss at the end of the year instead of a profit.

In the course of less than twenty years there has been a complete revolution from a state of great prosperity to one of utter prostration. What is the cause of all this? None other than freshets, all the time increasing in number and destructive power. In about the year 1887 I visited these plantations after one of these

overflows specially for the purpose of seeing their condition and ascertaining whether some remedy could not be applied, and I found that on eight of the most valuable plantations on the river the entire rice crop, just ready for harvesting, had been swept away, not one bushel of rice having been gathered and the fields being as bare as a well-traveled highway.

DAMAGE ON THE SOUTH SANTEE.

Take another river, the south branch of the Santee, into which flow the waters of the Broad, the Saluda, and the Catawba, all of which have their sources in these mountains. The South Santee, like the Savannah, was noted for its splendid rice plantations, cultivated in the most expensive and scientific manner, and yielding annually the most bountiful harvests.

For years past the same process has been going on as on the Savannah, and all from the same cause, until there is now not one plantation under cultivation. During a recent visit there I was told by a planter that during the last season the small area planted by him had been covered by no less than 13 distinct freshets of greater or less force, making it absolutely impossible for him to make a crop.

RICE FIELDS AS SEEN BY WASHINGTON.

More than a century ago these rice plantations, now in ruin, attracted the wonder and admiration of the foremost man of his times, and, withal, a great farmer. In Mrs. Ravenel's Life and Times of William Lowndes is found the following:

When General Washington visited the State in 1791 he crossed in his journey all the large rice rivers from the Waccamaw to the Savannah, and he expressed to Mr. Charles Pinckney, then governor, his admiration of what he saw. "He had no idea that the United States possessed such agricultural improvement as the tide lands showed."

But all the rice fields that charmed the eye of Washington are not in a state of ruin to-day—by no means. It is only those lying on rivers that have their sources in the mountains. On the other rivers, those not reaching to the mountains, the cultivation of rice is as profitable as ever, a freshet never destroying a crop except when combined with an equinoctial gale which forces the salt water in from the ocean. The rule is that, as to rivers having their sources in the mountains, rice planting is substantially abandoned, while, as to the others, it is carried on as successfully as ever.

The conclusion is irresistible that the source of the trouble is the mountains, which are also the source of the waters. And how can one doubt this when we find that the destruction from these floods commences in the very mountains themselves, then invades the valleys lying at their feet, then overflows the rich bottom lands of the Broad, Saluda, Catawba, Wateree, and the Congaree, and lastly, overwhelms the rice fields on the coast, the waters all the time loaded with the best soil of the State, which blocks up our harbors or stains for many miles the ocean, into which it is emptied and wasted? Not only is it plain whence comes the trouble, but it is equally plain that it is of recent origin, because these things did not happen in the days when Washington visited the State, nor for many years afterwards. What has brought about the change?

FOREST DESTRUCTION THE CAUSE.

All the evidence goes to show that the cause is the destruction of our mountain forests, which commenced some twenty years ago, just before the time when destructive freshets became so frequent. The lumberman first cut only the more valuable trees, such as the walnut and cherry; then, as railroads improved the means of transportation, he cut other somewhat less valuable trees, until now everything merchantable is cut, tramroads opening up sections hitherto inaccessible. It is estimated by the Secretary of Agriculture that, at the rate the destruction by cutting and fires is now going on, these mountain forests will be destroyed within the next ten years.

HEAVY RAINFALL.

Two of the most striking features of these Appalachian Mountains are the enormous rainfall and the splendid forests. Careful investigation by the Secretary of Agriculture shows that for a period of ten years the average rainfall in these mountains at various places in South Carolina, western North Carolina, and Georgia was nearly 73 inches.

For the year 1898 it was at Highlands, N. C., 105.24 inches; at Horse Cove, 99.97 inches, and at Flat Rock, 78.39 inches. In May, 1901, in twenty-four hours it was 6.12 inches at Flat Rock, N. C.; 7.25 inches at Marion, N. C., and at 8.3 at Patterson, N. C. There was a rainfall of 8 inches in eleven hours near Roan Mountain. The total rainfall for August, 1901, at Highlands was 30.74 inches, while the annual rainfall in the basin of Broad River is approximately only 51 inches.

Moreover, the rainfall, as a rule, is exceedingly heavy at short periods, and, owing to the steep mountain sides and the absence of lakes and other reservoirs, heavy rainfalls are followed by a rapid rise in the streams, which, when the forests have been

cleared or fires have burned off the underbrush and fallen leaves, produce most destructive floods. The Secretary says:

The soil, once denuded of its forests and swept by torrential rains, rapidly loses first its humus, then its rich upper strata, and finally is washed in enormous volume into the streams, to bury such of the fertile lowlands as are not eroded by the floods, to obstruct the rivers, and to fill up the harbors on the coast. More good soil is now washed from these cleared mountain-side fields during a single heavy rain than during centuries under forest cover.

In New England and many of the Northern States the numerous lakes and glacial deposits of sand and gravel, spread out over the hills and valleys, serve as storehouses for the water and help materially to preserve uniformity in the flow of the streams. In this respect they cooperate largely with the forest cover in that region; and, indeed, they would accomplish much in that direction were the forest cover entirely removed.

But in the Southern Appalachian region there are no lakes and no glacial gravels and sands; the forests and the soil are the factors upon which the solution of water storage depends. And that the problem resolves itself largely into one of forest cover, with its undergrowth and humus, is seen by the fact that in the streams of the Piedmont Plain of the South Atlantic States the irregularity in flow, as observed for a number of years, has been almost directly proportional to the extent of forest clearings. Observations and measurements of the Southern Appalachian mountain streams made during the last few years show that the same is true in that region. Hence, here the water problem is a forest problem.

MOUNTAIN FORESTS.

As to the forests of these mountains the House report says:

The oldest, largest, and most varied primeval hard-wood forests of the continent are within its limits. One hundred and thirty-seven species of trees have been examined and described by the Government experts who have visited and surveyed the territory. The list of shrubs and smaller plants is still greater. Northern varieties mingle with Southern; those from the Gulf region with those from New England. It contains a unique natural collection of forest species selected and fostered by soil and climate which if once destroyed can never be replaced. Among these are cherry, walnut, yellow poplar, chestnut, ash, beech, and the magnolia and mulberry.

The Secretary says they—

are the heaviest and most beautiful forests of the continent. * * * For economic reasons the preservation of these forests is imperative. Their existence in good condition is essential to the prosperity of the lowlands through which their waters run. Maintained in productive condition they will supply indispensable materials, which must fail without them. * * *

The agricultural resources of the Southern Appalachian region must be protected and preserved. To that end the preservation of the forests is an indispensable condition, which will lead not to the reduction but to the increase of the yield of agricultural products.

PRESERVATION OF OUR WATER POWER.

Up to this point I have considered this measure with reference only to the farming interests—much the most important to us—and which are already feeling most seriously the damage which the bill is intended to stop. But the question of preserving the magnificent water power furnished by the many rivers rising in these mountains is hardly less important. To-day the larger water powers in the South Atlantic States are confined to the rivers which have their sources in the mountains. I give a table, compiled from the Secretary's report, of the estimated available horsepower and that actually in use on the following rivers:

Rivers.	Available.	Actually used.
James	28,290	8,700
Roanoke	41,000	3,500
Yadkin	56,400	1,500
Catawba	57,000	2,000
Broad and Saluda	43,000	18,000
Savannah	75,000	11,500
Chattahoochee	285,000	4,300
Coosa	141,000	3,700

A safe estimate of the available but undeveloped water power on all the rivers and streams, according to Secretary Wilson, is 1,000,000 horsepower. Everyone is familiar with the extraordinary increase in manufacturing that has taken place in the two Carolinas in very recent years, much of it owing to our abundant water power. It is, of course, the cheapest power to be procured, the water flowing without cost day and night, while every ton of coal purchased adds necessarily and materially to expenses.

Heretofore the advantage of water power over steam has not been demonstrated because steam could be generated wherever fuel could be got, and mills could be located at points having advantages in transportation and otherwise. Now, however, steam has lost its advantage because, through improvements in electricity, power can be brought many miles at less cost than coal can be furnished at most points.

The water powers, therefore, in the not far distant future—

Says the report—

may become as valuable as coal mines, and, as the local supply becomes more costly by reason of deeper mining, the water powers will increase in value. This wealth should not be wantonly wasted.

It has been ascertained that in sections comparatively level, but where the forests have been cleared from areas aggregating from 60 to 80 per cent of the land, floods are frequent and excessive, and that some of the smaller streams in seasons of drought almost

wholly disappear, and the use of their water power is substantially abandoned, whereas the flow of streams whose sources have not been cleared of forests shows striking uniformity. The important thing is uniformity of flow—in contrast to a rushing torrent after each heavy rain followed by a weak flow. The report proceeds:

This is just what one would expect who has been, during a rainy season, in the heart of a mountain region where the lands have not been cleared nor have forest fires destroyed the humus cover from their surface. The raindrops are battered to pieces and their force broken by the leaves and twigs of the trees, and when their spray reaches the ferns, the grass, and the flowers below, instead of running away down the surface slope, it passes into the spongy humus and thence into the soil and the crevices among the rocks below. As much of this supply as is not subsequently used by the growing plants emerges from the storehouse weeks or months later in numberless springs. The rain must be extremely abundant or long protracted to produce any excessive increase in the flow of the adjacent brooks.

Of course, the damage is not all owing to the destruction of the forests in the mountains. Anyone passing through my State can see the same process in operation on every hillside that has been cleared for cultivation and now abandoned. There is nothing on the lands to hold the water, which, after each rain, rushes into numerous rivulets, then into the swollen creeks, then into the rivers, already overflowing with the torrents that have rushed down the mountains. And it may with much force be said that the preservation of the mountain forests will avail but little unless the cooperation of individual landowners can be procured.

One of the most beneficial results from passing this bill, Mr. Chairman, will be that it will give an object lesson to our people of the benefits of forestry. The late Mr. Morton, formerly Secretary of Agriculture, had printed at the head of every one of his letters the words: "Plant a tree." No better advice could be given. The Department of Agriculture has for years been doing all in its power to induce private owners both to preserve their forests and to renew them by forest tree planting.

"The private forest lands exceed in area those of the States and the United States combined, and their preservation in productive condition, as regards both the timber and water supply, is of vast importance to the nation." The object of the Department is to show that improved ways of handling timber are best for the owners from a pecuniary standpoint, as well as for the forest, and the Secretary, upon application to him, will, after examination of the land if it be from 5 acres up, prepare a plan for the purpose of promoting and increasing its present value and usefulness to its owner and to develop and perpetuate forests upon it; and all without cost to the owner.

I realize, Mr. Chairman, that this is a stupendous project, and to many persons a startling one, but I never was better satisfied that it was our duty to act and to act quickly. While great damage has already been done, yet it is as nothing compared to what will soon take place if some remedy be not applied. The experience of other countries teaches us that it must be done at some time, and that if longer delayed it will only entail enormous additional expense. The Senate report says:

As illustrating the necessity for such action as is now proposed, attention may be called to the fact that in every civilized country it has been found absolutely necessary to preserve the forests on mountain slopes, and especially is this true in more southern latitudes. Everywhere it has been found vastly cheaper to preserve existing forests on these mountains than to reforest such regions after the former forests have been once destroyed.

In Italy it was found that destroying the mountain forests had produced excessive floods, and the Government is now restoring them at an estimated cost of \$24 per acre. In France the same destruction occurred, and with the same inevitable result, and the restoration of the forests now in progress will, it is estimated, cost no less than \$50 per acre. Unfortunately for those countries the remedy was postponed too long, a postponement that will cost Italy \$12,000,000 and France no less than \$40,000,000.

In our own country the State of New York is now paying a similar penalty. That State years ago sold, or allowed to be sold, the Adirondack forests, and now, realizing that the water supply of her most important river is rapidly failing, she is buying back the same forests at great expense. Fortunate it is for us that we have realized the danger while we are in position to avert it at only the cost of cheap land.

It is estimated that because of the small amount of work necessary to be done by the Government beyond mere protection, the reserve will be self-supporting through a system of timber selling that will improve, instead of destroying, the forests. South Carolina alone can not afford to make this outlay, necessary as it is for the protection of her farmers, but she fully appreciates the necessity for it and has adopted the following resolution favoring this bill:

A resolution favoring the establishment of a national forest reserve in the Southern Appalachian Mountain region.

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring). The general assembly of South Carolina hereby expresses its approval of the movement looking to the establishment by the Federal Government of an extensive national forest reserve in the Southern Appalachian Mountain region as a wise and beneficent measure, such as many other nations have already adopted, and which this country should adopt before it is too late, looking to

the conservation of its forests and the protection of the sources of important streams; and

Whereas the proposal to establish this forest reserve has been approved and urged by the leading scientific societies and forestry associations of this country and by the general press; and

Whereas this general assembly has passed an act granting its consent to the acquisition of lands in northern South Carolina by the Federal Government for incorporation in such a forest reserve, believing the measure to be one of great importance to the people of this State; and

Whereas a bill is now before the Federal Congress providing for the purchase of lands for this purpose:

Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives in Congress from this State are hereby requested to urge upon Congress the importance of prompt and favorable action in behalf of this measure.

Neither can the other interested States undertake the work. The United States alone can do it, and I am here, in obedience to the action of the legislature of my State, asking that Congress shall pass this bill. All private rights are protected. What will be done will be done in subordination to the laws of the States interested, and even in the mountains themselves agriculture will not be hindered, but improved.

Through the beneficence of Providence these magnificent mountains, having 46 peaks and 41 miles of ridges exceeding 6,000 feet in height, and 288 other peaks and 300 miles of ridges of over 5,000 feet, "the greatest masses of mountains east of the Rockies," and "the highest mountains covered with hard wood in America," have been provided as an unfailing source for the rivers of six great States.

What a wonderful provision! First the bountiful, even wonderful rainfall; then these splendid forests to preserve and store it for the use of man! But the work of man is fast destroying the handiwork of God. Let us at once see to it that this shall stop and that what was intended for the benefit of toiling millions shall not be perverted to their ruin. [Loud applause.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Nevada [Mr. NEWLANDS].

[Mr. NEWLANDS addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSON].

[Mr. JOHNSON addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield thirty minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RHEA].

Mr. RHEA of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I shall avail myself of this opportunity to submit a few remarks upon the past, present, and future policy of the Administration in the Philippine Islands. Since I have been a member of this House I have been content, for reasons satisfactory to myself and I trust to my constituents, to remain silent and to serve them in the most effective way I could by constant attendance upon the sessions of the House and by voting upon all propositions for what I believed to be for their best interests.

Not only have I endeavored to be constant in my efforts to represent them upon this floor, but wherever their interests were involved I have endeavored to serve them as efficiently as I could, and this without question of political affiliation or condition in life.

I do not know whether I should consider myself fortunate or unfortunate in being in the American Congress at a period when the whole theory of our Government seems to have undergone a sudden and violent change.

Four years ago when I announced my candidacy for Congress we were upon the threshold of a war with Spain for the purpose of freeing the people of Cuba from Spain's inhuman and despotic power.

Since that time strange events have crowded thick and fast upon each other, until the American mind stands appalled at the gravity of the situation.

The sound of Dewey's victorious guns in the harbor of Manila, as reechoed later by Schley's greater victory in the harbor of Santiago, is still fresh in the minds of the American people.

But who can realize the stupendous results and grave responsibilities inherited by the American people from those brilliant victories.

I venture the assertion, that if four years ago some member of this House had announced to the American Congress that the United States Government would occupy the attitude it does today with reference to those foreign islands he would have been laughed to scorn and ridicule by every lover of the institutions of his country.

At that time he would indeed have been considered a wild and reckless prophet who should have foretold that a war begun to free the struggling Cubans from the cruel and despotic power of Spain would to-day have been changed into a war of subjugation in the Philippine Islands—a war which for inhuman acts and atrocious conduct has shocked not only the sense of justice, but the moral sense of the civilized world.

Mr. Chairman, the story of what induced our war with Spain is known to every intelligent citizen in the country.

They know this unhappy people had been striving for generations to secure their liberty and independence. They know that Spain's wicked and inhuman policy had devastated the beautiful island of Cuba and made it a "howling wilderness."

They know that the bitter cries of its oppressed and starving people had so stirred the American conscience that there was a universal demand for intervention.

They know that the destruction of our ill-fated battle ship, with so many precious lives, was the crowning act in the long series of tragedies which hastened the declaration of war and the crushing of Spain's power in the island of Cuba.

They know, too, Mr. Chairman, that this great Republic most solemnly declared that it was not to be a war of conquest; that it was not to be a war for territorial aggrandizement; that it was not to be a war of "criminal aggression," but we protested to all the world that our only purpose was to free the Cuban people from the Spanish yoke and give them the blessing of liberty and independence.

The people applauded the action of Congress in voting \$50,000,000 for this purpose. It was a short, decisive, and victorious battle.

We had a right to be proud of our Army and proud of our Navy.

We had a right to be grateful to the Philippine people, who, at our request joined with our naval forces in crushing the power of Spain in the Philippine Islands.

We knew that the Filipinos had been fighting for ages to free their native land from the heel of the despot and to secure their independence.

We know now that they were led to believe through our representatives that an alliance with our forces meant their liberty and a government of their own.

They knew it was a war against oppression, for liberty, and the uplifting of humanity, for we ourselves had so declared, and they trusted in the honor and justice of the great American people. How that trust has been so wantonly and shamefully betrayed the whole world knows to-day.

I believe it was the intention of our Government in the beginning to give to the Philippine people their liberty and independence and a government of their own.

The correspondence between our representatives and the Administration can leave no serious doubt that this was the intention.

We defy any candid and truthful man to read this correspondence and then assert that such was not the inevitable conclusion.

The very fact that our own Government did not question or controvert the tenor of that correspondence is conclusive proof of the fact that the Philippine people had a right to expect that the United States would guarantee to them their independence.

We sought their aid and armed and supported them with the munitions of war.

We knew then that liberty and independence was their dearest hope, and that they would fight Americans as quick as Spaniards if subjugation was to be their eternal lot.

Is it possible that we armed these people knowing that later they would turn their arms upon the American flag?

No, Mr. Chairman, such would have been a suicidal policy and unworthy of the patriotism, if not the good sense, of the American people.

The proof is irresistible that we intended, and they believed, that the hour of their deliverance had come.

But in an evil hour the insane desire to become a world power took possession of some of the American people.

The taste of Spanish blood had whetted the appetite for more, and had so poisoned the American system that we started forth upon our inglorious career of greed, cruelty, and despotism.

We had demonstrated the superior skill of our soldiers and sailors, and our splendid battle ships had startled the world with their effective and destructive power.

Now, we should turn them, not against a great and powerful nation, but against a weak and feeble people, who had lately been our allies against Spain; whose burning desire was for independence; whose every act and declaration was a solemn warning that nothing short of liberty would ever be submitted to; that it was independence or extermination.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that for ingratitude, treachery, and cruelty our present war in the Philippines has been surpassed in modern times. What did Spain do in Cuba that we have not done in the Philippine Islands?

Ah, Mr. Chairman, what have we done in the Philippine Islands that Spain did not do in Cuba?

The American conscience revolted at Weyler's reconcentration camps in Cuba, but that same conscience is supposed to be dormant and numbed at our same policy in the Philippine Islands.

We are told that it is treason to criticize the conduct of this cruel and relentless war.

We are told to wait until the work of "benevolent assimilation" has been completed.

Shall we wait until thousands more of our brave American

boys shall go down in death and to the grave in trying to subjugate a people who have been taught by the noble example of our forefathers that liberty was the priceless jewel of the human race?

Shall we wait until the torch has finished its deadly work and blackened the earth with the smoke of its humble homes?

Shall we wait until another Smith shall issue his command to "kill and burn and make it a howling wilderness;" until its land is bleached with the bones of its men, women, and children?

Shall we wait until we have exterminated its population "above the age of 10," and left only its babes and sucklings as a reminder of the generosity of the great American people?

Mr. Chairman, those who have disagreed with the Administration in its policy in the Philippine Islands have been accused of encouraging resistance to our authority there.

Let us remember that nearly a century and a half ago, when our forefathers were struggling for liberty and independence against the despotism of Great Britain, the elder Pitt, one of England's greatest statesmen, came to our relief and declared upon the floor of the House of Commons:

Gentlemen, sir, have been charged with giving birth to the sedition in America. They have spoken their sentiments with freedom against this unhappy act, and freedom has become their crime. Sorry I am to hear the liberty of speech in this house imputed as a crime. But the imputation shall not discourage me. It is a liberty I mean to exercise.

No gentleman ought to be afraid to exercise it. It is a liberty by which the gentleman who calumniates it might have profited, by which he ought to have profited. He ought to have desisted from his project. The gentleman tells us America is obstinate; America is almost in open rebellion. I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people so dead to all feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest.

The cry of treason and the encouragement to the American rebels had no terrors for Pitt. He went so far as to boldly declare that he rejoiced that America had resisted.

I am not aware, Mr. Chairman, that any American Senator or Representative has ever gone so far with reference to the Filipinos. It has only been a source of regret to us that this free Republic should have pursued a course of such manifest injustice and cruelty as to inevitably lead to resistance upon the part of a people whose burning desire was for liberty and to whom the thought of independence was as sweet as it was to the American colonists.

Mr. Chairman, in all the years of our national life, what loyal American has been found to denounce Pitt as a traitor and to condemn him for his courageous defense of our colonial ancestors?

They were resisting what they rightly conceived to be the unrighteous and unconstitutional acts of the British Parliament.

The Filipinos are resisting what they conceive to be an unrighteous military subjugation and the unconstitutional acts of the American Congress and the President of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, we were told in the beginning that our war in the Philippine Islands was in behalf of civilization and Christianity—that it would be of short duration, and with little loss in treasure and blood.

But nearly four years have passed and the bloody tragedy still goes on, and as the years have fled the Army has been enormously augmented; the expenditures are climbing rapidly to the half-billion mark; our military excesses have gone from bad to worse, until the country has been largely depopulated of its adult male citizenship, to say nothing of the women and children who have perished in the awful work of destruction.

Since we have Christianized them with the sword and civilized them with the torch we do not now hear so much about Christianity and civilization.

It is now commercial expansion! We are told that they have once again become pacified and the land is ready for the advent and possession of the carpetbagger and adventurer.

Mr. Chairman, we would hope and trust that they could not only be pacified, but satisfied; but we do not believe that the word "pacified" has any place in the argument of this question. We do not believe that a people high strung and intelligent as they are said to be—a people who love their homes and their country, and who for more than two hundred years have shown their willingness to die for the security of the one and the independence of the other, in their unequal warfare against Spain and other powers—will ever become "pacified" until they have been promised and assured their independence and a government of their own. They may be overpowered and subdued for a while, but will not the insults and wrongs and tortures and devastation which they have suffered at our hands live to rankle in the bosoms of their posterity and call for a continued military force to keep them in subjection?

Now, before proceeding to ascertain what is to be the future course of the Republican party with reference to the Philippine Islands, as revealed by the two bills pending in the Senate and House for the government of said islands, let us see how the account stands to date.

But first let me advert to the proposition so often advanced by our friends upon the other side that the American people had

indorsed at the polls the policy of the party in power in the Philippine Islands. I deny it.

I deny that the Republican party ever went before the people upon any fixed and certain policy as to the government of the islands. Their cry was, Stand by the flag; uphold the Army; the country is prosperous; "let well enough alone," and trust to us to deal honorably and justly with the great questions involved in our foreign possessions—and the people, whose blood was still feverish from the excitement of war, took them at their word.

But the people of this country are a just, intelligent, and discriminating people; they are a patient and forbearing people, but when their conscience is once aroused they can not be trifled with.

They know a great deal more about these questions than they did two years ago.

The facts have been slowly but surely coming to light.

The books have been partly opened and we see more clearly the fearful condition to which our country has been brought.

It is true the reserve (I will not say concealment) that has obtained in Administration circles, and the censorship which has been permitted, has kept the light from a great many things that the people would like to know in regard to what has transpired in the Philippines; but we know enough to know that our whole course there has been an expensive and horrible one.

The Secretary of War recently stated in a communication to the Senate that it would be difficult to give in detail all of our expenses in the Philippine Islands up to the present time.

But it is not denied, I believe, from any source that these expenses have exceeded \$300,000,000.

And this does not take into account the amount we have paid, are now paying, and the enormous amount we will have to pay for generations yet in pensions to the dependents of those who have or may die from wounds or disease and to those who have and will contract some of the innumerable diseases to which the human race is subject.

I have no doubt it would be a safe prediction to say that 75 per cent of the Americans who are in the service of their country in that tropical climate will finally be placed upon the pension roll.

No one can estimate the untold millions that the American people will yet have to pay for this purpose.

Mr. Chairman, if the millions we have already spent in trying to subjugate the Philippine people had been kept at home and wisely expended what manifold blessings it would have brought to the American people.

We have seen gentlemen upon this floor antagonize certain items in the agricultural appropriation bill, where the question of only a few thousand dollars was involved, and which was intended to aid the great agricultural interests of the country. This great Department of the Government which is doing such a magnificent work for the farmers of the country is to receive niggardly aid at the hands of the American Congress, while millions are leaving the Treasury of the United States in our mad prosecution of a cruel and unrighteous war. We are asked to give only a few thousand dollars to the Agricultural Department to be expended under the direction of its Bureau of Public Road Inquiries for the purpose of making experiments in road building and of giving information and arousing public sentiment as to the great importance of a better system of public roads, and yet we spend millions to establish our reputation as a world power and to oppress a weak and sorrow-stricken people 10,000 miles from our capital.

But we are told that the Government ought not to go into the business of assisting our great rural communities in securing a better system of public roads.

Mr. Chairman, this Government since its foundation has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in improving rivers and harbors to increase our commerce and build up the great cities of the country.

They have given away millions of acres of the public lands of the United States to aid in the construction of the great railroads that traverse our Western territory in order to develop that great section and give to its people better transportation facilities.

We contend that if the Government can engage in such enterprises as I have mentioned, and a number of others that might be enumerated, it is just as legitimate and proper for the Government to extend its aid in perfecting a better system of public roads, so as to furnish our rural communities better transportation for the products of their farms.

Then, again, Mr. Chairman, under the system so wisely begun and so auspiciously being carried on of establishing rural free delivery for the carrying of mail to the home of every farmer and wage-earner in the United States, the roads of this country will eventually become a great network of postal routes over which the United States will have its mail carried to within convenient reach of every citizen of the land.

Now, for the lack of sufficient appropriations, this great and

beneficent service of rural free delivery has not progressed with the rapidity we had hoped for or that the rural communities had a right to expect.

I believe it is the greatest institution ever put into operation for the direct benefit of the agricultural and wage-earning classes of the country.

They can feel its benefits quickly and immediately, for it brings them into closer touch with the educational, industrial, and commercial interests of the country.

With its complete establishment, the people of all the land will become in easy communication with each other. Newspapers, magazines, and other educational agencies will daily find their way into the homes of the country boys and girls, upon whom in the future, as in the past, must largely rest the perpetuity of our free institutions.

Mr. Chairman, we want to see this great system expanded more rapidly. I have urged its establishment and rapid extension for my constituents with as much persistency as I could. I do not complain that I have not been able to do more, for I realize that the appropriation has not been sufficient to enable the authorities to press the work more vigorously. If we could have kept but a part of the hundreds of millions this Government has so recklessly expended in our inglorious war of conquest and oppression in the far-away islands of the sea, we could not only have more quickly given to that great army of rural producers and taxpayers better roads and mail facilities, but we would have been better engaged in preserving the honor and traditions of our country.

The Congress appropriates about \$5,000,000 for the Agricultural Department of the United States. As I have said before, this Department, presided over as it is by a wise and distinguished Secretary, is doing, through its various branches and agencies, an inestimable service to the American people in general and to the American farmer in particular.

I would not detract from any of our citizenship engaged in any of the avocations of life, but I say the agricultural interests of the country deserve the most generous and liberal treatment at the hands of Congress.

They are a patient, patriotic, and persevering people, and have always constituted largely the foundation upon which the greatness and prosperity of our Republic rests.

For the American farmer the policy of the Republican party results in the burning of the candle at both ends.

They not only take from him an enormous sum in the way of taxes for the purpose of increasing the Army and Navy and of carrying out their imperial policy in the Orient, but by reason of its unjust system of tariff taxation as it regards what the farmer has to buy we have reached the point where he is completely at the mercy of the great monopolies and trusts who a few years ago were demanding protection for their infant industries, but which have now become so overgrown that they are actually selling agricultural implements and other domestic articles manufactured here in America for from 25 to 75 per cent less in foreign countries than they are selling the same article here at home.

In other words, by reason of the injustice of our tax laws they are enabled to pay the freight and other charges upon these goods to foreign countries and then sell them much cheaper there than they do to our own people here in America.

Mr. Chairman, as an illustration of the great injustice which the protected monopolies are enabled to practice upon our own people by reason of the tariff system now in force, I herewith give a list of some of the agricultural implements and other articles manufactured in this country and showing the price at which they are sold in this country and the lesser price at which they are sold in foreign countries:

Articles.	Domes- tic price.	Foreign price.
Barbed wire, per 100 pounds.....	\$3.00	\$2.00
Wire nails, per 100 pounds.....	2.25	1.35
Plows.....	14.00	12.60
Horse nails, per pound.....	.17	.14
Axes, per dozen.....	8.25	7.20
Cultivators.....	11.00	8.40
Kettles.....	1.40	.85
Table knives, per gross.....	15.00	12.00
Rivets, per 100 pounds.....	10.00	5.55
Typewriters.....	100.00	60.00
Sewing machines:		
Fine.....	27.50	20.75
Medium.....	22.00	17.50
Cheap.....	18.00	12.00

I do not believe that the American people will much longer submit to a policy which gives the foreign purchaser such a great advantage over our own people in the purchase of such goods of American manufacture.

Mr. Chairman, we are told that under domestic conditions, as well as the policy of conquest and empire upon the seas, the American wage-worker in shop and mine and factory is contented

and happy, and yet who has not felt in the recent past the unrest and dissatisfaction that was permeating the wage-working classes of the country? Notwithstanding the efforts that have recently been made to alleviate the situation and adjust the differences between capital and labor, we see inaugurated in Pennsylvania, almost under the shadow of this Capitol, one of the greatest, if not the greatest, strikes in the history of the world. Does this show that labor is satisfied with present conditions? Not at all. If such an unfortunate condition of affairs can exist now, at a time when it is alleged there is unexampled prosperity, what may we expect when periods of depression come?

I believe the conflict between capital and labor is one of the greatest dangers that threatens our Republic, and it is most earnestly to be hoped that some way can be found to adjust these differences upon a basis alike honorable and just to all.

We have discussed the policy of the Administration in the Philippines, its conduct of the war, and the effect of such a policy upon the future of this country.

In addition to the many millions taken from the Treasury and spent in our efforts to subdue those people, we are continuing to spend something like seventy-five millions per annum in the further prosecution of those efforts, and where it will end no human being can tell.

We all know that partly by reason of the prosecution of this war the very bill now under consideration carries many millions more than similar bills did prior to the Spanish-American war.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there is one other feature of this question that I want to present to this House and the American people.

It is believed that upon the passage of the majority bill now pending that millions of capital will go from this country to the Philippine Islands for exploitation and investment in its lands, forests, and mines. As a nation we are yet in the morning of the development of the natural resources of our own great country, and that great section from which I come is in the very infancy of its industrial development.

No place in the world offers greater inducement for legitimate investment than that great district which I have the honor to represent upon this floor.

I assert here, without the fear of successful denial, that no similar area upon the face of the earth can present a greater field of varied and natural resources than southwestern Virginia.

Its mountains of coal, embracing the surface of almost entire counties, has scarcely been touched by the hand of industry.

Its iron, lead, marble, barytes, salt, plaster, zinc, and other deposits are there in almost inexhaustible quantities, all of which is yet in the beginning of its development.

Its timber consists of numerous varieties of hard woods, and is of the finest quality; its water power is unexcelled; its agricultural lands are fertile and abundantly productive; its grazing lands are unsurpassed, and produce cattle for export and home consumption that commands the highest price.

Its people are honest, industrious, conservative, law-abiding, hospitable, and patriotic, and would welcome those who would come there with capital and an honest purpose to assist in the development of the vast resources I have described.

But now you propose to pursue a course which will divert millions of American capital from the development of our own resources and for the benefit of our own people, to the exploitation of the lands of a wronged and helpless people on the other side of the earth.

Mr. Chairman, the measures of the Republican party for the government of the Philippine Islands, now pending in the Senate and House, are but another step in the onward march of empire and colonial possessions. They do not provide for any government, except a government of force and a perpetuation and increase in the executive, administrative, and judicial power of the Philippine Commission.

They do not disclose or even intimate what the future policy of the Republican party is to be with reference to the islands. They are framed for present emergencies and are almost entirely devoted to provisions for exploitation, greed, and plunder.

There are about 76,000,000 acres of land in the Philippine Islands and only about 5,000,000 are held by private title.

What a magnificent field for the American adventurer! We have spent years in preparation for this, the next inglorious step in the crushing of a people's hopes and aspirations.

Under our "benevolent" rule its men, women, and children have been starved, its people have been tortured, and the torch has swept its towns and villages from the face of the earth.

And now, after all this reign of terror, our Army is to be kept there to hold in subjection its remaining population while the greedy speculator seeks what else he may devour.

No one to molest him or make him afraid.

The American Republic with its Army stands behind him and in front of him while he roams over its great public domain and takes from the forests and mines their richest treasures.

Mr. Chairman, what a spectacle is presented to the world to-day! England is crushing liberty and independence in the South African Republics, in order that she may possess its lands and rob it of its riches, and we denying liberty and independence to a helpless people in order that we too may become a world power, rob the land of its riches, and take our place beside the despotic empires of the earth.

The people of this country have never yet declared for such a policy, nor do I believe they ever will.

No gentleman upon the other side will confess to the American people that he is in favor of ever permitting these islands to be admitted as States into the Union upon equality among the sisterhood of States. That may be the hidden purpose of some, but they dare not proclaim it.

You do not propose now or hereafter to give them their liberty, but your purpose is to hold these people as subjects, and to rule them with the sword of a tyrant in one hand and the decrees of a dictator in the other.

You will keep on sacrificing the lives of American soldiers and spending millions upon millions of American treasure until the people shall demand that you stop your career of annihilation and spoliation, until they shall demand that you shall give to these people their own government with that protection necessary for its peaceful and successful inauguration.

Then, Mr. Chairman, our soldiers can turn their faces homeward and the drain upon our Treasury can cease.

In this course there is honor and glory for the Republic; in any other there is humiliation and shame.

We can then say to all the earth that we began as a Republic and that we shall continue as a Republic.

We can say that wherever we are forced to go it will be to carry the blessings of liberty, not tyranny; it will be to teach people to love us, not to hate us; it will be to establish republics, not empires, and that no black star representing a colonial despotism shall ever stain the red, white, and blue of the American flag. [Loud applause.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. I yield thirty-seven minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MAYNARD].

Mr. MAYNARD. Mr. Chairman, in common with almost every member of this House, I am keenly interested in that phase of this bill which refers to the question of building battle ships and other war vessels in the Government navy-yards throughout the country. Representing, as I do, a district in which one of these yards is situated, it is but natural that the subject should have claimed a large share of my attention. Among the many important measures which have come before this Congress for consideration, none affect so vitally the majority of my constituents as does the measure now before us.

A country like the United States with unlimited seacoast to defend, with many of our largest and most prosperous cities to protect against the invading fleets of an enemy, with a growing commerce, and with ships that are carrying trade to every port, we must be in a position to defend them wherever attacked. All of these things demand that we shall be a great naval power. The burden and responsibility placed upon us by the late war but accentuates the necessity for an increase of our Navy, and the position which the United States occupies as a great naval power makes it absolutely incumbent upon us to be prepared to measure strength successfully on the seas with the strongest naval forces.

The reasons which appeal to us to increase the Navy must just as strongly appeal to our business judgment to convince us that we should keep the public yards of the country prepared not only to repair vessels but to construct in the shortest time and in the most economical manner the largest fighting craft for which a great naval power may have need in time of war. The policy of nearly all the naval powers of Europe is to increase the strength of their navy, and while they encourage and patronize the private dockyards, they at the same time demonstrate their belief that it is sound policy to keep in the highest efficiency the public dockyards by constructing a portion of the new ships in the Government yards.

I refer particularly to Great Britain, whose fighting machines plow the sea in every quarter of the globe, building, as she has, no less than 89 vessels in Government yards in the last twelve years, while Germany and France each built 60 per cent of their ships in government yards; and Russia proposes, when existing contracts are completed, to build all of her ships, and even little Japan is practically doing this to-day.

The reasons for building at least a portion of our ships in the navy-yards are many; but it seems to me that it will only be necessary to call the attention of this House to a few prominent facts to convince the most prejudiced mind of the fallacy of our present policy of fostering private yards at the expense of the public ones. Owning plants that represent capital invested to the extent of nearly a hundred million dollars, costing annually ten millions to

maintain, to do four millions of repair work, seems to me to be a business proposition so ridiculous as to need no other argument.

But, Mr. Chairman, the advocates of the private shipbuilding concerns tell this House that we should build our ships in private yards because we save money. Now, if this be true—but which I by no means admit, and, upon the contrary, most positively deny—it would be far better that we sell or even give away these naval stations to some private trust, with whom we may contract at their own price, getting back as much as possible of the money invested, pay the four millions annually for repair work, and save the ten millions that is required to maintain the public yards.

But let us examine some of the other reasons why it is good public policy to build all or a part of the vessels provided for in this bill in the public yards.

First. The Government owns its own plants, which represent an investment of a hundred million dollars. An equal investment in a private concern would have to pay interest, depreciation, taxes, insurance, and a large force of expert men, as well as a large office force; all of which the Government has without adding one cent to the cost of building the ship.

Second. To the actual cost of building a ship in the private yard is to be added whatever per cent of profit is satisfactory; I suppose not less than 10 per cent, and frequently very much more. While it may not have proved profitable in some instances, and the contracting parties may have sustained a loss, we all know that the business is conducted for a profit; all of which would be saved to the Government building in its own yards.

Third. As long as the yards are to be maintained and repair work done in them, we must have a trained force of men to properly and accurately make the repairs that may be necessary.

To keep this force of skilled men on hand, so that they may be available for such repair work as comes to the yard, the Department is trying to find employment for the men instead of hurrying the repairs and doing only such things as are necessary. The present tendency is to see what repairs can be done and what improvements can be made to the ships with the idea of providing work to keep a trained force together. With a ship building on the docks they can be used either on the ships or, when necessary, on repair work, thus always having on hand a large force that can be used for either purpose, and by doing away with the necessity of extending the work on the part of the Department, and the men will not be afraid of working themselves out of a job.

To keep the cost of repairs down to the lowest point the Government must have the most skilled men, but under the present policy we take the risk of driving those men away from employment in the Government yards because of the uncertainty of the length of their employment. With a certainty of a continuance of their employment the Government yards would command the most skilled and best trained men in the trades; and from this skill, in addition to the other strong reasons given, the cost of repair work in the yards would be very much reduced from what it is under present condition.

The chairman of the committee yesterday urged that one of the strongest reasons for building in private yards is that the Government works eight hours and the private yards nine and ten hours. That is not a good reason; the hours of work in Government employ was fixed by Congress, and now the gentlemen on the other side seek to use it as an argument to crack the head of labor. The mechanic working eight hours will do as much work as the man working ten hours, because the shorter hours better fits him for his work; he will certainly do better work for this and another reason; the best trained and most skillful men will seek employment where the hours are shorter and the pay is best.

It follows as a sure conclusion that the most skillful workman will produce the best job and in the shortest time. A better class of workmen means a better built ship, and a better built ship means a saving to the Government in maintenance and repair. The private yards do get ten hours' work a day out of the men, but the Government gets no advantage out of this fact. The extra two hours are the profit of the shipbuilding company, and it is this profit that is diverted by the present policy from the mechanic to the capitalist.

Admiral Bowles, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair in submitting the advantages of building new work in the Government yards, says: "The fourth advantage in carrying on new work in the Government yards is that it enables the Government to maintain a high standard of workmanship and design, by which contractors can be made to conform to what is necessary under their contract," and the Admiral adds that he considers this a great advantage.

I take it for granted that if the members of this House can be convinced that the work can be done in Government yards as cheaply, as expeditiously, and as efficiently as it can be done by private corporations that there will be practically no opposition to those provisions of the bill now under consideration providing for such work to be undertaken by Government labor. And this

is undoubtedly true. No one, it is thought, will attempt to deny that private shipbuilders have made large, even enormous, profits out of Government contracts.

If this were not so, they would not be so anxious to secure them, nor would they be so interested in the attempt to defeat any legislation which has for its object the taking of this work out of their hands. Certainly it is true that the U. S. S. *Monadnock* was built by the Government for less than her sister ship, the *Monterey*, was built for by an outside corporation. That the Mare Island Navy-Yard repaired the transport *Logan* for 35 per cent less than the contractors bid to do the work for is a matter of official record, and if such an enormous saving can be made in one instance, there is no good and sufficient reason why it can not be done in all.

It has been repeatedly asserted that when the present stone dock at Mare Island Navy-Yard was completed the Government gave the contract to construct the caisson to a private firm for \$78,000. A few years later a new caisson was needed, and the work of building it was given to the Government mechanics, who built it for so low a price that the chairman of the Naval Committee admitted in his argument yesterday that the Government saved \$13,000—thirteen thousand as admitted by the gentleman from Illinois or forty-one thousand as claimed by the much-abused cards. The fact, which is the only important thing sought to be shown, is clearly established that the Government, under its own officers, with its own men, saved money over the same work done by contract. The gentleman from Illinois has proved the contention of the card. Further comment is unnecessary.

Many of those who are opposed to the employment of Government labor on this class of work have cited the cases of the *Texas*, *Cincinnati*, *Raleigh*, and *Maine*, the cost of construction of which vessels they assert exceeded the sum for which they could have been built by the contractors. But it is a well-known fact that no contractors would undertake the work for the estimates made by the Government. The building of these ships was at that time an experiment, and the navy-yards were not then in a condition to do the work as economically as at present; and many things that were charged to these vessels should have been charged to the betterment of the yards, such as tools, slips, etc., which were not consumed in their building and are still in use at the two yards in which these vessels were built—so Chief Constructor Bowles testified in his hearing before the Naval Committee two years ago.

Their organization was poor; they had no trained foreman to direct the work, no skilled force of mechanics to execute it. The men had to be trained to a new style of shipbuilding. We were changing from a navy of wooden ships to a navy of ironclads. Even the officers of the Navy in charge were themselves inexperienced in building iron ships. From that time on the progress has been steady, and the mechanics now employed, or ready to be employed, in the Government yards are not to be excelled by any in the country.

The men are thoroughly capable and efficient, the method of supervision can not be improved upon, and the yards can at slight cost be fitted with every device needed or desirable in order to place them in thorough condition to build any vessel the Government may construct, even to the largest and costliest battle ship. It may be confidently asserted that to-day our Government yards are in a position to build our ships at no additional cost to the country and to the taxpayers than it would be to have them built for if the work was intrusted to private corporations.

A prominent member of this House, and a deep student of the subject, stated some time ago in a communication which has since been published that "we owe it to the taxpayers to build where it can be done at the least possible expense;" and, in stating the case thus, I am persuaded that he expressed the sentiments and wishes of nine-tenths of the voters throughout the country. Rear-Admiral Melville, the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering of the Navy Department, in a report made in 1892 stated in regard to the construction of the machinery of the *Raleigh* and *Cincinnati* as follows:

It is gratifying to the Bureau to be able to report in regard to the building of the machinery of these two vessels that, judging from the expenditures thus far, its cost when fully completed and erected on board the vessels will be considerably less than the original estimates on which the contractors refused to bid as being too low for the amount of work required, and this after making due allowance for the cost of repairing the machinery of the *Cincinnati* damaged by fire.

Such testimony from such a source is significant, and should not be forgotten.

Then, too, it is important to remember the testimony of another expert on this subject. I refer to the evidence of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy, recently expressed before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, who gave it as his opinion that, owing to the marked improvement effected during the last ten years in the administration of navy-yard affairs, the Government could secure better ships for less money by patronizing its own plants.

It has been estimated that the United States has up to the present time spent nearly \$100,000,000 in the equipment of its navy-yards, and practically the only use to which they are now put is to keep its vessels in repair. What an enormous investment and what a pitifully small return! As already stated, statistics show that it costs over \$10,000,000 annually to run our navy-yards to enable them to do about \$4,000,000 worth of repair work.

What a state of affairs! What business man of ordinary intelligence could permit such conditions to continue? It is a wanton waste of public money for which there is no excuse. It is well to remember that the cost of maintaining our navy-yards would be practically no greater if \$10,000,000 worth of new construction work, in addition to the repair work, were done than it is to have only a small amount of repair work done there. During the last ten years 4 ships only have been built at the navy-yards at a cost of \$7,200,000, while during the same period 139 ships have been constructed in private yards at a cost of over one hundred and thirty-one millions.

With a view to obtaining precise and reliable information as to what amount of expenditure would be necessary to put the Government yards in fit and proper condition to successfully build even the largest battle ships, I requested advices on the subject from the Navy Department, and quote herewith from their official reply:

While improvements are now in progress which will bring the Boston, League Island, and Puget Sound navy-yards to a state of efficiency, there are necessary certain preparations in the way of building slips, slip traveling cranes, railroad tracks, and power communications which must be made before even the important yards could build a battle ship. To be precise: The New York Navy-Yard would be in proper condition to build a battle ship or cruiser provided a simultaneous appropriation is made amounting to \$175,000 for preparation of the building slip with overhead traveling crane and power communications. At the Norfolk Navy-Yard it is possible to launch a battle ship or armored cruiser, and the yard is in proper condition to undertake the building of such vessels provided a simultaneous appropriation is made of \$225,000 for the building of a new slip, with overhead cranes and power communications. The preceding answer applies to the Mare Island Navy-Yard. At the Boston Navy-Yard the improvements now proceeding in the plant at that yard will bring it into proper condition to undertake the building of a battle ship or cruiser within about two years.

A further communication from the Navy Department is here given:

Referring to the Bureau's letter No. 575-A, 105 and 92 of this date, with regard to the Government navy-yards which are in a condition to undertake the building of a battle ship or armored cruiser, it is noted that particular mention of the navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H., was accidentally omitted, and it is desired to add that with an appropriation of \$175,000 for the preparation of the building slip, now available, with overhead traveling crane and power communications, the building of a battle ship or armored cruiser could be undertaken at that yard.

Thus it will be seen that the Government yards could, at comparatively slight expense, be put in position to undertake the building of war vessels; and it would only seem sound and reasonable business policy to do this, for reasons already stated, instead of having the country's ships constructed by outside parties, who are certainly in the business to make money. But, rather than utilize its own facilities, the governmental policy has heretofore been to keep her costly yards in comparative idleness and use them only for occasional repair work and pay exorbitant sums of money for the construction of new ships by those whose only desire in obtaining the contract is to make as much out of them as possible.

And right here, Mr. Chairman, let me say with the strongest emphasis that this is no attack upon the private shipyard. I for one believe that the private yard is an enterprise that should be fostered. I believe that they should have a share of the Government work. There is in the district which I have the honor to represent upon this floor one of the finest shipbuilding plants in the world; and I would not raise my voice to injure an enterprise in the success of which so many of my constituents are interested.

Foster the private yards, but not at the expense of the public ones. There should be work enough for all. The private yards of the country have now 60 vessels building; the Government yards are comparatively idle. In time of need we should be able to use either or both. Give these four provided for in this bill to the public yards.

Mr. Chairman, in the limited time allotted to me I can not enumerate a great many other reasons which I believe would appeal to this House, why the building of Government vessels in the public yards would be an advantage, both as to the construction of new work and at the same time facilitate and cheapen the cost of repair work which it is the present policy of the Government to have done in the public yards.

The necessity for the United States being a strong naval power and for the continued increase of the Navy is evident; and if this is to be done, we should certainly not any longer remain at the mercy of the private contractor, but should with the least possible delay equip the public yards of the country for doing new work under the most favorable conditions. We have shown that it is a sound policy pursued by all the naval powers of the world; that it cheapens construction and guarantees a better built ship; it provides a permanent force of trained and skilled men prepared at all times to quickly and cheaply do any class of work the navy-

yards may be called upon to perform; that it establishes a basis and a standard to which contractors can be made to conform in the execution of such work as may be undertaken by them.

And apart from the considerations already touched upon, which it is thought are amply sufficient in themselves to cause this desirable change to be made, apart from the enormous saving of public money which this policy would effect, it is submitted that even were the cost entailed by the Government constructing its own vessels the same or even greater than to have them built by private corporations still it would be undoubtedly advantageous to adopt the former method for the two-fold reason that this great country, with its continually expanding territory, should be in a position at any moment to turn out powerful fighting machines under its own auspices in case of war, and secondly, that the money spent in the Government yards goes directly into the pockets of the people and not to swell the dividends of the stockholders and capitalists.

Mr. Chairman, the building of battle ships in Government yards is good policy. The people demand it. Labor has petitioned for it. We represent the people, and are here to carry out their wishes. Let us give them what they want. [Loud applause.]

On motion of Mr. MEYER of Louisiana, the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the Chair, Mr. SHERMAN, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill (H. R. 14046) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, and for other purposes, and had come to no resolution thereon.

CUBAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE.

Mr. HITT. Mr. Speaker, I desire to submit a conference report. I ask to have the statement read in lieu of the report.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HITT], chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, calls up a conference report, requesting that the statement be read and that the reading of the report be omitted. Is there objection?

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I desire to ask the gentleman if this report is concurred in by the minority members of the committee?

Mr. HITT. This report is unanimous, and, more than that, it is that for which the House strove in conference.

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. Is it signed by the minority members?

Mr. HITT. All of them.

The SPEAKER. The Chair hears no objection to the request, and it is so ordered. The Clerk will read the statement.

The report of the conference committee is as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13996) making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service in the Republic of Cuba, having met, after full and free conference have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 2 and 3.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 1, and agree to the same.

ROBERT R. HITT,
HUGH A. DINSMORE,
ROBERT ADAMS, JR.,

Managers on the part of the House.

S. M. CULLOM,
JOHN T. MORGAN,
H. C. LODGE,

Managers on the part of the Senate.

The statement of the managers on the part of the House was read, as follows:

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13996) making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service in the Republic of Cuba, submit the following written statement in explanation of the accompanying report, namely:

On amendment No. 1, increasing the salary of the minister to Cuba from \$10,000 to \$12,000, as proposed by the Senate, the House recedes.

On amendment No. 2, providing for rent of a proper legation residence and offices not to exceed \$2,000, as proposed by the Senate, the Senate recedes.

On amendment No. 3, providing for a consul at Matanzas at \$2,500, as proposed by the Senate, the Senate recedes; so that the bill remains unchanged except in the increase of the salary of the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Cuba, which is made \$12,000 instead of \$10,000.

ROBERT R. HITT,
ROBT. ADAMS, JR.,

Managers on the part of the House.

The conference report was agreed to.

On motion of Mr. HITT, a motion to reconsider the last vote was laid on the table.

And then, on motion of Mr. DALZELL (at 4 o'clock and 50 minutes p. m.), the House adjourned.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, the following executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a copy of a communication from the Secretary of the Interior submitting an estimate of appropriation for survey of boundaries of

Colorado, New Mexico, and Oklahoma—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a communication from the General Superintendent of the Life-Saving Service, relating to mileage of certain officers—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, making recommendation as to settlement of a deficiency in the appropriation for the Sac and Fox Indian Agency in Iowa—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions of the following titles were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several Calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. McCLEARY, from the Committee on the Library, to which was referred the bill of the Senate (S. R. 12) authorizing the selection of a site and the erection of a pedestal for a bronze statue in Washington, D. C., in honor of the late Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2042); which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. PARKER, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 14351) to provide for a national military park commission, reported the same with amendments, accompanied by a report (No. 2043); which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, private bills and resolutions of the following titles were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the Committee of the Whole House, as follows:

Mr. HENRY C. SMITH, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 3423), reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 250) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Louis Scofield, jr., accompanied by a report (No. 2021); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. OTJEN, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 8006, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 251) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Mrs. Martha E. West, accompanied by a report (No. 2022); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. HENRY C. SMITH, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 5976, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 252) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of William E. Cummin, accompanied by a report (No. 2023); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. KEHOE, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 5489) for the relief of Howard Lodge, No. 13, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, of Gallatin, Tenn., reported the same with amendments, accompanied by a report (No. 2024); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. GIBSON, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 4866) for the relief of the estate of Dr. Thomas J. Coward, deceased, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2025); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. CALDWELL, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 1773, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 253) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of the heirs of James Goodloe, deceased, accompanied by a report (No. 2026); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 7438, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 254) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of R. H. Dunaway, accompanied by a report (No. 2027); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 11041, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 255) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Amos L. Griffith, accompanied by a report (No. 2028); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. SIMS, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 14070) for the relief of John A. Meroney, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2029); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. KEHOE, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the Senate (S. 92) for the relief of Howard Lodge, No. 13, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, of Gallatin, Tenn., reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2030); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. SIMS, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the resolution of the House (H. Res. 223) referring bills of the House Nos. 13965, 2517, 5493, 5491, 5502, 5507, 5508, 5484, 11143, 12747, 12748, 13603, and 13903 to the Court of Claims, reported the same with amendments, accompanied by a report (No. 2031); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. CALDWELL, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 7421, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 256) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of August Heberlein, accompanied by a report (No. 2032); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. THOMPSON, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 12446, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 257) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Mrs. A. E. Hardin, accompanied by a report (No. 2033); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. MAHON, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 14326) for the relief of Samuel B. Bootes, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2034); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 13518, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 258) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Julia A. Pierce and John Pierce, heirs of John C. Pierce, deceased, accompanied by a report (No. 2035); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 13521, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 259) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of the legal representatives of H. S. Thompson, deceased, accompanied by a report (No. 2036); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 11937, reported in lieu thereof a bill (H. R. 14412) for the relief of Margaret Dalton, widow of George Dalton, deceased, accompanied by a report (No. 2037); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. SIMS, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 11208) for the relief of the heirs and legal representatives of John W. Hancock, deceased, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2038); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. KEHOE, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 11272) to pay J. B. McRae \$99 for services as hospital steward, etc., reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2039); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. THOMPSON, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 10654) for the relief of Mount Zion Society, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2040); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 7355) authorizing the payment of the claim of M. A. Gantt & Son for board and lodging to volunteers during the Spanish-American war, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2041); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. GRAFF, from the Committee on Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 10961) for the relief of Judd O. Harzell, of Laharpe, Ill., reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2044); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXII, the Committee on Elections No. 1 was discharged from the consideration of the bill (H. R. 6175) for the relief of the estate of Samuel Lee, and the same was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. RAY of New York: A bill (H. R. 14410) to provide for the control and management of United States penitentiaries, and for other purposes—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14411) to regulate commutation for good conduct for United States prisoners—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CUSHMAN: A bill (H. R. 14413) to establish a Branch Soldiers' Home at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. HENRY C. SMITH: A joint resolution (H. J. Res. 190) concerning consolidation and duplication of scientific work carried on by the Government—to the Committee on Agriculture.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. MAHON, from the Committee on War Claims: A bill (H. R. 14412) for the relief of Margaret Dalton, widow of George Dalton, deceased, in lieu of the bill H. R. 11937—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. ALLEN of Maine: A bill (H. R. 14414) granting an increase of pension to Frederick F. Willey, alias William F. Willey—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. BOWERSOCK: A bill (H. R. 14415) granting a pension to William McClure—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CUSHMAN: A bill (H. R. 14416) granting an increase of pension to Albert H. Phillips—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. DOUGHERTY: A bill (H. R. 14417) granting a pension to Lewis D. David—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GRAFF: A bill (H. R. 14418) for the relief of Bernard Wagner—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. GRIFFITH: A bill (H. R. 14419) granting an increase of pension to Stephen A. Kennedy—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HASKINS: A bill (H. R. 14420) granting an increase of pension to Delia H. Honey—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. HENDERSON: A bill (H. R. 14421) granting an increase of pension to John Q. A. Rider—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HENRY of Connecticut: A bill (H. R. 14422) for the relief of Charles Uerkvitz—to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. LEWIS of Georgia: A bill (H. R. 14423) for the relief of the estate of Mrs. Tabitha W. Reese, deceased—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. MIERS of Indiana: A bill (H. R. 14424) granting an increase of pension to Edward Sherman—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14425) granting an increase of pension to Harvey Miller—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14426) granting a pension to Sarah J. Kinman—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SIMS: A bill (H. R. 14427) for the relief of the estate M. W. Savells, deceased—to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14428) for the relief of D. C. Savells—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. SMITH of Iowa: A bill (H. R. 14429) granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim of the widow, heirs, and personal representative of Thomas Page for Indian depredation—to the Committee on Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14430) for the relief of the personal representative of Jacob Bogert—to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. TOMPKINS of Ohio: A bill (H. R. 14431) correcting military record of Harvey Williams—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14432) granting an increase of pension to Elizabeth W. Eldridge—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14433) granting an increase of pension to J. M. Rife—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14434) granting an increase of pension to Israel Gaymen—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14435) granting an increase of pension to James Coyle—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14436) granting an increase of pension to Samuel C. Heastan—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14437) granting a pension to Henry M. Bostwick—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14438) correcting the military record of Carlos H. Cady—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. NEVILLE: A bill (H. R. 14439) granting an increase of pension to Franklin Peale—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. WADSWORTH: A bill (H. R. 14440) granting a pension to William L. Buck—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HENRY C. SMITH, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 250) in lieu of H. R. 3423, referring the claim of Louis Scofield, jr., to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. OTJEN, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 251) in lieu of H. R. 8006, referring the claim of Mrs. Martha E. West to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. HENRY C. SMITH, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 252) in lieu of H. R. 5976, referring the claim of William E. Cummin to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. CALDWELL, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 253) in lieu of H. R. 1773, referring the claim of the heirs of James Goodloe, deceased, to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

Also, from the Committee on War Claims, a resolution (H. Res. 254) in lieu of H. R. 7438, referring the claim of R. H. Dunaway to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

Also, from the Committee on War Claims, a resolution (H. Res. 255) in lieu of H. R. 11041, referring the claim of Amos L. Griffith to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

Also, from the Committee on War Claims, a resolution (H. Res. 256) in lieu of H. R. 7421, referring the claim of the estate of August Heberlein to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. THOMPSON, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 257) in lieu of H. R. 12445, referring the claim of Mrs. A. E. Hardin to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. MAHON, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 258) in lieu of H. R. 13518, referring the claim of Julia A. Pierce and John Pierce to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

Also, from the Committee on War Claims, a resolution (H. Res. 259) in lieu of H. R. 13521, referring the claim of the legal representatives of H. S. Thompson, deceased, to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, the following petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ALEXANDER: Resolutions of the Merchants' Exchange of Buffalo, N. Y., in favor of the Lodge consular bill—to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. ALLEN of Maine: Petition of George B. Merrill and 47 other citizens of Yarmouthville, Me., for repeal of the duties on beef, veal, mutton, and pork—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CALDERHEAD: Petition of the Kelley Milling Company, Kansas City, Mo., for the removal of the duty on breadstuffs—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CASSINGHAM: Papers to accompany House bill for the relief of Fletcher Duling—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. DARRAGH: Papers to accompany House bill 11254, to amend the military record of Andrew Martin—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. DAYTON: Petition of John A. Teter, of Pendleton County, W. Va., for reference of war claim to the Court of Claims—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. DOUGHERTY: Petition of Lewis D. David for restoration on the pension roll—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GRAHAM: Resolutions of J. L. Buzzell Post, No. 24, of Amandale, Department of Minnesota, Grand Army of the Republic, favoring House bill 3067, relating to pensions—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GRIFFITH: Petition of National Association of Manufacturers, in favor of a system of national irrigation—to the Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands.

Also, petition of James T. McDonald, of Krebs, Ind. T., in support of House bill 12268, relating to Indian Territory—to the Committee on the Territories.

Also, paper to accompany House bill granting a pension to Stephen A. Kennedy—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, petition of the Samuel Wymond Cooperage Company, in favor of House bills 178 and 179—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HANBURY: Additional papers to accompany House bill 9874, to reimburse William A. Brown & Co. for one case of opium erroneously condemned and sold by the United States—to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. HILL: Resolutions of the Grand Division of the Sons of Temperance of Connecticut, concerning post exchanges at military posts—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. HITT: Petition of the Personal Liberty League, of Rockford, Ill., in favor of House bills 178 and 179, reducing the tax on distilled spirits—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. JACK: Petition of Local Union No. 1384, of Punxsutawney, Pa., favoring an educational test for restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. JONES of Washington: Petition of W. L. Jones, favoring the passage of a bill authorizing the Secretary of War to use only American-built vessels in the transportation of Government supplies to the Philippines—to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. LINDSAY: Resolution of the drug trade section of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, allowing the payment of a drawback in cases where certain imported materials can not be positively identified, as shown in House bill 11308—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MANN: Petitions of the Board of Trade and citizens of Chicago, Ill., in support of House bill 3057, for the enactment of irrigation legislation—to the Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands.

Also, resolutions of National Encampment Service Men of the Spanish War, of Chicago, Ill., favoring the Bell bill, allowing travel pay to volunteers from Manila, P. I., to San Francisco, Cal.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petitions of St. Adolbert's Society and the Polish Roman Catholic Clergy Society, of Chicago, Ill., favoring the erection of a statue to the late Brigadier-General Count Pulaski at Washington—to the Committee on the Library.

By Mr. McCLELLAN: Resolution of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, in favor of House bill No. 11308—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MIERS of Indiana: Papers to accompany House bill granting an increase of pension to Harvey Miller—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. MOODY of Oregon: Resolutions of the Chamber of Commerce of Astoria, Oreg., urging the passage of House bill 163, to pension employees and dependents of Life-Saving Service—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HOLLIDAY: Resolutions of United Mine Workers' Union No. 198, of Seelyville, Ind., favoring the restriction of the immigration of cheap labor from the south and east of Europe—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. OTJEN: Resolution of common council of Milwaukee, Wis., against the beef trust—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RUPPERT: Resolutions of the drug trade section of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, favoring the enactment of House bill 11308—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. RYAN: Resolutions of Buffalo (N. Y.) Merchants' Exchange, approving the reorganization of the consular service—to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. SIMS: Resolutions of Forked Deer Lodge, No. 72, Jackson, Tenn., for more rigid restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. STARK: Papers to accompany House bill 14377, granting a pension to Josephine Stewart—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SULZER: Resolution of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, in favor of House bill 11308—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. WARNOCK: Petition of J. W. Hood, of Fayetteville, N. C., and others, favoring Senate bill 5002 and House bill 12940, designated as the inquiry commission bill—to the Committee on Labor.

SENATE.

THURSDAY, May 15, 1902.

Prayer by the Chaplain, Rev. W. H. MILBURN, D. D.

The Secretary proceeded to read the Journal of yesterday's proceedings, when, on request of Mr. GALLINGER, and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Journal will stand approved.

SAC AND FOX AGENCY, IOWA.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a communication from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a letter from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs submitting an item to be incorporated in the general deficiency appropriation bill for the payment of indebtedness incurred by the Indian agent of the Sac and Fox Agency, Iowa, amounting to \$2,143.05; which, with the accompanying paper, was referred to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE.

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. W. J. BROWNING, its Chief Clerk, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13996) making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service in the Republic of Cuba.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13895) making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, asks a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and had appointed Mr. WADSWORTH, Mr. HENRY of Connecticut, and Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi managers at the conference on the part of the House.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. HANSBROUGH presented a petition of Lodge No. 125, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Jamestown, N. Dak., and a petition of Local Division No. 178, Order of Railway Conductors, of Grand Forks, N. Dak., praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. CLAPP presented a petition of Flour Packers and Millers' Protective Union No. 7548, of Minneapolis, Minn., praying for the enactment of legislation providing an educational test for immigrants to this country; which was referred to the Committee on Immigration.

Mr. ELKINS presented petitions of Local Division No. 448, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Bluefield; of Lodge No. 236, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Benwood Junction; of Lodge No. 236, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Hinton; of Local Division No. 284, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Grafton; of Local Division No. 190, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Huntington, and of Colonel A. Howard Fleming Lodge, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Fairmont, all in the State of West Virginia, praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. BURTON presented a petition of the American Federation of Labor, of Pittsburg, Kans., praying for the enactment of legislation providing an educational test for immigrants to this country; which was referred to the Committee on Immigration.

He also presented petitions of Tip Top Lodge, No. 396, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Goodland; of Osawatimie Lodge, No. 65, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Osawatimie; of Walnut Valley Lodge, No. 354, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Arkansas City; of Carver Division, No. 28, Order of Railway Conductors, of Atchison; of Local Division No. 161, Order of Railway Conductors, of Parsons; of Herington Division, No. 261, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Herington; of Local Division No. 368, Order of Railway Conductors, of Argentine; of Cherokee Lodge, No. 370, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Parsons; of Lodge No. 96, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Dodge City; of Local Division No. 179, Order of Railway Conductors, of Topeka; of Local Division No. 137, Order of Railway Conductors, of Osawatimie; of Lodge No. 564, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Hoisington; of Local Division No. 81, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Kansas City, and of Kaw Valley Lodge, No. 313, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, all in the State of Kansas, praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. LODGE. I present a resolution adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, relative to the building of war vessels in the navy-yards of the country. I ask that the resolution be printed in the RECORD, and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

The resolution was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In the year 1902. Resolutions relative to the building of war vessels in navy-yards of the United States.

Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives from Massachusetts in the Congress of the United States are requested to use all reasonable efforts to secure the passage of the naval appropriation bill now pending in such form as shall authorize the construction by the United States Government in its own navy-yards of some of the war vessels to be built under the provisions of that bill.